Baton Rouge LA003

supportedunresolved Breckinridge says he was told on the march that the enemy numbered not less than 5,000, that the enemy expected the attack, and that he learned only late in the afternoon that the Arkansas had broken down within four miles of the town; Irwin says Van Dorn had estimated the Union force at about 5,000 and Breckinridge's division, including 1,000 under Ruggles who were to meet him at Camp Moore, at 6,000, and that Williams was expecting the attack. Breckinridge says rangers who leaked through in the darkness caused firing in which Helm was injured and two guns disabled.

Attributed knowledge from an interested report and a history; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Irwin says Breckinridge was promised ten days' rations but could get no more than half. Breckinridge says only the troops with their arms and ammunition could be carried by rail, the sickness was appalling, his men had found no water since the Comite, and he ordered the enemy's camps and stores destroyed for want of transportation. Irwin says both sides were enfeebled by malaria and exposure.

Supply and sickness statements from an interested report and a history; not returns.

supportedunresolved NPS says the Confederates wished to recapture the capital. Breckinridge says he undertook to capture the garrison if the Arkansas could clear the river or divert the gunboats, and that with no more than 1,000 exhausted men around him at ten o'clock he did not pursue further. Irwin reads Van Dorn's object as regaining control of the river to Baton Rouge, and says Williams posted his left against the expected attack of the Arkansas.

Stated aims from a summary, an interested report and a history.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Union victory and the live result Union Victory. Breckinridge says the enemy were completely routed at the last encampment and that he withdrew for want of water and support; Irwin says it became clear to both sides that the attack had failed; NPS says the Federals finally forced the attackers to retire.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The Union evacuation on August 20 is campaign context, not this record's outcome.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 849 total (US 371; CS 478), and the live field agrees. Breckinridge gives 467 Confederate casualties; a printed footnote says the tabular statement shows only 446. Irwin gives the Confederate loss as about 84 killed, 313 wounded and 56 missing (453) and the Union loss as 84 killed, 266 wounded and 33 missing (383).

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved Breckinridge organized his force in two divisions under Clark and Ruggles; Clark pressed the attack until wounded. Irwin says Williams was killed near the close while urging his men forward, and that Cahill was entitled to the command but Dudley seems to have commanded the troops engaged for the rest of the battle; NPS says Cahill ordered a retreat to a prepared line nearer the river. The frozen commanders are Major General John C. Breckinridge and Brigadier General Thomas Williams, as on the live page.

Command roles from an interested report, a history and a summary; who directed the Union line after Williams fell is described differently. The listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads 2nd Brigade, Department of the Gulf [US] and Breckinridge's Corps [CS]; the live field reads zero. Breckinridge says he left Vicksburg with somewhat less than 4,000 and found Ruggles already at Camp Moore in command of a small force; he says his own troops, having suffered from exposure at Vicksburg, numbered no more than 3,400 on the march, that the morning report of August 4 showed 3,000 effectives, and that he carried not more than 2,600 into action, besides some 200 partisan rangers and about the same number of militia under Hardee who could not arrive in time; he estimated the enemy at not less than 4,500 in action (reported beforehand as not less than 5,000) and eighteen guns to his eleven. Irwin says Breckinridge reported 3,600 effective on July 30 including Ruggles, puts the Confederates in action at about 2,600 plus 400 or 500 rangers and militia, and Williams at about 2,500 fighting men with eighteen guns; Williams's troops from Vicksburg had fallen from 3,200 to about 800 effective, and Weitzel said not 1,200 could have marched five miles.

Figures from an interested report and a history for different dates and bases. Breckinridge's 3,400 is stated for his own troops, and he does not say whether it includes Ruggles's small force at Camp Moore; Irwin attributes to him 3,600 on July 30 including Ruggles. The figures differ in stated scope and are not reconciled. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Irwin describes the bluff at Baton Rouge as lower and more gently sloped than above, six roads leading out of the town, an unfortified Union line on an open plain with its right on the gunboats, and a dense morning fog; he calls the advantage of position slight on either side. Breckinridge says the ground was commanded by three gunboats in the river.

Ground described by a history and an interested report; no map verification. The Union dispositions were Williams's, so the phase is left unresolved.