Santa Rosa Island FL001

supportedunresolved Brown says a first picket report of a landing was disbelieved and no alarm made until volleys were heard at the Zouave camp about 3.30. Anderson says Chalmers's column met a sentinel whose shot gave the alarm, after which the advance could not be concealed.

Knowledge and alarm from the two reports; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Anderson says the Neaffie had to be used as a tug and on re-embarkation a hawser fouled her propeller, delaying the withdrawal. Brown says the steamer McClellan, sent to fire on the landing place, was delayed and arrived after the enemy had left.

Water transport from the two reports; not returns.

disputedunresolved Anderson directed his columns to capture guards and sentinels quietly and get between Fort Pickens and the camp, with a party to damage the batteries, buildings and camps. NPS says the aim was to surprise the camps and capture Fort Pickens; Brown says the enemy did not get within 500 yards of the batteries he meant to spike. NPS says Anderson then adopted a defensive stance to entice the Federals to leave the fort and attack; Anderson says that with daylight, and no longer a possibility of surprising the batteries, he directed the signal for retiring.

Aims from the attacking commander's orders, a summary and the defender's inference; Anderson's report does not state an aim of capturing the fort, or a defensive stance to draw the garrison out.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Brown says the enemy were driven to their boats under fire and destroyed no quartermaster's or commissary stores; Anderson says the camp was destroyed with very great destruction of stores and the re-embarkation was successfully accomplished.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text and the live field read 154 (US 67; CS 87). Brown's three accounts differ: on October 9, regulars 5 killed, about 15 wounded and 8 missing and volunteers 7, 8 or 9 and 10; on October 11, regulars 4, 20 and 8 and volunteers 10, 9 and a figure read 'IG'; on October 17, 4 and 9 killed, 20 and 7 wounded, 10 and 11 missing. On October 9 he says he has about a dozen of the enemy's dead and some 30 prisoners; on October 11 he counts 14 enemy killed, 7 wounded and 27 prisoners in hand; he quotes a Pensacola paper's 21 killed, 38 wounded and 22 prisoners, and a Confederate paper's statement that 175 would more than cover the Confederate loss while 250 would probably barely cover the Union loss. Anderson reports 18 killed, 39 wounded and 30 prisoners, estimates the Union loss at 50 or 60 killed and 100 wounded, and took 20 prisoners.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Anderson's categories sum to 87, the CWSAC Confederate figure; that equality is not independent confirmation.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Brigadier General Richard H. Anderson and Colonel Harvey Brown; the live page gives Anderson as Major General. Brown sent Vogdes out with two companies and had Arnold man the ramparts, then ordered Arnold forward with two companies to support Vogdes and sent Wilson an order to advance and attack; Vogdes was captured before a shot was fired and Arnold succeeded to the command. Brown's October 12 letter says the volunteer regiment did not behave well. Anderson directed the columns and the withdrawal.

Command roles from the two reports; NPS's statement that Brown sallied is not adopted over Brown's own account, the live rank is not adopted, and there is no automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field gives the island garrison about 600 and the Confederate detachments about 1,200; the live field reads US 0 and CS 1,200. Brown estimated the landing force at 1,200 or 1,500 and says his officers' almost unanimous estimate was 1,500, later citing a Confederate acknowledgment of 1,500; he says less than 200 regulars and some 50 volunteers pursued five times their number. Anderson lists battalions of 350, 400 and 260 and an independent company of 53, with an artillery company not counted.

Anderson's battalion figures sum to 1,063 before the uncounted artillery company; the CWSAC 1,200 is not traced to a return, and no inspected passage gives the island garrison's strength. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live US zero is not measured absence.

supportedinherited Brown describes the island near the landing as about three-quarters of a mile wide, with sand ridges on the sea side and low swampy ground with sand hillocks and bushes on the harbor side. Anderson says a march of 3 or 4 miles was made toilsome by the ground.

Natural ground described by the two opposing commanders; no map verification.