Peachtree Creek GA016

supportedunresolved Cox says Thomas could not see Hood's lines through the forest, that misleading maps misled him and Sherman about the gap between the wings, that Johnston knew the country by occupation, and that Schofield and McPherson approached faster than Hood was aware. Hood says Union demonstrations on his right forced Cheatham to extend a division front, which delayed the attack.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts; no message log inspected.

unknownunresolved

No battle-specific supply, ammunition or transport return was inspected. Retrospective descriptions are not readiness measures.

supportedunresolved Hood says his object was to crush Thomas's army before it could fortify and then turn on Schofield and McPherson, attacking at 1 p.m. by divisions in echelon from the right. Cox says Hood and his subordinates meant a decisive engagement, and cites Johnston's statement that he had told Hood of his plan to attack at Peachtree Creek. NPS says Johnston had decided to attack Thomas before being relieved.

Stated plans from interested accounts and a summary; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Hood says Stewart's corps carried temporary works but had to abandon them, and that when the attack failed he withdrew the troops to their former positions. Cox says the attack was repulsed along the whole line. NPS says the Union troops held and the Confederates fell back.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty texts read 6,506 (US 1,710; CS 4,796). Cox gives the Army of the Cumberland's reported loss, except Palmer's corps, as 1,707; notes that Hood did not dispute Hooker's estimate of 4,400 Confederate killed and wounded in front of the Twentieth Corps; says Geary's parties buried 409 Confederates; puts the Confederate dead at not below 800 and total losses at about six thousand. Hood's report gives no figure for the day.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Cox's Confederate figures are estimates built on burial counts and an assumed ratio; Cox's 1,707 excludes Palmer's corps and differs from the frozen 1,710.

disputedunresolved Hood blames Hardee for the delay to nearly 4 p.m. and for failing to push the attack. Cox says Hood's later report sought to hold Hardee responsible and was neither quite just nor generous, that Ward's brigade commanders attacked without waiting for orders, and that Thomas in person placed Ward's batteries. The frozen commanders are General John Bell Hood and Major General George H. Thomas; the live page gives the same ranks.

Attributed judgments from interested accounts in dispute; Hardee is not a listed commander; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields name the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of Tennessee without counts; the live field reads zero. Hood gives the army's effective strength when he took command on July 18 as 33,750 infantry, 3,500 artillery and 10,000 cavalry, with 1,500 Georgia militia, a total of 48,750. Cox's Appendix A gives Johnston's July 10 return (present 73,849, effectives 50,932). Cox calls the Army of the Cumberland nearly fifty thousand men, says Hood's attack fell on Newton's division and Hooker's corps while Palmer's corps was almost unemployed, and gives Hardee's formation of four divisions with Cleburne's in reserve.

Army totals on different dates and bases (effective, present) and an approximate Union army size; none measures the troops engaged and none is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Hood calls Peachtree Creek a considerable obstacle to an army; Cox says its marshy banks and muddy channel made it no inconsiderable obstacle, that the ridges and ravines threw forward each Union division's right, and that Newton had covered his front with a hasty barricade of rails and timber. NPS places the creek about three miles north of Atlanta.

Ground described by interested accounts and a summary; no map verification. Union barricades were built that day and are not tagged inherited.