Rocky Face Ridge GA007

supportedunresolved Cox says McPherson at Resaca had no accurate knowledge of the topography or roads and could not tell how far Johnston had detached troops against him, and that the valleys west of Rocky Face covered the army's shift. Johnston says a report reached him on the afternoon of the 9th that Logan's and Dodge's corps were in Snake Creek Gap. Cox says Johnston was misled by scouts and country people about wagons burned on the 11th.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and report; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says the Union troops that moved by Snake Creek Gap carried ten days' rations, three cooked, with all baggage left near Ringgold and no tents even for general officers. Johnston says that during the winter about half of his cavalry and artillery horses had to be sent far to the rear for want of forage at Dalton.

Movement orders and a pre-campaign condition statement; no supply return inspected. Not a readiness measure.

supportedunresolved Cox says McPherson was ordered to pass Snake Creek Gap and place himself on the railroad in Johnston's rear, while Thomas and Schofield kept Johnston occupied; the orders were not to waste life in serious assault, but the skirmishing turned into something like a pitched battle. NPS gives the same demonstrate-and-turn plan.

Stated plans from an interested history and a summary; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result is a Union victory, glossed as forcing the Confederates off the ridge; the live page reads Union Victory. Johnston says five assaults on Hood's troops on the 9th were all repulsed and that his infantry and artillery marched for Resaca on the night of the 12th. Cox says the enemy had been compelled to evacuate the Dalton lines. NPS says Johnston retired toward Resaca on the 12th after discovering Sherman's movement.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The Confederate withdrawal followed the turning movement; tactical repulses on the ridge are recorded separately.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown, while the frozen result note says Union casualties were high; the live field reads 1437 (US 837; CS 600). Cox says losses for Dalton and Resaca cannot be given accurately because the reports covered a month, puts Union killed and wounded before Dalton at not more than six or eight hundred and calls Sherman's loss trifling; he gives about 150 on each side for the cavalry affair of the 9th and some scores on each side on the 11th. The inspected Johnston report gives no Rocky Face figure.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The cavalry figures are for separate affairs and are not added to the ridge fighting; 'high' and 'trifling' characterizations conflict.

supportedunresolved Johnston says Dug Gap was held by two Arkansas regiments and Grigsby's dismounted Kentucky brigade until Hardee arrived with Granbury's brigade and the attackers were put to flight; Cox says Hardee led the smaller Confederate force there in person. Cox says Sherman told McPherson he had lost a great opportunity by retiring from Resaca. The frozen commanders are General Joseph E. Johnston and Major General William T. Sherman; the live page gives General William Sherman and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Johnston.

Attributed judgments from interested accounts; McPherson and Hardee are not listed commanders; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields name the Military Division of the Mississippi and the Army of Tennessee without counts; the live field reads zero. Cox gives Sherman an effective force of nearly 100,000 men and 254 guns at the opening of the campaign (Cumberland 60,000, Tennessee 25,000, Ohio 14,000) and argues that Johnston's 44,000 effectives at Dalton on May 1 understate the number present; his Appendix A gives 52,990 officers and men present for duty on May 1 (the April 30 table totals 52,992). Johnston gives 40,900 effective infantry and artillery after Mercer's brigade arrived and about 4,000 effective cavalry, puts Sherman's army at the Missionary Ridge force (then 80,000) plus reinforcements and cites Wheeler's estimate of 15,000 Union cavalry. Johnston says Wheeler with 2,200 men defeated more than double that number of Union cavalry near Varnell's Station on the 12th.

Army-wide figures on different bases (Union effective force; Confederate effectives, which Cox says exclude officers and men not bearing arms; present for duty) and dates; none measures the troops engaged at the ridge and none is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox describes the crest attacked by Newton's division as so narrow that no deployment could be made, and the Dug Gap approach as ending at a perpendicular wall with only clefts leading up through it. Johnston says Rocky Face and Snake Creek Gap at its south end completely covered the Union movement to turn Dalton. NPS says Johnston had entrenched on the ridge and across Crow Valley.

Ground described by an interested history, an interested report and a summary; no map verification. The ridge and the Confederate works predated the engagement, but the works' timing is not established here, so no inherited tag is assigned.