Dalton I GA006

supportedunresolved Thomas says reports about February 10 that Johnston had weakened his army by reinforcing Polk preceded the move, and that Palmer reported on the 22nd reliable information that Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions had gone; he says his divisions learned on the 25th that the enemy was much stronger than supposed and that the reinforcements had been ordered back, and Cleburne's division attacked the gap on the 26th. Johnston says the detached force was probably exaggerated to Thomas, and reported on the 25th that the enemy's forces and plans were not developed.

Knowledge attributed by each commander; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Thomas says his transportation was in very poor condition and, for want of horses, scarcely any of his artillery could be moved when he prepared to move in mid-February. Johnston says full forage could not be supplied at Dalton, so about half his cavalry and artillery had been sent far to the rear. Gladden's statement says the Confederates had plenty of ammunition.

Condition statements by the two commanders and a secondhand statement, not returns for the demonstration.

supportedunresolved Thomas says Grant directed a move to his front with the object of gaining possession of Dalton and as far south as possible; he withdrew counting the move a complete success because it caused reinforcements sent against Sherman's Meridian Expedition to be recalled. NPS says Thomas probed Johnston in the hope that the detachment made him vulnerable. Johnston judged that the enemy seemed to have converted his movement into a reconnaissance.

Stated aims and later judgments of the two commanders and a summary; the recall is campaign contribution, not this record's tactical result.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Johnston says his troops held the railroad gap and drove the enemy in the valley on the 25th, were successful at both places, and that the enemy retired in the night of the 26th; Thomas says he withdrew after judging the movement a success, his divisions falling back on the nights of the 25th and 26th and taking up their positions on the 27th. NPS says Thomas withdrew on the 27th.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The two commanders judge the demonstration differently; neither judgment is adopted.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads Unknown; the live field reads 429 (US 289; CS 140). The casualty table forwarded with Thomas's report gives 289 killed and wounded at Buzzard Roost on February 24 and 25 (no missing column). Gladden's statement gives Confederate losses at Buzzard Roost and east of Rocky Face as 50 to 60 killed and 150 wounded. No inspected source gives the live Confederate 140.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The live Union 289 matches the forwarded table, which covers two days and killed and wounded only; the Confederate figures are secondhand and differ from the live 140.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Major General George H. Thomas and General Joseph E. Johnston; the live page styles Johnston Lieutenant Colonel. Thomas's report has Palmer directing the advance on Tunnel Hill and Cruft's position, and Thomas himself deciding to withdraw. Johnston says Granbury's brigade was ordered to retake Dug Gap at sunrise, without naming who gave the order, and that this was done.

Command roles from the two commanders; the listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the two armies without bounds; the live field reads zero. Thomas says he opposed four divisions to the army at Dalton and became convinced it largely outnumbered them; John W. Gladden's statement, submitted by James Lamon and forwarded with Thomas's report, put the Confederate force at about 30,000. Johnston gives the effective total of his infantry and artillery on December 31, 1863 as 36,826 and his cavalry as 5,613, and says Hardee's infantry except Stevenson's division was ordered to Polk on February 17; NPS speaks of the loss of two divisions. Johnston says Clayton's brigade defeated double its number in Crow's Valley.

An army return seven weeks earlier, a detachment order, a secondhand estimate and the Union commander's judgment; no matched return for the demonstration. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Thomas describes Buzzard Roost as a pass through Rocky Face Ridge, very precipitous and a very strong position, and says the divisions sent east of the ridge found the enemy in heavy force and very strongly posted; a mounted regiment held a gap 6 miles south of Buzzard Roost until driven out on the 26th. Johnston describes skirmishing in the gap through which the railroad passes and in the valley east of the mountain (Mill Creek Gap and Crow's Valley), and the retaking of Dug Gap.

Ground described by the two commanders; no map verification. The positions were occupied during the operation, so the phase is left unresolved.