Chickamauga GA004

supportedunresolved Cist says Brannan's reconnaissance on the 19th revealed the armies' relative positions, until then unknown to both commanders, and that a staff officer reported a gap between Reynolds and Wood without knowing that Brannan's division was still in position. NPS says Rosecrans was informed of a gap and created one in moving units to fill it. Bragg says a reconnaissance during Polk's delay found the main road to Chattanooga open. Cist says Rosecrans had believed he was outnumbered two to one.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts and a summary; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Bragg says most of his troops had been two weeks without shelter on short rations in a drought, without cooking utensils, and that nearly half his army had arrived as reinforcements without a wagon or artillery horse, with nearly a third of the artillery horses on the field lost. Cist says some unauthorized person ordered Thomas's ammunition train back to Chattanooga, and that his troops took cartridges from the boxes of the slain.

Supply statements from interested accounts on both sides; no ordnance or subsistence return inspected.

supportedunresolved NPS says Bragg aimed to defeat part of Rosecrans's army and reoccupy Chattanooga. Bragg's circular of September 18 orders the right column to sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee and Gordon's Mills, and he says his reconnaissance found the road to Chattanooga open. Rosecrans's order to Wood, as quoted by Cist, was to close up on Reynolds; Cist says Rosecrans's plan was to keep his line closed on the left.

Stated plans from a summary, a quoted order and an interested history; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. NPS says Thomas's force held until after dark and then left the field. Bragg says that when night suspended the fighting the whole field was his. Cist calls it a victory only in name because Chattanooga remained in Union hands.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Cist's judgment concerns campaign contribution, not the tactical result.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty fields give 34,624 (US 16,170; CS 18,454). Cist gives Rosecrans's loss as 1,687 killed, 9,394 wounded and 5,255 missing, total 16,336, and Bragg's, in part estimated, as 20,950. Bragg wrote on September 29 that cavalry returns would swell his approximate aggregate to nearly if not quite 18,000, and later that two-fifths of his troops had fallen. He reported about 7,000 prisoners on September 24 and over 8,000 on December 28.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Bragg's inclosed approximate casualty return was not inspected. Bragg's prisoner figures are report-date cumulative claims; his December 28 narrative credits Wheeler's cavalry with captures on the 20th and 21st, so neither figure is confined to the September 18–20 interval.

disputedunresolved Bragg calls the reasons for Polk's delay on the 20th entirely unsatisfactory. Cist says that, by executing an order he knew could not be carried out literally rather than asking what it meant, Wood was 'to this extent' responsible for the disaster that swept the right wing from the field; says the order was written by an officer with no military experience before the war, argues Rosecrans should have gone to the front rather than to Chattanooga, and says Thomas was the only general officer above division command on the field on the 20th. NPS says Thomas took over command. The frozen commanders are Bragg (General), Longstreet (Lieutenant General), Rosecrans and Thomas (Major Generals); the live heading ranks Bragg Major General.

Judgments are attributed to interested accounts; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee without counts; the live field reads zero. Cist says Rosecrans had at most 55,000 effective men of all arms on the field, against a September 20 return of 67,548 present for duty equipped, and gives Bragg about 70,000 effective in line. In his December 28 narrative Bragg says that when it was ascertained on August 20 that Rosecrans had crossed the mountains, his effective infantry and artillery amounted to fully 70,000; that after the last of August, with two small divisions from Mississippi, his own effective force exclusive of cavalry was a little over 35,000; and that five small brigades of Longstreet's corps, about 5,000 effective infantry, arrived in time to participate, three on the 19th and two on the 20th. His inclosed field return of September 27, after the battle, totals 38,846 effective infantry and artillery.

Each side's history and commander assigns the larger number to the opponent; returns and estimates differ in date and scope. None is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Bragg says the Federals held selected positions strengthened by barricades, slight breastworks of timber and abatis, concealed in a dense forest. Cist says the Union troops threw up temporary breastworks of logs and rails during the night (the selected passage gives no date), and that Thomas placed Brannan's division on the crest of Horseshoe Ridge with artillery on the spurs. NPS names Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill.

Works built during the frozen interval and positions chosen on the field; no inherited tag is used. No map verification.