Natural Bridge FL006

supportedunresolved Newton says a refugee from a blockading vessel had given the enemy two weeks' notice, which he learned only after the expedition and without which he would not have landed; he had expected small forces because refugees unanimously put the Confederates near Tallahassee and St. Marks at less than 600.

What each side knew is stated by the Union commander after the event. No original reconnaissance, order or message chain was inspected to establish contemporary knowledge. Surprise in a summary does not independently establish what each commander knew.

supportedunresolved Newton says the expedition returned because the navy could not co-operate, ammunition was nearly expended and his communications would soon have been cut; his artillery was drawn by hand the whole way, and without the navy at Port Leon he could not draw on the ammunition and provisions on shipboard.

One commander's explanation; no ordnance or supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Newton's plan was to march to Newport, cross the St. Marks, take St. Marks in rear or strike the railroad to Tallahassee, while the navy silenced the batteries and landed 500 to 600 seamen at Port Leon. His April letters describe it as a raid meant to occupy the enemy nearer home, deter attacks on the southern forts and divert forces from Steele's column. NPS says the aim was to engage and destroy the Confederates who had attacked Cedar Keys and Fort Myers.

Stated plan and later statements of purpose by one commander; the later framing is partly self-justifying.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. NPS says the Union troops, unable to take the bridge, retreated to the fleet. Newton reports the complete repulse of two Confederate charges, leaving him master of the field, and a withdrawal in order because the navy could not ascend the river.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Newton's claim to have held the field is his own.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 174 (US 148; CS 26); the live field reads 173 (US 148; CS 25). Newton's March 15 report gave 150 killed, wounded and missing; his March 19 report and casualty table give 148, of whom 35 missing (the table's total row is garbled in OCR). He gives no Confederate figure.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved Newton directed Major Lincoln's assault on the bridge, Colonel Townsend's attempt on the Confederate right and Pearsall's support, then decided to withdraw to the pine barrens; he blames the navy's failure, which he connects with the relief of its commander after he landed. He names Generals Jones and Miller as the Confederate commanders. The frozen commanders are Major General John Newton (US) and Major General Sam Jones (CS); Newton signs these reports as brigadier general, and the live page gives Samuel Jones without rank.

Command roles from the Union commander only; no listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen US force text names the 2nd and 99th U.S. Colored Infantry without a figure; the frozen CS text lists local units and 'reinforcements from Georgia amounting to approx. 1,000 men', with a frozen CS bound of 1,000. The live field reads zero. Newton's March 15 report gives his force as 900 to 1,000 men with two navy howitzers and a captured 12-pounder, and the enemy 'it is said' 1,500 to 2,000; his March 19 report gives 893 enlisted men and a prisoner's statement of 1,500 to 2,000. His April 6 letter says he had calculated that the enemy would concentrate only 600 to 700 local troops, that with men pressed for the occasion these were increased to about 1,000, and that he had only 500 men in line when over 1,000 veterans arrived from Georgia, and puts the Confederate total at over 2,000; his April 19 letter says the enemy was over 1,000 at first and was reinforced by 1,000, and that the enemy's available force when the expedition started did not exceed 700. His April 17 postscript lists the Confederate units named in a Tallahassee newspaper and adds that it omits over 1,000 Georgia reinforcements.

One commander's successive estimates, several secondhand, for different moments of the day. The frozen CS text appears to follow Newton's postscript list (its units occur in his list in the same order, his list adding cadets, the Second Florida Cavalry and Scott's battalion; Georgia reinforcements of about 1,000 against his 'over 1,000'); its basis is not stated in any inspected passage. Newton's April 6 letter also puts the local force at about 1,000 before the Georgia troops arrived; the frozen text ties its 1,000 to the Georgia reinforcements alone. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedunresolved Newton says the Confederates held intrenchments at the bridge with sloughs, ponds, marshes and thickets in front and on the flanks; Townsend's flanking attempt was stopped by a wide, deep slough; his own position was a low salient in the marshes under cross-fire, and he withdrew 300 yards to open pine barrens. He adds that the bridge could have been held by 200 resolute men and that the approach road proved over eight miles long rather than the four or five the guides promised.

Ground described by an interested commander; no map verification. The Confederate works were in place when the attack came.