Fort DeRussy LA017

supportedunresolved Taylor's April 18 report says Walker lacked mounted means of gaining information from March 12 to 15, yet his estimate of the force in his front proved more correct than Taylor's own; on March 13 Taylor asked Walker for as correct an estimate as possible of the enemy's strength and direction. Irwin says Smith and Porter naturally supposed Banks's troops were marching up the Teche. NPS says Smith sent troops out on the 13th to learn whether any enemy was in their path.

Attributed knowledge from interested letters, a history and a summary; no reconnaissance reports inspected.

supportedunresolved Taylor wrote on March 14 that the fort held an ample supply of provisions and all the ammunition suited to its guns, and that labor on the works would continue to the last moment. Inclosure F, signed by his chief of artillery, lists the guns lost (among them two 9-inch Dahlgrens) as mounted and equipped with an average of over 100 rounds per gun and 60,000 Enfield cartridges. Irwin says A. J. Smith embarked at Vicksburg on nineteen river transports.

Pre-action supply statements and a post-loss ordnance list from the interested side; not a supply return for the attackers.

supportedunresolved Irwin says Smith and Porter determined to take or turn Fort De Russy and push on to Alexandria. Taylor wrote on March 13 that the place must be held if able to resist a coup, but that if it was not tenable the garrison should not be sacrificed, and on March 14 that having committed to its defense they must take the risk. Irwin says Walker concentrated on the Bayou De Glaize rather than be shut up at Marksville.

Stated aims from a history and interested letters written before the assault.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Union victory and the live result Union Victory. Irwin and NPS say the garrison surrendered to the assault; Taylor, from enemy accounts, says the fort surrendered after two hours' resistance.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. NPS's statement that the river to Alexandria was open is campaign context.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 317 total (US 48; CS 269), and the live field agrees. Irwin gives the attackers' loss as 3 killed and 35 wounded and the captures as 25 officers, 292 men and ten guns. Taylor, from enemy accounts, gives 4 killed and 30 wounded for the Union and 5 killed and 4 wounded for the garrison, and says the enemy claimed 200 prisoners; his inclosure lists the guns lost.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved NPS says A. J. Smith decided to use Mower's division, ordered the charge about 6:30 p.m., and Mower's men scaled the parapet; Irwin says Mower arrived before the fort and the brigades of Lynch and Shaw carried it. Taylor asked that Colonel Byrd keep courier communication open. The frozen commanders are Lieutenant Colonel William Byrd, Brigadier General A. J. Smith and Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower; the live page gives Andrew Smith as Major General and does not list Mower.

Command roles from a summary, a history and an interested letter; the listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads 3rd Division, XVI Army Corps [US] and Fort DeRussy Garrison (approx. 350 men) [CS], and the frozen CS bound is 350; the live force field reads zero, and the live description gives a garrison of 350. Irwin says Sherman's contingent was two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Mower with Kilby Smith's division, all under A. J. Smith, that Mower arrived before the fort, and that the brigades of Lynch and Shaw carried it; he puts A. J. Smith's force at about 9,000 for duty at the end of March. Taylor's 10 p.m. letter of March 13 reports Walker's news of a largely superior enemy force at Moreauville.

Unit identifications, a garrison figure without an inspected basis and a later campaign figure; the frozen US unit is one division while Irwin names two divisions under Mower. No count of the assaulting force. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved NPS describes an earthen fortification with a partly iron-plated battery designed to resist the fire of Union ironclads. Irwin says the fort lay twenty-eight miles from the landing by land and nearly seventy by the river, and that the navy broke through a raft nine miles below it. Taylor's April 18 report says the place was taken by a land attack before the gunboats appeared.

Ground and works described by a summary, a history and interested letters; no map verification. The works predate the action, but their state on March 14 is unestablished, so the phase is left unresolved. Taylor's March 13 letter to Douglas on the land approach (Sub-inclosure No. 1, pp.575-576) was read in the parent OCR but not selected, so it is not cited.