Marietta [Operations] GA013

supportedunresolved Cox says the Union army first expected Johnston's next line to be the Chattahoochee, that the Confederate mountain positions overlooked every Union camp, and that Johnston correctly read the Union shift to the left.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says the Etowah railroad bridge was completed on June 11, that beef driven on the hoof kept rations adequate except bread, that supply trains struggled through mud, and that Sherman's difficulties at Kenesaw were almost wholly due to supply. Johnston says his non-battle losses were mainly slight sickness from heavy cold rains in late June, and that detachments sent against the railroad failed because they were too weak.

Supply and health statements from interested accounts; no supply return inspected. Not a readiness measure. Cox's beef-on-the-hoof passage describes the change of base to the railroad in early June, before the frozen June 9 start (context).

supportedunresolved Cox says Sherman chose to operate by his right flank to protect the railroad from Kingston, and that holding Johnston so he could not send aid to Lee was one motive for continuous operations. Johnston says fighting under cover was reducing Federal numerical superiority daily. NPS says Sherman's manoeuvres spared the Union army costly frontal attacks.

Stated aims from interested accounts and a summary; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Johnston says the army fell back on the night of July 2 because the Federal right was nearer Atlanta than the Confederate left; Cox says Johnston evacuated Kenesaw and the whole front that night. NPS says Sherman forced Johnston out of the Marietta area on July 2-3.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The aggregate result must not be combined with the GA014 and GA015 results.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads 0 (US 0; CS 0). Cox gives monthly figures only: Union killed, wounded and missing of 7,500 in June; Johnston's hospital returns of 4,000 killed and wounded for the month; and his own reconstruction of Confederate losses at 7,000 or more. Johnston gives about 10,000 killed and wounded and 4,700 other losses of infantry and artillery from May 5 to July 17.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. These are monthly or campaign totals that include Kolb's Farm, Kennesaw and days outside the frozen interval; they are context and must not be assigned to this record or added to GA014/GA015. The live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Johnston and Cox record Polk's death by a cannon shot on Pine Mountain on June 14; Cox says the shot came from one of Thomas's batteries. Cox says Harker seized ground on June 18 without waiting for orders. The frozen commanders are General Joseph E. Johnston and Major General William T. Sherman; the live page gives General William Sherman and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Johnston.

Attributed events and judgments from interested accounts; Polk and Harker are not listed commanders; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields name the two armies without counts; the live field reads zero. Cox says Blair's corps arrived on June 8 with about nine thousand men, almost exactly equal to Sherman's losses to that time, and that Georgia militia, a full division at least, were known to be in the field. His Appendix A lists 3,800 Georgia militia at Kenesaw on June 20 and 86,475 Confederates before the Chattahoochee crossing, and Johnston's July 10 return (aggregate present and absent 135,092, present 73,849, effectives 50,932). Johnston gives Smith's militia division an effective total of about 1,500 on July 1 and the force transferred to Hood as about 41,000 infantry and artillery and 10,000 cavalry.

Reinforcement, reconstructed and return figures on different dates and bases; the militia figures conflict (3,800 against about 1,500). Johnston's 41,000 and 10,000 is the force transferred at his relief on the night of July 17, after the frozen July 3 end (context). None is a count for the operation and none is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox says the country before the Union centre and left was rough, almost mountainous, that Johnston had prepared a new line behind Mud Creek in advance, and that Kenesaw Mountain was the key of the last Marietta line; drenching rains from June 4 made the roads nearly impassable. Johnston says the enemy approached under cover of successive lines of entrenchments. NPS says the Confederates held lines along Brushy, Pine and Lost Mountains.

Ground and weather from interested accounts and a summary; no map verification. Some Confederate lines were prepared before they were occupied, but no inherited tag is assigned without establishing their timing against the operation's start.