Jonesborough GA022

disputedunresolved Hardee says Hood believed the Union army was retreating for want of supplies, attacked believing only two corps were present, and recalled Lee's corps while still believing Sherman's army was before Atlanta; he says Lee took Cleburne's skirmish fire for the signal. Cox tells of an old woman's report that fed Hood's belief and calls Hood's misjudgment inexplicable. NPS says Hood did not realize Sherman's army was there in force.

Attributed knowledge in a controversy between Hardee and Hood; no message log inspected beyond the order Hardee quotes.

supportedunresolved Hardee says he was encumbered by the army's subsistence and ordnance trains sent to Jonesborough. Cox says Sherman sent half the baggage to the rear with ten days' rations to last fifteen, that Howard pushed on to the Flint because there was no water at Renfro's, and that over eighty cars and six locomotives were destroyed at Atlanta.

Condition statements from interested accounts; no supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Hardee says Hood ordered him to attack and drive the enemy across Flint River, that his aim was to keep between the enemy and Macon, and that on September 1 he had to hold through the day to secure the evacuation of Atlanta. Cox says Sherman wanted only enough pressure to make the evacuation and the railroad junction secure. NPS says Sherman moved six of seven corps against the supply lines.

Stated aims from interested accounts and a summary; not a causal estimate.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Hardee reported the 31st as without decisive results, Lee having been badly repulsed; on September 1 he says the assault was repulsed except where Lewis's and Govan's brigades gave way, and that he retired four miles at night once the evacuation was secured. Cox says Govan and most of his brigade with two batteries were captured. NPS says Hood evacuated Atlanta that night and Sherman cut the supply line but failed to destroy Hardee's command. For August 31, Hardee's telegram says Cleburne, commanding his corps, carried the enemy's entrenchments on the left and held them, and his 1865 report says Cleburne carried the temporary works and part of his command crossed the Flint and captured 2 guns it could not bring back; Cox says Cleburne's corps took little part beyond preventing Kilpatrick from crossing the river.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The evacuation of Atlanta is campaign context, not the tactical result. Hardee's and Cox's accounts of Cleburne's part on August 31 conflict; neither is adopted.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty texts read 3,149 (US 1,149; CS 2,000). For September 1 Cox gives Union losses of 371 in Carlin's division, 330 in Este's brigade and about the same in Morgan's division, over 300 Confederate dead left on the field, 865 surrendered with Govan and nearly a thousand more captured next day; for the 31st he says over four hundred Confederate dead were left. Hardee reported a few prisoners and 8 guns lost and a loss not heavy in killed and wounded on September 1, and quotes Hood's 1,400 killed and wounded for the attack of the 31st, chiefly in Lee's corps. Hardee also quotes Hood's total of 5,247 for July 18 through Jonesborough and says his own corps alone lost considerably more than 7,000.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Hood's 5,247 and Hardee's 7,000 are period totals (context), not assigned to this record. Cox's components are partial and span two days.

disputedunresolved Hardee says he urged Hood to come and take command on the 31st, and that Atlanta fell from Hood's misconception of Sherman's plans, not from the battle. Cox says Cleburne commanded Hardee's corps, and that Stanley's delay kept the Fourth Corps from deploying before dark on September 1 despite Sherman's and Thomas's efforts. The frozen commanders are Lieutenant General William J. Hardee and Major General William T. Sherman; the live page gives General William Sherman and Lieutenant General William Hardee.

Attributed judgments in a Hardee-Hood controversy and an interested history; Hood, Lee, Cleburne and Stanley are not listed commanders; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force fields read Six corps [US] and two corps [CS] without counts; the live field reads zero. Hardee says two Union corps were in position on the 31st with a third in reserve and three more in support, that on September 1 six corps under Sherman attacked his single corps, which held in single rank the line of two corps, and that three of Lee's brigades arrived late on the 31st; he says Hood believed only two Union corps were at Jonesborough. Cox says the attackers on the 31st were mostly of Lee's corps.

Corps counts, not personnel; the Confederate force changed overnight when Lee's corps was recalled. None is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Hardee says the Union troops of the 31st were strongly entrenched with a flank on Flint River, and that his own position on September 1 was not strong naturally and had little time to be strengthened. Cox says Davis's attack was impeded by tangled, broken ground and that Hardee's right was sharply refused behind a small stream.

Ground from interested accounts; no map verification. Both sides' works were built during the action and are not tagged inherited.