Corinth MS016

supportedunresolved Grant recalls Logan telling him, probably on May 28, that the enemy had been evacuating for days.

A retrospective report of a conversation with explicitly uncertain timing. It does not establish delivery to Halleck or the complete information available to him.

unknownunresolved

A contemporary order or message chain establishing Halleck’s receipt, timing and assessment of evacuation evidence was not inspected. Grant’s retrospective criticism is not an independent reconstruction of that information set.

supportedunresolved Grant describes bridging Owl Creek and building corduroy and lateral roads for the advance, then repeating road construction and entrenchment as the army moved.

These are attributed preparations and siege actions, potentially commander-created campaign mediators. Replacement boundaries remain null, so no reviewed causal phase or benefit is assigned.

supportedunresolved NPS describes Halleck’s armies advancing on Corinth as a vital rail center.

The source identifies an operational target, not an inspected pre-operation directive, a utility weight or an independent success to add to battle residuals.

supportedpost_outcome NPS describes Beauregard evacuating Corinth for Tupelo on the evening of May 29–30; Grant describes Union occupation without opposition after the evacuation.

Record withdrawal and occupation without turning Grant’s adjoining counterfactual criticism into a measured command effect.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen CWSAC result and current NPS summary both label this a Union victory.

The two records share one source family. This preserves the source classification without assigning commander credit or numerical campaign utility.

disputedpost_outcome The pinned row spans April 29–June 10 and includes the phrase “although the raid ultimately failed”; the live NPS page instead supplies a campaign-like February–June date field and a siege/evacuation narrative. Grant describes the pursuing column returning June 10.

The end date may encompass pursuit, but these sources do not establish why the table chose it. The raid wording is unexplained, not evidence of a separately established raid outcome. Preserve the source row and unresolved operation grain rather than silently correcting them.

supportedunresolved Grant says Halleck assumed field command on April 11 and named him second in command; Grant nevertheless describes orders going directly to subordinate formations while bypassing him.

Formal position and exercised authority are not identical. Grant is an interested retrospective narrator, and his account does not adjudicate command effectiveness or assign outcome credit to every listed general.

disputedunresolved The current NPS table displays zero troops on both sides; this is an unresolved source-data problem, not a measured force count.

The populated narrative contradicts a literal zero. Preserve the snapshot and missingness; do not import the zeros.

supportedunresolved Grant retrospectively estimates Beauregard’s May effective force as probably not much over 50,000, reports a Union-side estimate of it as 70,000, and gives the Union force as roughly 120,000.

The memoir distinguishes a retrospective effective estimate from an attributed wartime estimate, without an exact estimation date. The Union population basis is unspecified. These are not interchangeable opening counts or calibrated ranges.

unknownunresolved

No common operation-opening time, area or both-side population basis is established. Do not substitute May totals or an enemy estimate for reviewed opening strengths.

supportedunresolved Grant describes rolling land, forest, denser underbrush near creeks, and Corinth on a ridge between streams.

Retrospective terrain description; no imported defensive multiplier, readiness score or mapped population boundary. Contextual evaluative claims are not adopted.