Corinth MS002

supportedunresolved Greene says Grant was unsure whether Bolivar or Corinth was the target until the concentration at Pocahontas was learned, and that Rosecrans was fully informed of the approach.

Retrospective summary from the records; no inspected message log.

supportedunresolved NPS says heat, fatigue and water shortages, with Van Dorn's confidence, led him to stop on October 3; Greene quotes Rosecrans that his men were worn out when he delayed pursuit.

Attributed conditions, not ration, water or readiness returns.

supportedunresolved Greene quotes Van Dorn's report calling the attack on Corinth a military necessity; NPS says the Confederates hoped to seize Corinth and sweep into Middle Tennessee.

Attributed purpose from a quoted report and a summary; no inspected original.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result remains Union victory. Greene says the Confederates were in full retreat by noon on October 4, but later dates the battle to 'October 5th'.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Greene's October 5 date conflicts with his own narrative and the frozen interval; the frozen dates are kept.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 7,197 total (US 2,359; CS 4,838); the live NPS field reads 7150 total (US 2350; CS 4800;). Greene gives Rosecrans's reported 2,359 and official Confederate returns of 4,838, against Rosecrans's statement of 2,268 prisoners taken and his Medical Director's count of 1,423 Confederates buried, from which Greene infers a loss over nine thousand.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Greene's nine-thousand figure is an inference from an assumed wounded-to-killed ratio, not a count.

supportedunresolved Both sources say Van Dorn took command as senior. NPS says Hébert's sickness postponed the October 4 attack to 9 a.m.; Greene says the plan miscarried 'in Van Dorn's opinion' owing to that delay, and that two eccentric Union advances opened the gap exploited on October 3.

Attributed judgments about subordinate conduct; no automatic sole credit to either listed army commander.

supportedpost_outcome Greene says Rosecrans decided not to pursue until the next day and Grant blamed him for the delay; NPS says Rosecrans postponed pursuit.

Post-battle command decision; its consequence belongs to Hatchie's Bridge and campaign contribution, not this tactical result.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The live NPS field reads 45000 total (US 23000; CS 22000;), matching the narrative. Greene gives Van Dorn about 22,000 in the field from a September 28 return (Price about 14,000, Lovell about 8,000) and Rosecrans 23,000 from Grant's October 1 return.

Figures come from returns on dates before the battle; effective and engaged scopes are not established. Agreement may reflect shared dependence on the returns and is not independent corroboration.

supportedinherited NPS says Union forces had built inner and intermediate lines since the spring siege; Greene describes redoubts near the town and an outer line of entrenchments about two miles out, built earlier by the Confederates.

Pre-existing works at the opening boundary, from summaries; no map or engineering record verified.