Tupelo MS015

supportedunresolved Forrest says his scouts kept him constantly advised of the enemy's movements from La Grange, and that Smith's delay at Pontotoc gave the impression he meant to fall back toward Memphis, after which it was decided to accept battle wherever offered. Smith says he found the enemy strongly posted south of Pontotoc and chose to flank the position rather than attack it; NPS says he moved on Tupelo fearing an ambush.

Knowledge and reasons stated by the commanders and a summary; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Smith says that on the morning of the 15th, much of the bread having been spoiled when drawn, he had one day's rations left and about 100 rounds of artillery ammunition per gun, which made return necessary; NPS says he was short on rations. Forrest says hundreds of his men fell fainting from the heat and that brigades that exhausted their ammunition were relieved.

Supply and condition statements from the two commanders and a summary; no supply return.

supportedunresolved NPS says Smith's mission was to keep Forrest from raiding Sherman's railroad in Middle Tennessee. Smith says his object on the 13th was to secure Tupelo, gaining the railroad and the choice of ground for battle. Forrest says it was decided after consultation to accept battle wherever the enemy offered it and to attack if he retreated.

Stated aims from the two commanders and a summary.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Lee's July 14 dispatch calls the battle 'a drawn one' of three hours and says his army held a strong position. Smith says his troops drove the attackers from the field with heavy loss and returned for lack of rations and ammunition. Forrest says his troops could not carry the works and that the enemy, retreating, was driven back to his starting point.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Lee's same-day judgment differs from the recorded result and is not adopted.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads 1,948 (US 648; CS 1,300); the live field reads 1973 (US 647; CS 1326). Forrest gives his loss as 210 killed and 1,116 wounded (read '1,11G' in OCR) and the enemy's as equal to his own. Smith says 270 enemy dead were counted in Mower's front, that the enemy's loss on the 14th could not fall short of 1,800, and that it would reach 3,000 killed, wounded and prisoners over the expedition; the Union casualty return (No. 3) is garbled in OCR and was not selected.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Forrest's 210 and 1,116 sum to the live Confederate 1,326; the frozen figures have no inspected basis. Smith's 3,000 covers the whole expedition.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest and Major General A. J. Smith. Forrest says Lee ordered the attack and the advance and directed him to swing the right against the enemy's left; that on reaching the front he found the Kentucky brigade had been rashly precipitated forward and repulsed, and did not push Roddey's command forward; that Lee later ordered him to fall back, and after his wound at Old Town Creek he ordered Chalmers to take command. Lee reported that he attacked Smith in position at Tupelo that morning. Smith says Mower advanced his lines after two hours and credits Mower's division with the hardest fighting. NPS calls the attacks a number of uncoordinated assaults ordered by Lee.

Command roles from the commanders and a summary; the NPS characterization is recorded as NPS's statement. The listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field gives Smith's force as 14,000 (side bound 14,000); NPS gives Smith more than 14,000, Forrest about 6,000 at Okolona and Lee 2,000 more, and the live field reads 22000 (US 14000; CS 8000). A. J. Smith gives his aggregate on leaving La Grange as about 14,000, and the force that shelled his camp at Old Town Creek as perhaps 1,000. Forrest says his forces did not exceed 5,000 against 18,000 or 20,000; he says about 700 infantry were placed under Lyon in the reserve. Lee's dispatch gives no figures.

An expedition aggregate at the start, a subordinate commander's figure for his own forces, and estimates; no matched return. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedunresolved Forrest says the enemy held a strong position on a ridge fronting an open field that sloped gradually toward the attackers, and had built fortifications during the night, making it almost impregnable. Smith says the enemy came on in three lines from the edge of the timber and that their dead were found within thirty yards of his batteries. Lee reported that he could not force the position.

Ground and works described by the two sides' commanders; no map verification. The works were built the night before the attack, so the phase is left unresolved.