Mill Springs KY006

supportedunresolved Thomas says cavalry pickets reported the advance to Manson, who formed his regiment, ordered support and informed Thomas in person.

A participant’s retrospective warning sequence. OCR prints the clock as G.30; no exact clock is normalized or used as a feature.

unknownunresolved

NPS describes local spies, a council decision and mistaken expectations that flooded Fishing Creek would prevent Union reinforcement. No original spy report, council record or Confederate correspondence was inspected to independently establish this knowledge state.

supportedunresolved Thomas reports units delayed in rear by nearly impassable roads, and later replacing the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana when they were nearly out of ammunition.

Keep pre-fight movement constraints distinct from ammunition expended during combat; neither is a numerical readiness score or proven inherited disadvantage.

supportedunresolved NPS says Thomas was ordered to drive the Confederates across the Cumberland and break up Crittenden’s army.

The original December 29 instruction cited by Thomas was not inspected. Preserve this as an attributed operational aim, not an additional scored success.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen record and live NPS page both classify Mill Springs as a Union victory.

Shared source family, not independent corroboration or causal attribution; preserve the January 19 frozen engagement boundary.

disputedpost_outcome The pinned table gives 671 casualties (US 232; CS 439); the live NPS page gives 791 (US 262; CS 529).

No reconciled return supports selecting between these versions. Thomas’s flattened OCR casualty table has not been decoded or used to settle this difference; his enemy losses are likewise unadjudicated.

supportedpost_outcome Thomas reports the Fourteenth Ohio and Tenth Kentucky joined after the repulse for pursuit, and that the enemy had left its entrenchments during the night when Union troops entered next morning.

Late pursuit units do not become opening participants. The January 20 occupation and captured property are subsequent context, not another frozen battle or independent campaign score.

supportedunresolved NPS attributes the Confederate attack decision to Crittenden. Thomas attributes the Union flank attack to the Ninth Ohio while the Second Minnesota maintained frontal fire.

Actions remain assigned to the named actors without automatic outcome credit. Thomas’s praise and causal language are interested testimony, not a validated commander effect.

disputedunresolved The frozen description lists a Union division and Schoepf’s brigade, four brigades in total, against two Confederate brigades. The live NPS table displays US zero and CS 5,000.

Formation labels do not supply comparable headcounts; the zero is not evidence of no Union troops, and the new Confederate number has no inspected return basis.

unknownunresolved

Frozen numerical bounds are blank. Thomas’s report distinguishes arrivals, camp guards, participants and late pursuit formations, but supplies no validated matched opening headcounts. No Confederate personnel return was inspected.

supportedunresolved The NPS Crittenden article says Zollicoffer camped north of the Cumberland and attributed failure to recross to flooding and insufficient crossing means.

Secondary interpretation of the constraint and Zollicoffer’s explanation; no original engineering report, river survey or precise crossing capacity was inspected.