Utoy Creek GA019

supportedunresolved Cox says chopping heard through the night of the 5th showed the Confederate infantry had moved onto the hillside, and that Baird told Schofield he did not recognize his authority. Schofield says he was satisfied the line was only an outer line. Cox says a reconnaissance of the 12th found the Confederate lines farther forward than Sherman or Schofield had thought.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts; no message log inspected.

unknownunresolved

No battle-specific supply, ammunition or transport return was inspected. Retrospective descriptions are not readiness measures.

supportedunresolved Schofield says he attacked the outer line near its junction with the main line hoping to cut off the troops to its right and reach the main line first. Cox says Sherman believed his right must be near the railroad. NPS says Sherman wanted to reach the railroad between East Point and Atlanta.

Stated plans from interested accounts and a summary; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Inconclusive and the live page Indecisive. Schofield says Reilly's brigade retired with heavy loss and that the enemy abandoned the position that night for his main works; Cox says Hascall's crossing enfiladed Bate's line, which was abandoned in the night, and quotes Sherman calling the next day's advance a noisy but not a bloody battle. NPS says the Federals were repulsed and failed to break the railroad.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads 625 (US 400; CS 225). Cox gives Reilly's loss on the 6th as a little over three hundred, and Baird's loss in carrying the skirmish line on the 5th as 83 killed and wounded with 140 prisoners taken. Schofield's inspected passage gives no figure and says no movement of consequence was made during the 4th and 5th, without mentioning the skirmish-line action Cox places on the 5th.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Cox's figures are partial and span two days; the live figures have no inspected basis. Schofield and Cox differ on whether there was fighting of consequence on August 5.

supportedunresolved Cox says the dispute over Palmer's rank and Schofield's authority delayed movements, that Sherman called the delays unpardonable, that Schofield reported he had totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps, and that the delays encouraged Hood to entrench the Sandtown road line. Schofield says Reilly's brigade executed the order gallantly. The frozen commanders are General John Bell Hood and Major General John M. Schofield; the live page gives Major General John Schofield and General John Hood.

Attributed judgments from interested accounts (Cox commanded the assaulting division); Palmer and Baird are not listed commanders; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields name the Army of the Ohio and the Army of Tennessee without counts; the live field reads zero. Schofield says Reilly's brigade, supported by all of Cox's division, made the assault of the 6th against a line he judged an outer line not held in strong force. Cox says the works were strongly held by Bate's division (from prisoners) and that Hood had put part of Hardee's corps on the Sandtown road line. NPS adds the Fourteenth Corps.

Formation statements that conflict on the defenders' strength; no count is inspected and none is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Schofield says the position was a rough and broken ridge on the east bank of a branch of Utoy Creek, and that abatis and entanglements made success impossible. Cox says the brigade crossed an open valley and struck felled, interlaced trees. NPS says the delay let the Confederates strengthen their defences with abatis.

Ground from interested accounts and a summary; no map verification. The Confederate line was entrenched during the operation and is not tagged inherited.