Jackson MS008

supportedunresolved Johnston says he reached Jackson on the night of May 13, learned that four Union divisions at Clinton lay between him and Pemberton, and ordered Pemberton to come up on Sherman's rear. Greene says Johnston telegraphed Richmond 'I am too late'.

Attributed knowledge and dispatches from the commander's report and a history; no inspected message log.

supportedunresolved Greene says torrential rain delayed McPherson's attack an hour and a half for fear of spoiling ammunition. Johnston says the resistance gave time to remove the public stores; Greene says 18 guns and much ammunition and stores were nevertheless taken on Gregg's front.

Supply statements from a history and the commander's report; no inspected return.

supportedunresolved NPS says Johnston ordered the evacuation of Jackson and had Gregg defend it until the evacuation was complete; Greene says the brigades were to make enough of a defence to gain time to remove stores. NPS says the Union corps intended to cut the city and railroads off from Vicksburg.

Stated aims from a summary, a history and the commander's report; no inspected order text.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Johnston says his force retreated by the Canton road at 2 p.m.; his May 14 dispatch says Gregg evacuated about noon. Greene says the Union troops entered Jackson between 3 and 4 p.m.; NPS places Johnston's order to disengage in mid-afternoon.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The evacuation clocks differ and are not synchronized.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty texts read 1,136 total (US 286; CS 850). Greene says Sherman lost less than 30 and McPherson 265, that McPherson gave the enemy loss as 845 including many prisoners, and that the Confederate reports put their losses a little under 400.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen Confederate 850 is close to McPherson's 845 and far above the Confederate reports' figure as Greene gives it.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Johnston and Gregg against Grant; the live heading lists only Grant, as Lieutenant General, and Johnston, as Lieutenant Colonel, against the frozen Major General and General. Greene says Gregg made but a feeble resistance while Walker made more of a fight, and judges that Johnston seemed to wish to clear himself of responsibility in advance; NPS calls the evacuation a tragedy.

Judgments are attributed to Greene and NPS; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit. The heading ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the Army of the Tennessee and the Jackson Garrison without counts; the live field reads zero. NPS says only about 6,000 troops were available and that Johnston could have had 11,000 by late on the 14th and 4,000 more by the next morning. Johnston says Gregg's and Walker's brigades were reported at 6,000 and that arrivals would have swelled his force to about 11,000; Greene gives the four brigades — Gregg's and Walker's, just returning from Raymond, and Gist's and Maxey's, expected the next day — as about 12,000. Johnston's May 14 dispatch says prisoners identified McPherson's corps (four divisions) as marching from Clinton, and infers that if prisoners tell the truth the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's army.

Available, expected and opponent figures differ in scope; none is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Greene says Johnston posted a brigade on each road in intrenchments previously constructed on high ground commanding the approaches over open fields, with Walker on a semicircular ridge above a boggy creek. NPS says rain, resistance and poor defenses delayed heavy fighting until about 11 a.m.

Existing works and positions chosen on the day are combined, and Greene's 'commanding' and NPS's 'poor defenses' differ in emphasis; boundaries unset and no map verification.