Okolona MS013

supportedunresolved Smith says exaggerated reports of Forrest's strength reached him constantly, that Lee was reported coming to reinforce him, and that he could get no communication through to Sherman and believed Sherman had returned to Vicksburg. Forrest on February 18 thought the enemy fully posted of his movements. NPS says Smith knew Forrest commanded but not how many he faced.

Knowledge claimed by each commander after the event; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Smith says his command was encumbered with pack trains and captured stock and burned 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 bushels of corn and 2,000 bales of Confederate cotton on the march. Forrest reported on February 18 that he had no more than 40 rounds a man and asked for .54-caliber ammunition, and says that on the 22nd half his command was out of ammunition and pursuit was impossible; NPS likewise says his men were nearly out of ammunition.

Reported encumbrances and ammunition state from the two commanders and a summary; no ordnance return inspected.

supportedunresolved Smith's orders were to reach Meridian by about February 10; Smith says he decided not to force the swamps at West Point but to retire and draw the enemy after him to positions of his choosing, and that he did not regard a junction at all hazards as imperative. Forrest says he did not intend a general engagement on the 21st but pursued when he found the enemy retreating, being unwilling to let them leave without a fight.

Stated aims of the two commanders; the frozen record's day is the pursuit and running fight.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Smith says he had the best of the enemy everywhere except at Okolona, where his loss was severe and a battery was abandoned, and that at Ivey's farm a charge completely routed the attackers. Forrest says the Union force was repulsed at Okolona, abandoned guns, and fled after he repulsed the grandest cavalry charge he had witnessed ten miles from Pontotoc.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The two commanders' accounts of the final fight conflict.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads 150 (US 100; CS 50); the live field reads 532 (US 388; CS 144). Smith's February 26 letter gives a loss at Okolona of perhaps 300 or 400 killed, wounded and missing and a total killed and wounded probably reaching 400; his March 4 report gives 47 killed, 152 wounded and 120 missing, 319 in all, for the expedition, with a compiler's footnote pointing to a revised statement. Forrest's February 26 letter gives his own loss as about 25 killed, 75 wounded and 8 or 10 captured, and his report 162 prisoners and an estimated enemy loss of 800; his compiled return for February 20-22 is garbled in OCR, its total row ending in 144. The same February 26 letter says the enemy, driven from West Point to within 10 miles of Pontotoc in two days, left 6 pieces of artillery, 100 killed, over 100 prisoners and wounded estimated at 300 or over.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Smith's 319 covers the whole expedition and Forrest's return February 20-22; neither is this record's day alone, and the live 144 may reflect the garbled return's total but its basis is not stated. Forrest's February 26 enemy figures cover the two days' pursuit and differ from his report's 162 prisoners and 800.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live commanders are Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Brigadier General William Sooy Smith. Forrest says he took command of Bell's brigade at Okolona and advanced on the Union line, and that Colonel Jeffrey Forrest was killed rallying his men. Smith blames the stampede at Okolona on part of McCrillis's brigade and says Waring's brigade moved under orders not his own; NPS says Smith delayed ten days against orders.

Command roles from the two commanders and a summary; the responsibility for the delay is disputed between Smith and NPS, and neither is adopted. The listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field and side bound give the Union cavalry force as 7,000; the live field reads 7,000 (US 7000; CS 0). Smith says guarding about 3,000 refugees with their animals and some 700 pack-mules absorbed about 2,000 men, leaving a little less than 5,000 who could be thrown into action, and that the full force was 7,000; he estimated Forrest's force at West Point on February 20 at four brigades, about 6,000 or 7,000. Forrest says his force in the fight did not exceed 2,500 against twenty-seven regiments estimated at 7,000, and his February 26 letter gives 2,500 against 6,000 to 7,000; his February 14 dispatch had estimated 10,000 to 12,000 cavalry from scouts' reports.

Figures of different dates and scopes from the two commanders; each gives the other side the larger estimate. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The frozen Union 7,000 is the expedition's full planned strength, not the number engaged on the 22nd; the live Confederate zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved NPS places the attack on the prairie just south of Okolona. Forrest says the Union force, after abandoning guns near Okolona, gained the broken and hilly country on the Pontotoc road, where he dismounted most of his command and fought the last 9 miles on foot, and that the final Union stand was in three lines across a large field ten miles from Pontotoc. Smith describes his stand at Ivey's farm, where the ridge spread into a wide open field, and says the undergrowth sheltered the retreating enemy.

Ground described by the two commanders and a summary; no map verification.