Marmiton River MO028

supportedunresolved NPS says McNeil, not knowing that many of the Confederates were unarmed, refrained from an all-out assault; Britton says the massed lines made an imposing appearance by their numbers.

Attributed perception from a summary and a history; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Britton says the Federal charge could only be made at a walk because the horses were worn out, the division's batteries fired 220 rounds that day, and the Confederates halted at the Marmiton to destroy the train and blow up the ammunition of the lost guns. Price says he destroyed many wagons with broken-down teams the next morning.

Horse condition, ammunition expended and destruction of transport; no supply return.

supportedunresolved Price says Fagan rallied part of his force and helped Shelby hold the enemy on the prairie in front of the unarmed men until nightfall. Britton says the train was sent on to the Marmiton under escort while the fight went on.

Stated aims from an interested report and a history. Price does not name the place; identifying his 'prairie beyond the river' line with Britton's Shiloh Creek stand is an interpretation, and part of his account may cover the Little Osage action.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. NPS says Price continued his retreat after about two hours and McNeil could not mount an effective pursuit; Britton says the Confederates moved off in rapid retreat at sundown; Price says he withdrew at nightfall.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown and the live field zero. No inspected passage gives a loss figure for this action.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved Britton says Pleasonton ordered McNeil to form the Second and Fourth Brigades and charge, Cole directed the artillery, and Fagan and Clark had rallied the routed divisions. The frozen commanders are Major General Sterling Price and Brigadier General John McNeil; NPS names McNeil as John S. McNeil.

Command roles from a history and an interested report; no automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force field reads Two brigades, provisional cavalry division and Army of Missouri; the live field reads zero. NPS says McNeil commanded two brigades and that the Confederate line included a sizable number of unarmed men. Britton says McNeil's Second and Benteen's Fourth Brigades met Price's whole army drawn up in quadruple line, with Shelby's division in front, and that Cole brought ten guns into action. Price says he formed the unarmed men, several thousand, in line of battle on the prairie.

Unit identifications and an unquantified count of unarmed men; no return. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence. Price does not name the place; identifying his 'prairie beyond the river' line with Britton's Shiloh Creek stand is an interpretation, and part of his account may cover the Little Osage action.

disputedunresolved NPS places the stand at the Marmiton ford, where the train had difficulty crossing. Britton places it on Shiloh Creek about six miles northeast of Fort Scott, after which the Confederates retreated to the Marmiton crossing ten miles east of Fort Scott; Price says the train had gone ten miles ahead to the Marmiton.

Location described differently by a summary, a history and an interested report; no map verification.