Decatur AL004

supportedunresolved Granger says he sent spies toward Gadsden and Blountsville on October 12, used the gunboats to patrol the river, and on the afternoon of the 26th telegraphed that he did not think the attack yet serious. Doolittle says he did not expect Hood's army for a day or two and thought his cavalry officer had overestimated the enemy.

Attributed knowledge from interested reports; the telegrams and scout reports were not inspected.

disputedunresolved Both reports describe reinforcement by gunboat and rail during the siege. For the night of October 26 Granger says the gunboat Stone River arrived with 200 men of the 102d Ohio and 18th Michigan; Doolittle says it brought detachments of the same regiments 'numbering about 1,200 men'. The gunboats also engaged the Confederate river battery on the 28th.

The two reports of the same arrival differ (200 against about 1,200); neither is adopted. No transport or supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Granger says Decatur was an important objective to the Confederates and that their force left Palmetto with the avowed intention of taking it. Doolittle reports information that Beauregard and Hood intended to take Decatur and, failing that, to winter at Corinth. NPS says Hood demonstrated against Decatur in an attempt to cross the Tennessee River.

Stated or inferred Confederate aims come from the defenders' reports and a modern summary; no Confederate order was inspected.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Union victory (Confederate forces could not cross the river); the live result reads Union Victory. Granger says he found on the 29th that the Confederates were withdrawing and that this ended the siege; Doolittle says the 30th found the post quiet.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 605 (US 155; CS 450); the live field reads 355 (US 155; CS 200). Granger and Doolittle both give Union losses in killed, wounded and prisoners as 113. Granger estimates Confederate loss at 1,000 and quotes a Mobile paper's 1,500; Doolittle says 139 prisoners were taken and Hood 'was heard to admit a loss of 1,000 in killed and wounded'.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The reports' 113 differs from the frozen and live 155.

supportedunresolved Granger says Doolittle commanded until he arrived from Huntsville at about 5 p.m. on the 26th, 'just as the fight was closing', and that he then directed the sorties of the 28th; Doolittle says the general commanding assumed direction at dark and thanks him for the latitude given. The frozen description says Granger commanded 'for most of the battle'; the frozen commanders are Brigadier General Robert S. Granger (US) and General Hood (CS).

Direction is attributed as the reports state; Hood's personal direction is not described in the inspected passages. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text reads a garrison and other troops of approx. 5,000 against the Army of Tennessee; the live field reads 5,000 (US 5,000; CS 0). Granger gives his garrison as 1,500 effective men before reinforcement, 'not to exceed 1,800' with 300 gathered from the line, and 3,000 by nightfall of the 27th, and puts the Confederate force at not less than 35,000. Doolittle says he met Walthall's division, '5,000 strong', with less than 500 men on the first day, gives the garrison as about 2,500 on the 28th and a total of about 5,000 after reinforcements, 'never exceeded 5,000', and puts Hood's aggregate at about 40,000; his recapitulation reads 1,500, 2,500 and 5,000 for the first three days.

Garrison figures for different days and bases (effective, total after reinforcement); Confederate figures are the defenders' estimates of the whole army. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Granger says the country in front of the fortifications was an almost level, unobstructed plain for 800 yards, crossed by a ravine beyond which the ground rose to a dense wood, and that with 1,800 men he had to man a continuous front of 1,600 yards; the Confederates later occupied the ravine with rifle-pits and placed a battery on the river bank commanding the pontoon bridge.

The ground and the post's works predate the engagement; rifle-pits and batteries dug during it are not inherited. Narrative description; no map verification.