Iuka MS001
1862-09-19 to 1862-09-19 · MS · Iuka and Corinth Operations [September-October 1862] · frozen result: Union · NPS summary (as listed)
Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's Army of the West main column marched into Iuka, Mississippi, on September 14. Price's superior, Gen. Braxton Bragg, the commander of the Confederate Army of the Mississippi, who was leading an offensive deep into Kentucky, ordered him to prevent Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Mississippi troops from moving into Middle Tennessee and reinforcing Brig. Gen. James Negley's division of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio, which was garrisoning Nashville. Price had about 14,000 men, and he was informed that, if necessary, he could request assistance from Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, commanding the District of the Mississippi, headquartered at Holly Springs. Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, feared that Price intended to go north to join Bragg against Buell. Grant devised a plan for his left wing commander, Maj. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, and his men to advance on Iuka from the west; Rosecrans's forces were to march from the southwest, arrive at Iuka on the 18th, and make a coordinated attack the next day. Ord arrived on time and skirmishing ensued between his reconnaissance patrol and Confederate pickets, about six miles from Iuka, before nightfall. Rosecrans informed Grant that he would not arrive at Iuka on the 18th but would begin his march at 4:30 am, the next morning. On the 19th, Ord sent Price a message demanding that he surrender, but Price refused. At the same time, Price received dispatches from Van Dorn suggesting that their two armies rendezvous, as soon as possible, at Rienzi for attacks on the Federal forces in the area. Price informed Van Dorn that the military situation had changed so he could not evacuate Iuka immediately. He did, however, issue orders for his men to prepare for a march the next day, to rendezvous with Van Dorn. Rosecrans's army marched early on the 19th, but, instead of using two roads as directed, it followed the Jacinto (Bay Springs) Road. After considering the amount of time that Rosecrans required to reach Iuka, Grant determined that he probably would not arrive on the 19th, so he ordered Ord to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates. As Rosecrans advanced, his men fought actions with Confederate troops at points along the way. About 4:00 pm, just after ascending a hill, the Union column halted because the Confederates were well-placed below in a ravine, filled with timber and underbrush. The Confederates launched attacks up the hill, capturing a six-gun Ohio battery, while the Federals counterattacked from the ridge. Fighting, which Price later stated he had "never seen surpassed," continued until after dark; the Union troops camped for the night behind the ridge. Price had redeployed troops from Ord's front to fight against Rosecrans's people. Ord did nothing, later proclaiming that he never heard any fighting and, therefore, never engaged the enemy; Grant also remarked that he had heard no sounds of battle. Following the fighting on the 19th, Price determined to reengage the enemy the next day, but his subordinates convinced him, instead, to march to join Van Dorn, as earlier planned. At the same time, Rosecrans redeployed his men for fighting the next day. Price's army evacuated via the uncovered Fulton Road, protected its rear with a heavy rearguard and hooked up with Van Dorn five days later at Ripley. Although Rosecrans was supposed to traverse Fulton Road and cover it, he stated that he had not guarded the road because he feared dividing his force; Grant later approved this decision. Rosecrans's army occupied Iuka and then mounted a pursuit; the Confederate rearguard and overgrown terrain prevented the Union pursuit from accomplishing much. The Federals should have destroyed or captured Price's army, but instead the Rebels joined Van Dorn and assaulted Corinth in October.
Command responsibility (ledger v2)
US: William S. Rosecrans
Grade A under rule 2; echelon army. superior_directing
The description names Rosecrans's army; NPS shows Grant ordering Ord to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price (superior_directing: Grant).
Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle MS001, belligerent US, fullname William S. Rosecrans; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Mississippiarnold-cwsac-battles, battle MS001; column description · snapshot
952b5d08402a…he ordered Ord to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates.nps-ms001-v1 · snapshot
578f14581abd…Confederate: Sterling Price
Grade A under rule 2; echelon army.
A cited passage states the command.
Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle MS001, belligerent Confederate, fullname Sterling Price; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's Army of the West main column marched into Iukaarnold-cwsac-battles, battle MS001; column description · snapshot
952b5d08402a…Side strength (ledger v3)
US: grade A, 4,250 (4,040–9,450)
applicability_unresolvedcompiled_dependencederivation_unknownwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| us-cw | A | 4,000–4,500 | reported_engaged | derivation_unknown | 4,000-4,500arnold-cwsac-forces, battle MS001, belligerent US; column description · snapshot a462f6be964b… | |
| us-greene-column | C | 9,000 | unknown | scope_unresolved | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| us-hamilton | bound | 2,800 | reported_engaged | lower | partial_scope | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Confederate: grade A, 3,200 (3,040–14,700)
applicability_unresolvedbound_conflictcompiled_dependencederivation_unknownwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs-cw | A | 3,200 | reported_engaged | derivation_unknown | 3,200arnold-cwsac-forces, battle MS001, belligerent Confederate; column description · snapshot a462f6be964b… | |
| cs-greene | bound | 3,000–4,000 | reported_engaged | lower | partial_scope | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
| cs-nps-price | C | 14,000 | unknown | scope_unresolved | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision iuka-corinth-review-correction-2026-09-24. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Greene says the wind kept the firing from being heard, and that Rosecrans's midday message saying he was within eight miles (OCR '12. -10 p.m.'; the clock is not verified against print) reached Grant only after night. NPS says Ord later said he never heard any fighting and Grant remarked he had heard no sounds of battle.
Retrospective accounts of what commanders knew; no inspected message log or acoustic evidence.
the direction of the wind was such that the firing was not heard.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…Eosecrans sent word, at 12. -10 p.m., that hegreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…but this was not received by Grant until after night.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.40 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…Ord did nothing, later proclaiming that he never heard any fightingnps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…Grant also remarked that he had heard no sounds of battle.nps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…logistics
supportedunresolved NPS says Rosecrans followed the single Jacinto road instead of two roads as directed; Greene says an after-midnight message from Rosecrans reported that, through a guide's fault, his march had been slightly delayed and one division was still at Jacinto, twenty miles from Iuka.
Movement constraints from summaries; no march table or transport record inspected.
instead of using two roads as directed, it followed the Jacinto (Bay Springs) Road.nps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…word was received from Eosecrans that, through the fault of a guide, his march had been slightly delayedgreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…one of his divisions was still at Jacinto, twenty miles from Iukagreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…objectives
supportedunresolved Greene says Grant's plan was to hold the Jacinto and Fulton roads and cut Price off against the Tennessee; NPS says Bragg had ordered Price to prevent Rosecrans reinforcing Buell's troops, and that Price was preparing to rendezvous with Van Dorn.
Attributed plans from summaries; no inspected orders.
The whole plan of attack was based on occu- pying the Jacinto and Fulton roadsgreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…issue orders for his men to prepare for a march the next day, to rendezvous with Van Dorn.nps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…ordered him to prevent Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans's Army of the Mississippi troops from moving into Middle Tennesseenps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…outcome
supportedpost_outcome The frozen result is Union victory, with a note that it caused Grant concern about Rosecrans's abilities; the live field reads Union Victory. Both sources say Price escaped by the Fulton road.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The frozen note is a source annotation, not a measured effect.
Union victory (In addition, it caused Grant to have concern about Rosecrans's abilities and leadership.)arnold-cwsac-battles, battle MS001; column results_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…Price's whole command had escaped by the Fulton road.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.41 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…Price's army evacuated via the uncovered Fulton Roadnps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 1,482 total (US 782; CS 700); the live NPS field reads 1384 total (US 790; CS 594;). Greene gives Rosecrans's reported 782 and Price's reported 496, against a provost-marshal tally of 1,438 including prisoners and an estimate of wounded carried off.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The provost-marshal total includes an estimate and prisoners; it is not adopted. Price's reported 86 killed and 408 wounded sum to 494 in the OCR against a printed total of 496; print was not checked.
1,482 total (US 782; CS 700)arnold-cwsac-battles, battle MS001; column casualties_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…total 782greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.42 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…puts them at 86 killed and 408 wounded — total 496greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.42 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…making a total of 1,438.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.42 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…responsibility
disputedunresolved NPS says Rosecrans stated he left the Fulton road unguarded for fear of dividing his force, and that Grant approved; Greene says Rosecrans, forced into action on arriving, had no opportunity to move onto that road. Grant had ordered Ord to wait for the sound of fighting.
The sources give different reasons for the open road; neither is adopted. The listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit for the combined operation.
he had not guarded the road because he feared dividing his forcenps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…He therefore had no' opportunity to move Hamilton's division over to the Fulton roadgreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.41 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…he ordered Ord to await the sound of fighting between Rosecrans and Price before engaging the Confederates.nps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.
disputedunresolved The frozen `forces_text` describes approx. 4,000–4,500 US (2nd and cavalry divisions) and approx. 3,200 CS (1st Division). The frozen structured US bounds are 4,000/4,000 (the upper bound is not 4,500) and the CS bounds are 3,200/3,200; the live field reads zero. NPS says Price had about 14,000 men. Greene gives Rosecrans's column about 9,000 and Ord's about 6,000, says Hamilton brought 2,800 into action, and that two Confederate brigades of three to four thousand did the fighting.
Army, column, engaged-division and brigade figures are different populations; none is adopted as a matched opening strength. Ord's column did not engage. The imported model row uses the structured 4,000 point value; the text's 4,500 upper bound is not carried into it. This is recorded, not corrected.
2nd Division and cavalry division, Army of the Mississippi (approx. 4,000-4,500) [US]; 1st Division, Army of the West (approx. 3,200) [CS]arnold-cwsac-battles, battle MS001; column forces_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…with the bulk of his force — about 9,000 mengreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…Ord, with about six thousand mengreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.39 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…which brought only 2,800 men into action.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.42 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…numbering between three and four thousand men.greene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.41 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…terrain
supportedunresolved NPS says the Confederates were well placed in a ravine filled with timber and underbrush below the hill the Union column had climbed; Greene places Hamilton's division on a wooded knoll across the road fork.
Position description; no map verification or numerical terrain effect.
the Confederates were well-placed below in a ravine, filled with timber and underbrushnps-ms001-v1, Description · snapshot
578f14581abd…Hamilton formed his division across the forks of the road, on the wood- ed knollgreene-iuka-corinth-selections-v1, p.40 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
a53e111410ce…Open questions
- Returns, Confederate casualty reconciliation and the Grant–Rosecrans–Ord message chronology remain deferred.
- NPS/CWSAC is one family; Greene is one retrospective history by a non-participant Union engineer officer, founded on the Official Records. Reports quoted inside Greene are not additional independently inspected families.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting.