Middle Creek KY005

supportedunresolved Garfield says he initially supposed the enemy was on Abbott’s Creek and intended to cut off the retreat; he later sent 20 mounted men across the plain to draw fire and partly disclose the position.

A retrospective account of his own belief and reconnaissance action, not independent proof of what either commander knew or a precisely synchronized clock.

supportedunresolved Garfield says the arriving boat supplied only three days of hard bread for 1,500 men before his pursuit.

This is provision capacity for the advance, not a troop return or a readiness score. His later forage shortage and withdrawal are subsequent context.

supportedunresolved NPS attributes to Buell the instruction that Garfield force Marshall back into Virginia.

A secondary summary of the directive, not the inspected original order. Later regional control is not a second modeled outcome.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result code is Union and its prose says Union victory (indecisive); the live NPS result is Indecisive.

Preserve disagreement without rewriting the frozen label or treating either account as an adjudicated tactical effect.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen table records 92 casualties (US 27; CS 65). Garfield reports 2 killed and 25 wounded on January 11, but 1 killed and 20 wounded, two since dead, on January 14.

Same-author totals differ; later deaths must not be counted twice. Enemy casualty claims in the full report are unadjudicated, and no reliable reconciliation with the table is established.

supportedpost_outcome Garfield reports moving back to Paintsville on January 12–13 because provisions and transport limited his ability to sustain the forward position.

Later context beyond the frozen January 10 engagement. It does not erase the result code, create a second battle or quantify campaign contribution.

supportedunresolved Garfield says he declined pursuit at darkness because his men on different hills might fire on each other.

One attributed command decision; no automatic allocation of the whole outcome to Garfield or every listed commander, and no counterfactual effect estimate.

disputedunresolved Garfield’s January 11 report describes leaving with 1,100 men, receiving 700 reinforcements and opposing 2,500. His January 14 account instead says no more than 900 of his men were actually engaged and at least 3,500 enemies were present.

Separate departure, reinforcement and engagement populations; opposing-force estimates change across the same author’s reports. Neither report establishes matched opening strengths; do not sum them or choose a preferred estimate.

unknownunresolved

Pinned side-specific numerical strengths are blank. The selected reports distinguish moving and engaged forces but do not reconcile their own enemy estimates or establish a common opening population. No Confederate return was inspected.

disputedunresolved The live NPS page displays zero troops on both sides; its narrative describes more than 2,000 recruits by early January, only partly equipped.

Neither displayed zeros nor a recruiting estimate measures matched January 10 battlefield strength. Retain the inconsistency without replacing frozen missing values.

supportedunresolved Garfield describes a creek nearly waist-deep and a high rocky ridge to his front and left.

An attributed participant description at the fight; no measured terrain advantage, validated map or inherited/created classification.