Hancock MD001

unknownunresolved

No original reconnaissance, surrender correspondence, engineering report or message chain was inspected to establish the commanders’ contemporary information. Allan’s inference about anticipated reinforcements is not an independently verified knowledge state. The targeted original-report follow-up was inaccessible.

supportedunresolved Allan describes wagons delayed by difficult roads during the approach, leaving troops without food and in some cases covering on the second night, followed by a renewed separation of wagons and troops in snow and sleet.

These are attributed conditions before the Hancock engagement, not quantified January 5 readiness, an invented morale score or a reviewed causal effect. All inherited/created classifications remain unresolved until replacement boundaries are established. OCR spelling is preserved in the quotation.

supportedunresolved The NPS summary describes Jackson’s initial objective as disrupting the B&O Railroad and C&O Canal.

A retrospective summary of the operation’s aim, not an inspected pre-march directive or a quantitative measure of campaign contribution. Later damage elsewhere does not become a second modeled Hancock success.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen battle row records Inconclusive; the live NPS page says Indecisive.

Preserve the nondecisive source labels without converting them to a win, half-win or validated tactical effect.

disputedpost_outcome The pinned table gives 25 total casualties; the live NPS table displays zero total and zero on each side.

The live display does not adjudicate the pinned number, and no checked return resolves this discrepancy. Neither count is a strength estimate, a readiness measure or a predictor.

supportedpost_outcome NPS says the Confederates withdrew toward Romney on January 7; Allan likewise places departure from the Hancock vicinity on the morning of the 7th.

This is later context beyond the frozen January 5–6 record. Do not merge the rest of the Romney expedition into this engagement, enlarge the frozen campaign membership, or add a second performance score.

supportedunresolved NPS attributes the surrender demand to Jackson and its refusal to Lander. Allan describes Lander as having just arrived and assumed command at Hancock.

These are source-attributed actions and a retrospective command sequence, not a verified transfer time or allocation of all outcome credit. The two families are not proven independent.

supportedunresolved Allan describes Jackson leaving Winchester on January 1 with some eight or nine thousand men, including multiple brigades, militia, batteries and cavalry.

An explicitly approximate retrospective expedition total. It does not count the opening Hancock population or the Union garrison. The later footnote listing formations found at Hancock after the engagement is not an opening return.

unknownunresolved

The frozen side-specific strength bounds are blank. Neither the NPS summary nor Allan’s expedition estimate establishes matched opening strengths, detachment membership or a common boundary for Hancock.

disputedunresolved The current NPS page displays zero troops on both sides and a January 1862 date field; the frozen row dates the engagement January 5–6.

Displayed zeros and the campaign-like month do not supply measured personnel or exact engagement timing. Preserve both sources without replacing missing strength with zero.

disputedunresolved NPS places Jackson opposite Hancock on January 5 and describes unsuccessful efforts to find a safe crossing. Allan places the main force opposite Hancock on the night of January 4 and describes an attempted bridge above the town.

The river separates positions, but the sources disagree about the arrival date. Retain the discrepancy without creating a common opening clock or silently changing the frozen interval. Allan’s bridge narrative is a retrospective assertion, not a verified engineering survey or contemporary knowledge record.