Fort Pulaski GA001

supportedunresolved Gillmore says the positions of the five most advanced batteries were screened from the fort little by little, that subsequent inquiry showed the defenders knew the exact position of only two batteries, and that messengers passed between the fort and the interior over the marshes.

What the defenders knew is inferred afterward by the besieging commander; no Confederate report was inspected (the volume's report list includes Pemberton's and Lawton's reports, which were not inspected; no report by Olmstead is listed).

supportedunresolved Gillmore says ordnance was landed without a wharf on an exposed beach, that 250 men could hardly move a 13-inch mortar on a sling-cart, and that each battery had a service magazine for about two days' firing, with a depot magazine of 3,600 barrels. He dates the absolute blockade of the fort from February 22 but says it proved impossible to isolate it perfectly. Jones says that before the end of February the force in Lazaretto Creek, with the batteries on Venus Point and Bird Island, 'effectually isolated' Pulaski, and that the fort would necessarily have had to surrender through starvation once its provisions were consumed.

Besieger's labor and supply arrangements, and a historian's inference about the garrison's provisions; no garrison return or supply inventory inspected. Jones's 'effectually isolated' and Gillmore's statement that perfect isolation proved impossible (messengers passed over the marshes) differ; Jones follows Gillmore's report and is not independent of it.

supportedunresolved Gillmore reported in December 1861 that reduction by mortar and rifled-gun batteries on Tybee was practicable; the breach was ordered in the scarp so as to take the magazine in reverse; after the first day he concluded the fort would have to be reduced by breaching, perhaps ending in an assault.

Stated plan and intent in the besieger's reports.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Gillmore says that after a first day's fire had begun a breach, the fort hoisted the white flag at 2 o'clock on the 11th; Jones says the fort, with its armament and garrison, was surrendered at 2 P.M.; NPS says Olmstead surrendered after 2:00 pm on April 11.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 365 total (US 1; CS 364); the live field reads 2 total (US 1; CS 1). Gillmore reports one Union man killed and says several of the garrison were severely and one fatally wounded; his 385-man garrison count describes the surrendered garrison, not a casualty return.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen CS 364 and the live CS 1 differ by an unstated population (possibly captured garrison against battle casualties; neither basis is stated).

supportedunresolved Gillmore says he was charged, as engineer and commander of the forces, with the offensive operations on Tybee; Hunter assumed command of the department on March 31, inspected the works without change, and sent the summons on April 10. Jones says Gillmore was given the rank of brigadier general of volunteers and charged with reducing the fort, and that Hunter arrived in time to demand the surrender. The frozen commanders are Major General David Hunter and Captain Quincy A. Gillmore (US) and Colonel Charles H. Olmstead (CS); the live page lists Hunter and Olmstead only. No inspected passage by Olmstead describes his decisions.

Command roles from an interested report and a derivative history; no listed commander receives automatic sole credit. Gillmore's rank is recorded as Captain in the frozen row and as brigadier general in Jones.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the Port Royal Expeditionary Force's investment troops and the fort garrison; the live field reads zero. Gillmore's December 1, 1861 reconnaissance letter, reprinted in his 1865 report, estimated 'probably' 700 good troops in the fort. His 1865 report says the garrison was found at the surrender to consist of 385 men including a full complement of officers; Jones gives five companies of the First Georgia, aggregate strength 385, under Olmstead. For the Union side Gillmore names the Seventh Connecticut, the Forty-sixth New York, two companies of volunteer engineers, two companies of the Third Rhode Island Artillery and an engineer detachment, without numbers. Armament also differs: the fort contained 48 guns, 20 bearing on Tybee (Gillmore 1865), or mounted 46 with twenty of the heaviest bearing (Jones); the Union batteries held thirty-six pieces (Gillmore 1862, Jones) or '30 pieces' as the 1865 report reads in OCR.

A pre-siege estimate four months earlier, a surrender-time count and unit lists. Jones's 385 matches Gillmore's and is not independent. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence; the frozen bounds are blank. The '30 pieces' reading of the 1865 report conflicts with its own itemized battery table in the same section (Batteries Stanton through Totten list 3+3+3+3+1+3+2+4+6+4+4 = 36 pieces, a computation from the listed rows); the OCR figure is preserved but is probably a misreading, not an independent count.

supportedunresolved Gillmore describes the fort as a casemated brick work of five sides on Cockspur Island, wholly a marsh, and Tybee as mostly a mud marsh whose last mile, holding the seven most advanced batteries, lay low, marshy and in full view of the fort. His eleven batteries stood between 1,650 and 3,400 yards away; Jones gives an average of 1700 yards for the breaching batteries.

Ground and distances from an interested engineer report and a derivative history; no map inspected. The fort is prewar construction; the battery sites were chosen by the besiegers.