Allatoona GA023

supportedunresolved Corse moved on a signal telegram relayed through Allatoona, and Sherman signalled from Kenesaw that Hood was moving on Allatoona. French says Hood's orders suggest the general-in-chief did not know the pass was fortified and garrisoned, that he could see the garrison's night signals to Kenesaw, that the garrison was reinforced that morning without his knowledge, and that he later received Armstrong's note, written at 9 a.m., that Union infantry was entering Big Shanty.

Attributed knowledge from interested reports; the signal and message chain was not inspected.

supportedunresolved Corse brought about 105,000 rounds of ammunition by rail and guarded a depot of over a million rations; his guns fell silent for want of ammunition until a volunteer brought canister from the east fort, and rain damage to the track kept his second train from returning until the morning of the 6th. French says his ammunition was nearly exhausted and could not be resupplied under two hours, that ammunition had to be carried by hand from wagons a mile away, and that his matches failed so the stores could not be burned. NPS says the Confederates began to run out of ammunition.

Ammunition and transport statements from interested reports; no ordnance return inspected.

supportedunresolved French quotes Hood's October 4 orders to move up the railroad and fill the deep cut at Allatoona, and a later order that it was 'of the greatest importance' to destroy the Etowah railroad bridge if possible. Corse was ordered by Sherman's signal to move with his whole command to Allatoona. NPS frames Hood's northward move as a threat to Sherman's supply line.

Stated aims from quoted orders in interested reports.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Corse says the attackers withdrew in disorder at 3.30 p.m., repulsed at every point; French says works after works were carried until the garrison was forced into its central redoubt, and that he withdrew because Sherman's infantry was closing behind him. NPS says the fort held.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. French's account of carrying the outer works and Corse's of repulse describe different phases.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 1,505 (US 706; CS 799); the live field reads 1,603 (US 706; CS 897). Corse's October 7 report gives his loss as about 600 and 150 Confederate dead buried and 400 prisoners; his October 27 report gives 231 dead buried, 411 prisoners and Young's estimate of 2,000 Confederate loss, and his loss table totals 706. French's preliminary report gives 798 and one staff officer; his November 5 report's text reads 709 while its table lists 122 killed, 443 wounded and 233 missing, and he claims 205 prisoners and 750 Union killed and wounded.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. French's text figure (OCR '709') and table components are preserved as printed; the compiler's note refers to further tables not legible in OCR.

supportedunresolved Corse says he inspected the ground with Tourtellotte and made the dispositions, ordered Tourtellotte to hold the east hill to the last, and was knocked insensible for thirty or forty minutes at about 1 p.m.; he credits Tourtellotte and Rowett. French says he decided to withdraw, sent word to Sears to withdraw, and blames the cavalry officer who failed to cut the railroad. The frozen commanders are Brigadier General Corse and Major General French; the live page gives French as Brigadier General.

Direction is attributed as the reports state; the live rank for French is not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text reads one brigade (1,944 men) against one division (approx. 2,000 men); the live field reads 3,944 (US 1,944; CS 2,000). Corse's October 7 report says he brought about 900 muskets and Tourtellotte had about 600, 'about 1,500'; his October 27 report lists the garrison at 890 men and his detachment at 1,054, 'an aggregate of 1,944', and puts Young's Texas brigade at 1,900. French's preliminary report says prisoners gave the Union force as over 2,000, 'about equal to my own'; his November 5 report says that, leaving out three regiments not in the assault, he had 'but a little over 2,000 men'.

Corse's two figures differ in basis (muskets brought against a regimental aggregate); French's figure excludes three regiments and the troops left at Allatoona Creek; Young's 1,900 is Corse's estimate of an attacking brigade. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; the live figures are not adopted.

supportedinherited French says the railroad crosses the ridge through a cut sixty-five feet deep, that he found three redoubts west of the cut and a star fort east of it with outer works, abatis and stockades, and that the hills were so rugged and abrupt the troops could not be placed until about 9 a.m. Corse withdrew his force from the town to the ridge on either side of the cut; NPS says the garrison regrouped in the earthen star fort.

The pass and its works predate the attack; the defenders' use of them is not tagged. Narrative descriptions; no map verification. The fort names do not agree: NPS says the garrison regrouped in the 'Star' fort, French puts a star fort east of the cut, and Corse and French place the final stand in the west fort or 'center redoubt on the west of the railroad'; the discrepancy is not resolved.