Olustee FL005

supportedunresolved Seymour believed he had accurate information on the enemy's strength and thought Hardee might be at Lake City; Finegan's advance to meet him was predicated on information that the Union force had only three infantry regiments, and on February 13 he wrote that the enemy credited him with a much larger force than he had.

Contemporary beliefs stated by the two commanders; neither is verified. No original reconnaissance, order or message chain was inspected to establish contemporary knowledge. Surprise in a summary does not independently establish what each commander knew.

supportedunresolved Seymour wrote on February 17 that delays with the locomotive had kept him where his command could be fed and that he would advance without supplies; on February 22 he said Lake City could not be supplied by the railroad transportation at his command; after the battle he left six guns for loss of horses and some badly wounded for want of means to move them. Finegan halted the pursuit partly for the troops' fatigue and the absence of rations, asked for ammunition, and handed over his army deficient only in ordnance stores.

Statements in the two commanders' reports; no supply or ordnance returns inspected.

disputedunresolved Seymour advanced to take Lake City and, if successful, destroy the railroad at the Suwannee River, which he calls the general plan of operations; on February 22 he denied violating that plan. Finegan's object was to draw the enemy to his works and, once engaged, to press him. NPS gives Gillmore's aims as securing enclaves, severing supply routes and recruiting black soldiers.

Stated aims; Gillmore's own statement of the plan (and his later indorsement disputing Seymour's authority) was read but not selected.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Seymour says the troops withdrew in perfect order after a struggle that ended at dusk and that the battle might fairly have been a victory; Finegan says the Union lines gave way entirely after four and a half hours, calls the victory complete and the rout complete. NPS says Finegan did not exploit the retreat.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 2,806 total (US 1,860; CS 946), as does the live page. Seymour's return's total row reads in OCR 11 officers and 192 men killed, 44 and 1,110 wounded, 2 and 504 missing, 55 and 1,806 in all, aggregate 1,861 (followed by an unexplained '1,801 120'). Finegan reports his loss as 93 killed and 841 wounded, while the compiled Confederate table's grand total reads 946; he puts the Union loss at not less than 2,000 or 2,500, with 418 wounded removed, about 400 dead buried and nearly 200 prisoners. Seymour left six guns on the field (five on February 22); Finegan claims five captured.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Finegan's 93 killed and 841 wounded and the table's 946, and Seymour's 1,861 against the frozen 1,860, are preserved; the gun counts differ.

supportedunresolved Seymour directed the attack, blaming the failure on the Seventh New Hampshire's breaking and praising Barton's brigade and the artillery. Finegan ordered Colquitt forward, sent the whole command after him and went on the field; he withdrew the pursuit order on Colquitt's advice and says his cavalry commander failed to execute repeated pursuit orders. The frozen commanders are Brigadier Generals Truman Seymour (US) and Joseph Finegan (CS).

Command roles from interested reports; neither listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text reads Division (US) and District of East Florida (CS), with blank numerical bounds; the live page gives 5000 total (US 0; CS 5000) and describes Finegan's 5,000 Confederates. Seymour's March 25 report puts his own force near 5,500 officers and men and sixteen guns; on February 22 he wrote that the enemy was supposed, on the best information he could get, to be 4,000 to 5,000 strong, and on March 25 that the disparity in numbers was too great. Finegan's February 26 report gives his effective force as 4,600 infantry, less than 600 cavalry and three batteries of twelve guns, estimates the Union force at twelve infantry regiments, about 8,000, with 1,400 cavalry, and says he had waited for several days with a force less than 2,000 strong before reinforcements arrived; on February 13 he had about 1,800 infantry and 450 cavalry at Olustee.

Each commander's count of his own side is paired with a higher estimate of the other. The Confederate figures are for different dates (February 13 and the eve of battle). The live zero for the Union side is not measured absence. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

disputedunresolved Seymour says the ground was firm and even, covered with pine timber but without underbrush, and on February 22 that he came upon the enemy intrenched; NPS says the Confederates were entrenched near Olustee. Finegan says he had field-works thrown up at Ocean Pond, the only strong position between Lake City and Barber's, but, apprehending that the enemy would not approach them, sent Colquitt forward to engage and then advanced the whole command.

Whether the fighting took place at the Confederate works is disputed between the reports; no map verification.