Kennesaw Mountain GA015

supportedunresolved Cox says Sherman thought Johnston's line must be very attenuated, and that once the heads of the columns developed the Confederates knew these alone needed attention and concentrated on them. NPS says Sherman was sure Johnston had stretched his line too thin.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and a summary; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says Sherman's difficulties were almost wholly due to supply, that the rains prevented lengthening the distance from depots, and that accumulating supplies for a move by the right was slow.

Retrospective explanation from an interested history; no supply return inspected. It concerns the decision context, not the assault itself.

supportedunresolved Cox says Sherman rejected Thomas's suggestion of regular approaches and determined on a serious effort to break the line, reasoning that a successful assault would be decisive; holding Johnston so he could not aid Lee was one motive for continuous operations. NPS describes a frontal attack with diversions on the flanks.

Stated reasoning from an interested history and a summary; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Johnston says the advance was everywhere repulsed with heavy loss. Cox says the one chance to break through was tried and lost; Sherman called Schofield's position beyond Olley's Creek the only advantage of the day. NPS says the fighting ended by noon with high Union casualties.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty texts read 4,000 (US 3,000; CS 1,000). Cox gives Sherman's loss as about twenty-five hundred, says about eight hundred fell at the head of each of the three assaults, and that Johnston admits over five hundred. Johnston reports Hardee's figures of 195 lost in Cheatham's division against 2,000 enemy and 11 in Cleburne's against 1,000, and Loring's 236 against Union estimates of 2,500 to 3,000.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Johnston's own-side components sum to 442 (a computation here, excluding other commands); the enemy figures are estimates, and Cox's 2,500 and the frozen 3,000 differ.

supportedunresolved Cox records Harker mortally wounded and Daniel McCook and Harmon fallen, judges the division and corps commanders wise in stopping, and says Sherman frankly admitted that the unfavourable chances had prevailed. Johnston says the assaults fell hardest on Cheatham's, Cleburne's, French's and Featherston's divisions; Cox says Logan's attack fell on the left of Loring's corps (French's and Walker's divisions). The frozen commanders are General Joseph E. Johnston and Major General William T. Sherman; the live page gives General William Sherman and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Johnston.

Attributed judgments from interested accounts; Johnston and Cox name different divisions of Loring's corps (Featherston's; Walker's), a minor unresolved discrepancy; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields name the two armies without counts; the live field reads zero. Cox says only three points were selected for assault, the middle attacked by two columns each with a two-company front; he names Newton's and Davis's divisions and Morgan L. Smith's division with Walcutt's brigade, and says Loring's corps held the mountain. Johnston calls it a general advance.

Formations, not counts; the scope of the attack is described differently. None is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox says Newton's columns were stopped at the entanglement of felled trees before the works, that Smith's division climbed a steep rocky slope choked with felled trees, and that Davis's men crossed rocky, rough and tangled ground. He cites French's report on how the mountain let the Confederates watch every Union movement. NPS says attacking an entrenched enemy was futile.

Ground described by an interested history and a summary; no map verification. The Kennesaw line was occupied on June 19 and prepared by Confederate engineers, but no inherited tag is assigned without a timing review.