Davis' Cross Roads GA003

supportedunresolved Hindman says he halted on information from citizens and cavalry that a Federal division was at Davis' and another at Stevens' Gap, that the scouts sent toward Stevens' Gap returned without information after being detained at a cavalry outpost, and that from Lookout Mountain the enemy could count every regiment he marched. Cist says Negley learned from citizens that the Confederates were concentrated in strong force in Dug Gap and discovered they were advancing in superior force.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts on both sides; no message log beyond the quoted orders inspected.

supportedunresolved Hindman says Conley's spring was the last convenient water before Davis' and insufficient for the whole force, and that he had no engineer company or working tools to clear the gaps. Cist says Negley was in danger of losing his train and secured his position without the loss of a single wagon.

Supply statements from interested accounts on both sides; no return inspected.

supportedunresolved Hindman quotes Bragg's midnight order to attack and force his way through to La Fayette, with Cleburne to attack in front when his guns were heard, and says he construed it as meant to save his own command rather than capture the enemy. Cist says Bragg saw a chance to defeat the Union corps in detail, and that Negley decided to fall back to a strong position in front of Stevens's Gap.

Stated orders and the recipient's construction from interested accounts; Hindman's construction of the midnight order was written after his suspension. Not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads 'Union strategic victory'; the live field reads 'Union Victory (strategic)'. NPS says the Union divisions withdrew to Stevens Gap under constant pursuit and fire. Hindman says his pursuit was ineffectual and the enemy retired to Stevens' Gap. Cist credits Negley's energy and skill, with Baird's co-operation.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads zero. No inspected passage gives a count.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The live zeros are not measured absence.

disputedunresolved Hindman says the evening council was unanimous against advancing without more information, accepts accountability for one hour's delay on the 11th, and thinks the delays did not affect the result; he quotes Bragg's order suspending him for not obeying orders to attack. NPS says the Confederate officers met and decided they could not attack in their condition. Cist says Bragg and Cleburne waited nearly all day for Hindman's guns. The frozen commanders are Negley, Hindman and Breckinridge, all Major Generals; the live heading ranks Hindman Brigadier General. Cist says Breckinridge's division was kept south of La Fayette.

Hindman's October 25 report was written after Bragg's September 29 suspension order, and his October 22 transmittal asks leave to publish it against 'calumnies'; his account is interested self-defense, not a contemporaneous record. The cause of the failed attack is disputed between Bragg's order and Hindman's account; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads 'Two divisions [US]; unknown [CS]'; the live field reads zero. Hindman says his orders described the Union force at the foot of Stevens' Gap as thought to be 4,000 or 5,000 strong, and he speaks of putting a column of 15,000 troops in motion. He quotes Bragg's chief of staff estimating 12,000 or 15,000 Federals forming in front of Dug Gap. Cist says Bragg put 30,000 troops in position to crush Negley and Baird.

Order estimates, a column size and an interested history's total differ in scope; none is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Hindman says Dug and Catlett's Gaps of Pigeon Mountain were, and had been for several days, so heavily blockaded as to be impassable, that Pigeon Mountain hemmed his force in, and that the country was broken and densely wooded. Cist says Stevens's Gap was heavily obstructed with fallen timber and Dug Gap full of obstructions.

Hindman reports the Dug and Catlett's Gap blockade as information from citizens and cavalry, confirmed by his scouts, existing for several days before September 10. Cist has Hill report both gaps closed by felling timber and says Stevens's Gap was found obstructed, without naming who obstructed it. The obstructions predate or fall within the operations and their makers are not all identified, so no inherited tag is used. No map verification.