Lone Jack MO015

supportedunresolved Foster says his pickets reported the enemy advancing about daylight, that several scouts had reported but nothing came from Warren, and that he waited believing Warren within hearing of his guns. Britton says captured pickets gave Foster information on the enemy's strength and location, that Foster thought the reported strength exaggerated, that Warren took the wrong road, and that on the night of the 15th Union skirmishers mistook their own advance for the enemy and killed two of them.

Reported knowledge in an interested report and a participant history; no message chain inspected.

disputedunresolved Foster says his men and horses were worn out after forty-eight hours without food or rest before reaching Lexington, and that Cockrell told him the Confederates were completely out of ammunition. Britton says the march of the 15th was thirty-three miles on a very hot day, that the artillery horses were all killed, and that the Confederates were fairly well supplied with arms and ammunition captured at Independence.

The Confederate ammunition state is disputed (Cockrell's statement to Foster against Britton's inference); the two may refer to different times (supply on entering the fight against exhaustion at its end). No return inspected.

supportedunresolved Foster was ordered to march toward Lone Jack with 800 men and says that had his orders to Warren been obeyed the enemy would have been captured or destroyed. Britton says the Confederates were concentrating near Lone Jack with a view to marching on Lexington, and that Warren was directed to join Foster by the evening of the 15th or morning of the 16th.

Stated orders and aims; not evaluated.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results are Confederate victory. Foster says his 740 men 'whipped' the enemy before Coffee's return, after which Brawner fell back and the enemy took the field about an hour later; Britton says Brawner withdrew unmolested to Lexington, leaving the two guns. NPS says the Union left in good order and that the Confederates soon had to evacuate the area.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome Frozen: 270 total (US 160; CS 110). Live: 272 total (US 272; CS 0). Foster could give no casualty list. Britton cites an official statement of 2 officers and 51 men killed, 13 officers and 144 men wounded, and 1 officer and 43 men missing on the Union side, says the enemy acknowledged 118 killed per Brawner, that the Union had lost nearly a third in killed and wounded by eleven o'clock, and that the Confederate loss is not known; Jackman lost four of ten captains killed and three wounded.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Britton's components sum to 254 (a computation here), not matching any frozen or live figure. The live CS zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved The frozen rows list Cockrell, Thompson and Hays (Colonels) for the Confederates and Foster (Major) for the Union. Foster says no field officers were sent with him because of a jealousy over rank, that Lieutenant Develin was drunk and arrested, and that after he was shot Captain Brawner commanded and fell back, leaving the guns; he names Cockrell as commanding the Confederates. Britton says Cockrell commanded the forces engaged, lists the regiments of Tracy, Hunter, Hancock, Thompson, Hays, Bohannon and Jackman with Quantrill's band, and says Hays and Quantrill were to open the attack mounted.

Command roles reported by participants; Coffee and Warren, not listed commanders, affected the outcome by their movements. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field gives the Union 800 men in detachments from fourteen companies with a section of artillery, and the Confederates as unknown, with Union numeric bounds of 800 (minimum and maximum); the live field reads US 800 and CS 0. Foster says he was ordered to march with 800 men, found Coffee 1,600 strong on the 15th, had about 740 on the 16th after two parties were out, faced about 3,000 advancing, and saw Coffee return with about 1,500. Britton gives Foster's force as 806, Coffey's as at least 1,200 (and 1,200 on his return), the combined enemy as not less than 3,000 against 740, and cites Jackman's report that he entered the battle with 500 men.

An ordered strength, a morning remainder and Union estimates of the enemy; Britton's regimental extrapolation is his own. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live CS zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Foster says a thick hedge protected both flanks and partly the front, with a small deep stream behind whose crossing he held. Britton describes the camp in an open square hedged on three sides, accessible from corn fields east and west, and says the position was not well chosen for receiving an attack nor intended to be; the attackers met a rail fence about forty yards out.

Ground described by an interested report and a participant history; the camp was chosen the night before. Phase unresolved.