Pea Ridge AR001
1862-03-06 to 1862-03-08 · AR · Pea Ridge Campaign [March 1862] · frozen result: Union · NPS summary (as listed)
On the night of March 6, Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn set out to outflank the Union position near Pea Ridge, dividing his army into two columns. Learning of Van Dorn's approach, the Federals marched north to meet his advance on March 7. This movement-compounded by the killing of two generals, Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch and Brig. Gen. James McQueen McIntosh, and the capture of their ranking colonel-halted the Rebel attack. Van Dorn led a second column to meet the Federals in the Elkhorn Tavern and Tanyard area. By nightfall, the Confederates controlled Elkhorn Tavern and Telegraph Road. The next day, Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, having regrouped and consolidated his army, counterattacked near the tavern and, by successfully employing his artillery, slowly forced the Rebels back. Running short of ammunition, Van Dorn abandoned the battlefield. The Union controlled Missouri for the next two years.
Command responsibility (ledger v2)
US: Samuel R. Curtis
Grade A under rule 2; echelon army.
A cited passage states the command. The side's first combat in the frozen interval was Sigel's rear-guard fight near Bentonville on March 6; Curtis had ordered Sigel to Sugar Creek, and on hearing Sigel was attacked 'immediately directed some of the troops to return to his relief'. Sigel led a detachment under Curtis (rule 2, second bullet); Curtis directed the change of front on the 7th and the counterattack on the 8th.
Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle AR001, belligerent US, fullname Samuel R. Curtis; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, having regrouped and consolidated his armyarnold-cwsac-battles, battle AR001; column description · snapshot
952b5d08402a…I immediately sent couriers to General Sigelor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I immediately directed some of the troops to return to his reliefor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…General Sigel deferred his march from Cooper’s farm till 2 o’clock i the morning of the 6thor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…Confederate: Earl Van Dorn
Grade A under rule 2; echelon army.
A cited passage states the command: Van Dorn went 'in person' to take command of the combined forces, and his advance skirmished with Sigel's rear guard on the 6th. McCulloch and McIntosh led the right wing under his direction until killed; that is subordinate context (rule 2, second bullet), not a change of the side's commander.
Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle AR001, belligerent Confederate, fullname Earl Van Dorn; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn set out to outflank the Union position near Pea Ridge, dividing his army into two columns.arnold-cwsac-battles, battle AR001; column description · snapshot
952b5d08402a…I resolved to go in person and take command of the combined forces of Price and McCullochor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…our advance skirmishing with his rear guardor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…During the whole of this engagement I was with the Missouri di vis- on, under Priceor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1 · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…Side strength (ledger v3)
US: grade A, 10,250 (9,740–20,500)
applicability_unresolvedbasis_mixedcompiled_dependencederivation_unknownwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| us-nps | A | 10,250 | reported_engaged | derivation_unknown | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| us-lv | A | 11,250 | reported_effective | Army of the Southwest, about [1] 11,250livermore-transcription-v2, p.79 (page image livermore-p79-image-v1) · snapshot 688ea7363f1b… | ||
| us-curtis-feb | C | 12,095 | unknown | engagement_link_unknown | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| us-curtis-10500 | bound | 10,500 | unknown | one_sided_boundpartial_scope | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| us-vd-20000 | C | 20,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| us-vd-range | C | 17,000–24,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Confederate: grade C, 16,000 (11,200–25,000)
applicability_unresolvedbasis_mixedwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs-nps | A | 14,000 | reported_engaged | derivation_unknown | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-lv | A | 14,000 | reported_effective | Van Dorn's command, about [2] 14,000livermore-transcription-v2, p.79 (page image livermore-p79-image-v1) · snapshot 688ea7363f1b… | ||
| cs-vd-16000 | C | 16,000 | unknown | engagement_link_unknown | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-vd-14000 | bound | 14,000 | reported_engaged | upper | one_sided_bound | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
| cs-curtis-range | C | 20,000–30,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-curtis-3040 | bound | 30,000 | unknown | lower | adversary_or_hearsay_estimateone_sided_bound | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision pea-ridge-review-correction-2026-09-25. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Curtis learned of the enemy's rapid approach from scouts and fugitive citizens about 2 p.m. on March 5, and on the morning of the 7th ascertained the flanking movement designed to attack his right and rear. Van Dorn says prisoners assured him he was not expected in that quarter, that his dispatch to McCulloch was never received, and that he learned only about 3 p.m. that McCulloch, McIntosh and Hebert had been killed. NPS says the Federals learned of Van Dorn's approach and marched north to meet him.
Reported knowledge in interested accounts and a summary; no message chain inspected.
About 2 o’clock p. m. scouts and fugitive citizens line in, informing me of the rapid approach of the enemyor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.197 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…morning this flank movement of the enemy, which I perceived was de- signed to attack my right flank and rear.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.199 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…we were assured that we were not expected in that quarteror8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…I sent him a dispatch to this effect, but it was never received by him.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…About 3 p. m. I received, by aides-de-camp, the information that Generals McCulloch and McIntosh and Colonel Hebert were killedor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…Learning of Van Dorn's approach, the Federals marched north to meet his advance on March 7.nps-ar001-v1, Description · snapshot
bced68c4e959…logistics
supportedunresolved Van Dorn says that on the night of the 7th his ammunition was almost exhausted, his ordnance officer could not find the wagons sent with the subsistence train to Bentonville, most troops had been without food since the morning of the 6th, and the artillery horses were beaten out; on the 8th his batteries retired one after another with every shot expended. Curtis says scarcity of forage made him spread his troops, and that on the evening of the 7th Asboth's battery ran out of ammunition and he could not find another cartridge. NPS says Van Dorn abandoned the field running short of ammunition.
Condition statements from interested reports and a summary; no ordnance or supply return inspected.
the ammunition was almost exhausted, and that the officer in charge of the ordnance sup- plies could not find his wagons, which, with the subsistence tram, had been sent to Bentonville.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…Most of the troops had been without any food since the morning of the 6th and the artillery horses were beaten out.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…the batteries were one after the other retiring Irom the field with every shot expendedor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The scarcity of forage and other supplies made it necessary tor me to spread out my troops over considerable countryor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…ran out of ammunition and fell back.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.201 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I could not find another cartridge to give them a final roundor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.201 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…Running short of ammunition, Van Dorn abandoned the battlefield.nps-ar001-v1, Description · snapshot
bced68c4e959…objectives
supportedunresolved Curtis says he chose Sugar Creek, in conformity with the orders of 'the general' of February 22 (not named in the passage), to make a stand against any odds, and on the 7th ordered a change of front and an attack from his new center before the enemy could form. NPS says Van Dorn set out on the night of the 6th to outflank the Union position in two columns; Van Dorn says he attempted to beat the enemy at Elkhorn and, on the 8th, resolved to withdraw.
Stated aims; not evaluated.
in conformitv with the orders of the general of the 22d ot February selected Sugar Creekor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…to make a stand against any and all odds.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…to open the battle by an attack from my new center on the probable center of the enemy before he could fully form.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.199 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…set out to outflank the Union position near Pea Ridge, dividing his army into two columns.nps-ar001-v1, Description · snapshot
bced68c4e959…I attempted first to beat the enemy at Elkhornor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.282 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…I resolved to withdraw the armyor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…outcome
disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results are Union victory. Curtis's March 9 report says the whole rebel force was routed and retired in great confusion 'but rather safely'. Van Dorn says he was not defeated but foiled, and that he inflicted a heavy blow and compelled the enemy to fall back into Missouri. NPS says Van Dorn abandoned the field; its closing sentence on Union control of Missouri is a campaign claim, not a tactical result.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.
completely routed the wholerebelforcj whfoh retired in great confusion, but rather safelyor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.192 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I was not defeated, but only foiled in my intent!or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.282 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…I have inflicted upon it a heavy blow and compelled him to fall back into Missouri.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.286 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The Union controlled Missouri for the next two years.nps-ar001-v1, Description · snapshot
bced68c4e959…disputedpost_outcome Frozen: 5,949 total (US 1,349; CS 4,600). Live: 3,384 total (US 1,384; CS 2,000). Curtis wrote on March 13 that his killed and wounded would exceed his estimate of 1,000, and put the March 6 rear-guard loss at some 25 killed and wounded; he says the enemy's loss was much greater but could never be reported. Van Dorn's March 18 letter gives his loss as not more than 800 or 1,000 killed and wounded and 200 to 300 prisoners, and the enemy's as about 800 killed and 1,000 or 1,200 wounded and about 300 prisoners; his March 27 report gives about 600 killed and wounded and 200 prisoners, and the enemy's total loss as about 2,000. The compiled Union return (not selected) is garbled in OCR.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen CS 4,600 is not found in the inspected passages; its basis is not established.
5,949 total (US 1,349; CS 4,600)arnold-cwsac-battles, battle AR001; column casualties_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…My loss of killed and ounded will exceed, my estimate of 1,000.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.195 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…our loss was some 25 killed and wounded.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.198 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…The loss of le enemy was much greater, but their scattered battalions can never irnisli a correct report of their killed and wounded.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.203 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…not being more than 800 or 1,000 killed wounded and between 200 and 300 prisoners.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.282 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The enemy’s loss was about 800 killed and 1,000 or 1,200 vnouior8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.282 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…our loss amounts to about 600 killed and wounded and 200 prisonersor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.285 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…making his total loss about 2,000.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.285 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…responsibility
supportedunresolved The frozen rows list Van Dorn (Major General) and Curtis (Brigadier General); the live page gives Curtis no rank and the NPS description styles him Major General. Curtis says he called his division commanders to Asboth's tent and directed the change of front, selected Osterhaus to lead the central column, and answered Carr's appeal with the order to 'persevere'; he says Sigel deferred his march from Cooper's farm until 2 a.m. on the 6th. Van Dorn says he was with Price's Missouri division throughout, had directed McCulloch to attack the Union left, and that the deaths of McCulloch and McIntosh and Hebert's capture left the right wing without a commander.
Command actions reported by the two commanders; subordinates (Sigel, Carr, Davis, Osterhaus, Price, McCulloch) are attributed actors, not rated. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.
Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle AR001, belligerent Confederate, fullname Earl Van Dorn; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle AR001, belligerent US, fullname Samuel R. Curtis; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, having regrouped and consolidated his armynps-ar001-v1, Description · snapshot
bced68c4e959…I therefore immediately called my commanders of divisions together at General Asboth’s tent, and directed a change of front to the rearor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.199 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I selected Colonel Osterhaus to lead this central columnor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.199 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I could then only reply by sending him the order to “ persevere.”or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.200 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…General Sigel deferred his march from Cooper’s farm till 2 o’clock i the morning of the 6thor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.197 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…During the whole of this engagement I was with the Missouri di vis- on, under Priceor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.285 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…had directed General McCulloch to attack with his forces the enemy’s I leftor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The death of McCulloch « McIntosh and the capture of Hebert left me without an officer to o mand the right wingor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.282 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.
disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the Army of the Southwest against the Army of the West without counts; the live field reads 24,250 (US 10,250; CS 14,000). Curtis reported 12,095 men and fifty guns on February 12, but says his force in Arkansas on March 7 was not more than 10,500 cavalry and infantry with forty-nine guns, after garrisons; a detachment of about 250 did not arrive until after the battle. He had heard the enemy put at 20,000 to 30,000 on March 6 and later estimated it at least 30,000 or 40,000. Van Dorn's March 9 telegram gives the enemy about 20,000; his March 27 report says his whole force was about 16,000, that he went into action with less than 14,000, and that the enemy was variously estimated at 17,000 to 24,000.
Returns on different dates, strength after detachments, and estimates of the other side. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.
Army of the Southwest [US]; Army of the West [CS]arnold-cwsac-battles, battle AR001; column forces_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…I reported my force to you on the 12th February, alter Colonel Davis division had joined me, at 12,095 men and fifty pieces of artilleryor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…My force m Ar kansas on the 7th ultimo was therefore not more than 10,500 cavalry ancor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…with forty -nine pieces of artilleryor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…with a piecM artillery and about 250 men, did not reach us till after the battle.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…The enemy is reported at from 20,000 3 30,000 fighting men.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.191 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…I estimated the >rce of the enemy to have been at least 30,000 or 40,000.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.197 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…F ought the enemy, about 20,000 strongor8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.281 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The whole force under my command was about 16,000or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.283 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…The force with which I went into action was less than 14,000 men.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.285 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…Chat of the enemy is variously estimated at from 17,000 to 24,000.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.285 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…terrain
supportedunresolved Curtis says he selected Sugar Creek as the strongest of several strong places, that his divisions felled trees to block roads (Dodge's obstructions delayed the flanking column some two hours) and threw up breastworks on the headlands on the 6th, and that his rear lay on the broken plateau of Pea Ridge with Cross Timber Hollow beyond. Van Dorn describes a strongly entrenched Union camp and, on the 8th, a new and strong Union position.
Works built on March 6, inside the frozen interval, and a position taken by the defender; interested reports, no map verification. Phase unresolved.
selected Sugar Creek as the strongest of several strong placesor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.196 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…This proved of great ad vantage, as it retarded the enemy some two hours in their flank move ment.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.198 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…Breastworks of considerable strength were erected by the troop* on the headlands of Sugar Creek as if by magicor8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.198 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…In my rear was a broken plateau called Pea Bidge, and still farther in my rear the deep valley of Big Sugar Creek, or Cross Timber.or8-curtis-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.198 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
5c6b210e757a…within 1 or 2 miles of the strongly- intrenched camp of the enemy.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.283 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…it revealed to me the enemy in a new and strong position, offering battle.or8-van-dorn-pea-ridge-selections-v1, p.284 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
bc17d50ecc31…Open questions
- Halleck's telegram (read, not selected), the division, brigade and regimental reports (Sigel, Osterhaus, Asboth, Davis, Carr, Dodge, Vandever and others; Pike, Price, Greer, Little and the Missouri State Guard), the compiled Union return in readable form, the Confederate returns, Britton's Pea Ridge chapters in volume I (located, not read under the ceiling) and maps remain deferred.
- NPS/CWSAC is one family (the NPS battle page plus the frozen Arnold rows). Each Official Records report author is a separate family; the OR volume is a shared container, not a witness. Report dates are not event times or proof of contemporary knowledge.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting.
- Families for this record: NPS/CWSAC; Curtis's March 6-14 dispatches and April 1, 1862 report (with Halleck's congratulation and Van Dorn's and Maury's letters printed with them); Van Dorn's March 9, 18 and 27, 1862 reports.