Spanish Fort AL005

supportedunresolved Gibson says his scouts reported two corps in his front, prisoners and captured maps informed his estimate, and he used devices to exaggerate his numbers; he had no means of estimating the enemy's strength exactly. Canby says the garrison's escape was aided by darkness and imperfect knowledge of the interior of the works.

Attributed knowledge from an interested defender and the besieging commander; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Canby says a new depot was set up at Starke's Landing five miles below the fort, that bad roads kept ammunition from being kept up so the fire of the batteries was reduced from April 5 to 7, and that fifty-three siege guns and thirty-seven field pieces were in position on the 8th. Gibson says his men had no unbroken rest in two weeks of fighting and digging.

Depot, ammunition and gun counts for the besiegers and a fatigue statement for the defenders; no supply return.

supportedunresolved Canby says the plan began with reducing the works on the east side of Mobile Bay and opening the Tensas and Alabama Rivers. Gibson says Maury's standing orders were not to hold Spanish Fort a moment after the garrison was in danger of capture.

Stated aims from the two commanders' reports.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Canby says the works were taken by midnight with more than 600 prisoners while most of the garrison escaped by the treadway; Gibson says the garrison was withdrawn in good order, some skirmishers being left behind. NPS says most of the garrison escaped to Mobile.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 1,401 (US 657; CS 744); the live field reads 1,398 (US 657; CS 741). Canby reports more than 600 prisoners; the Spanish Fort block of his comparative statement is garbled in OCR and ends with the figures 52, 575 and 30, whose columns are not verified. Gibson gives 73 killed, 350 wounded and about half a dozen missing before the evacuation and estimates about 20 killed (read 2U), 45 wounded and 250 captured that night; he estimates the Union loss at 2,500. Canby says partial captured records give 73 killed and 120 wounded for Blakely and Spanish Fort together.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved Canby says he ordered the bombardment for the evening of the 8th on A. J. Smith's suggestion, that Smith was told to put his whole force to the work after Geddes's brigade broke in, and that the work was led by Geddes under Carr and Smith. Gibson says he took immediate command of the defenses and decided to withdraw. The frozen commanders are Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson and Major General E. R. S. Canby; the live page gives Canby as Brigadier General.

Command roles from the two commanders' reports; no automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads XVI and XIII Corps and Spanish Fort Garrison; the live field reads zero. Canby gives the army assembled at Mobile Point and Dauphin Island in mid-March as 13,200 of the Thirteenth Corps, 16,000 of the Sixteenth and 3,000 engineers, artillery and cavalry, 32,200 in all, and names the brigade and three divisions engaged in the final operations. Gibson gives his garrison as Thomas's Alabama Reserves of about 950 muskets, Patton's artillery of 360 and his own brigade of 500 rifles, later relieved and reinforced, and his force as less than 2,000 men against two corps and a fleet with over seventy-five guns on land. His own estimate of the Union muskets is illegible in OCR.

A mid-March assembly figure for most of the army, a list of units in the final operations and a defender's garrison figures; no matched return. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Gibson says his line was about 3,600 yards long with three redoubts giving no mutual support, about 600 yards on the left had no works and dense forest, and the only way out was a treadway about eighteen inches wide and 1,200 yards long across the marsh to Battery Huger. Canby says the right of the investing line rested on Bay Minette.

Ground and works described by an interested defender and the besieging commander; no map verification.