Fort Anderson NC010
1863-03-13 to 1863-03-15 · NC · Longstreet's Tidewater Operations [March-April 1863] · frozen result: Union · NPS summary (as listed)
Lt. Gen. James Longstreet took charge of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina on February 25 and initiated his Tidewater Operations. He directed D.H. Hill, commander of the North Carolina District, to advance on the Union stronghold of New Berne with about 12,000 men. Maj. Gen. William H.T. Whiting, who commanded the Wilmington garrison, refused to cooperate. After an initial success at Deep Gully on March 13, Hill marched against the well-entrenched Federals at Fort Anderson on March 14-15. Hill was forced to retire upon the arrival of Union gunboats. The city's garrison was heavily reinforced, and Hill withdrew to threaten Washington, North Carolina.
Command responsibility (ledger v2)
US: Hiram Anderson
Grade B under rule 2; echelon detachment_or_post. superior_directing
Single CWSAC listing. The side's first combat was on March 13 on the Trent road and at Deep Gully (Foster; Hill), where no inspected passage names the Union commander. Foster puts Anderson in command of the work attacked at daylight on the 14th ('a small work on north side of the Neuse River, occupied by the Ninety second New York Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson') and says he instructed him to hold it (superior_directing: Foster). No passage states Anderson's command at first combat or names another officer (rule 2, grade B).
Lieutenant Colonelarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle NC010, belligerent US, fullname Hiram Anderson; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Confederate: D. H. Hill
Grade A under rule 2; echelon unknown. superior_directing
Longstreet directed D. H. Hill, commander of the North Carolina District, to advance on New Berne (superior_directing: Longstreet). Longstreet qualifies as directing this operation: Hill's report of the expedition is addressed to him.
Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle NC010, belligerent Confederate, fullname D.H. Hill; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…He directed D.H. Hill, commander of the North Carolina District, to advance on the Union stronghold of New Bernenps-nc010-v1 · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…Side strength (ledger v3)
US: grade D: no usable figure (modelled in the rating runs)
whole_engagement_leakage
Confederate: grade C, 12,000 (8,400–15,600)
applicability_unresolvedcompiled_dependencesingle_inputwhole_engagement_leakage
| Input | Class | Printed | Basis | Bound | Codes | Passage |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs-nps | C | 12,000 | unknown | scope_unresolved | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-foster-13000 | C | 13,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-foster-range | C | 13,000–14,000 | unknown | adversary_or_hearsay_estimate | dossier claim reported-force-scope | |
| cs-foster-pettigrew | bound | 7,000 | unknown | lower | adversary_or_hearsay_estimatepartial_scope | dossier claim reported-force-scope |
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision tidewater-review-correction-2026-09-25. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Hill writes that he could get no information from New Berne, and cites Longstreet's scout's report that the Federals there had been heavily reinforced, which he treats conditionally. Foster gives the enemy's strength from deserters and says recent information placed Longstreet's corps on the Blackwater, not southwest as reported.
Attributed knowledge in reports written after the action; no inspected message log.
I could get no information from New Berne.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…as your scout reports, that the Y^aukees have been so heavily re-enforced at New Berneor18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…[General Longstreet.]or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…The whole force of the enemy, from deserters,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.183 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…tion shows General Longstreet with his corps to be on the Black wateror18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…logistics
supportedunresolved Hill relays Pettigrew's report that the absence of the Whitworth ruined the attack, that the 20-pounder Parrotts were worse than useless, and that one burst, killing 4 men and wounding 4. Foster says the navy gunboats were at first badly placed, one aground and two damaged, and were towed into position by tugs.
Equipment statements from two opposing commanders' reports, the Confederate one relaying Pettigrew; no ordnance or naval record inspected.
The absence of the Whitworth ruined us.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…The 20-poiiuder Parrotts are worse than useless.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…One burst, killing 4 men and wounding 4 ;or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…The Navy gunboats were in an unfortunate position to be of much assistance at first,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…owing to one being aground and the other two damaged.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…They were, however, towed to position by tugs,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…objectives
supportedunresolved NPS says Longstreet directed Hill to advance on New Berne. Hill says he went with Daniel's brigade on the lower Trent road, sent Robertson to cut the railroad, and that Pettigrew was to bombard the shipping and barracks from the other side. Foster reads the plan as Pettigrew taking the work so that rifled batteries could drive off the gunboats and shell the town, and supposes the attack was timed for the anniversary of the town's capture.
Hill's plan is his own report; Foster's reading and supposition are an opponent's inference. No inspected orders.
He directed D.H. Hill, commander of the North Carolina District, to advance on the Union stronghold of New Bernenps-nc010-v1, Description · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…I went with Daniel’s brigade on the lower Trent road to New Berne,or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…sent Eobertson around on the upper Trent road to cut the railroad.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…Pettigrew was to bombard the shipping and barracks from the other side.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…The attack was to have been made with vigor enough by General Pettigrew to have taken CamiJ Anderson,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…whence he might have driven the gunboats from the river and shelled the town,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…the anniversary of the taking of the town,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.183 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…the supposition is that they intended to recapture the town on that day.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.183 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…outcome
supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. NPS says Hill was forced to retire when Union gunboats arrived; Foster says the gunboats and a rifled battery compelled Pettigrew to withdraw, and that the enemy retired on the morning of the 15th. Hill calls the expedition partly successful.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Hill's phrase characterizes the expedition, not the frozen engagement result.
Hill was forced to retire upon the arrival of Union gunboats.nps-nc010-v1, Description · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…assisted by a battery of rifled guns on this side of the Neuse,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…compelled General Pettigrew to withdraw his artillery and infantry,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…position till this a. m., when he finally retired.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…Our expedition was partly successful.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 7 total; the live NPS field reads zero. Foster reports his loss as only 2 killed and 4 wounded (OCR '2 killed and I 4 wounded'; the 'I' is read as a margin artifact, not checked against print); the compiler's footnote gives the 92nd New York 3 men wounded and 3 missing, with 1 man reported killed on March 13. Hill calls the Confederate loss slight and gives no count.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen 7 has no side split and its scope is not established. Foster's figure covers the whole New Berne attack and the compiler's footnote only the 92nd New York; neither scope is shown to equal the frozen 7.
Our loss was only 2 killed and I 4 wounded.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…were 3 men wounded and 3 men missing; 1 man reported as killed, March 13.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…Our loss has been slight.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…responsibility
supportedunresolved NPS says Whiting refused to cooperate. Hill says Daniel in person carried Deep Gully, that Robertson did not go himself and Garnett did not start until Sunday, and that Whiting's spirit spoiled everything. Foster says Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson declined several demands to surrender and that he instructed him to hold the work. The live heading ranks Hill Colonel against the frozen Major General.
Command friction and orders from two interested reports and a summary; the Deep Gully and Fort Anderson actions had different local commanders, and the frozen commanders Anderson and Hill do not receive automatic sole credit. The heading rank is not adopted.
Maj. Gen. William H.T. Whiting, who commanded the Wilmington garrison, refused to cooperate.nps-nc010-v1, Description · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…General Daniel in person charged it and captured it with four companies.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…Eobertson did not go himself.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…Garnett did not start until Sunday.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…The spirit manifested by Whiting has spoiled everything.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.189 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…Anderson was summoned to surrender several times, which he declinedor18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…I instructed him to defend and hold the work.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…Major Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle NC010, belligerent Confederate, fullname D.H. Hill; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.
disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the 1st Division, XVIII Corps and Hill's Division without counts; the live field reads zero. NPS says Longstreet directed Hill to advance on New Berne with about 12,000 men. Foster reports the enemy's whole force, from deserters, as 13,000 infantry and cavalry with thirty-nine guns, and in his longer report of the same date as about 13,000 to 14,000; he says Pettigrew attacked the work with 7,000 men and seventeen guns. Hill says the Deep Gully position was defended by five companies and two guns. No Union count for the engagement is given.
Expedition, deserter-reported and detachment figures differ in scope and source; none is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zeros are not measured absence.
1st Division, XVIII Corps [US]; Hill's Division [CS]arnold-cwsac-battles, battle NC010; column forces_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…to advance on the Union stronghold of New Berne with about 12,000 men.nps-nc010-v1, Description · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…The whole force of the enemy, from deserters, was 13,000 infantry and cavalry and thirty-nine pieces of artillery.or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.183 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…The force of the enemy was about 13,000 to 14,000 infantryor18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…General Pettigrew, with a force of 7,000 men and seventeen pieces artillery,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…It was defended by five companies and two pieces of artillery.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…terrain
supportedunresolved Foster describes Fort Anderson as a small work on the north side of the Neuse, held by the 92nd New York; NPS calls the Federals at Fort Anderson well-entrenched. Hill describes the Deep Gully line, 8 miles from New Berne, as a very strong position naturally, strengthened by earthworks.
Who built the works and when is not stated in the inspected texts; no map verification or numerical terrain effect.
attacked a small work on north side of the Neuse Eiver, occupied by the Ninety second New York Volunteers,or18-foster-tidewater-selections-v1, p.184 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
1119ff503564…Hill marched against the well-entrenched Federals at Fort Anderson on March 14-15.nps-nc010-v1, Description · snapshot
6a9730fa5c8e…we drove them to their first line of works at Deep Gully, 8 miles from New Berne.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…This was a very strong position naturally, and strengthened by earthworks.or18-hill-tidewater-selections-v1, p.188 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
647779176f7c…Open questions
- Pettigrew's, Daniel's and Robertson's reports, the navy reports and any Union return remain deferred; whether the frozen 7 covers Deep Gully is unknown.
- NPS/CWSAC is one family. Foster's, D. H. Hill's, Peck's and French's reports, printed in Official Records Series I, Volume XVIII, are separate families of interested commanders' accounts; the volume is a shared container, not an additional witness. The compiler's footnote is counted with the Foster selection, and Longstreet's indorsement with French's report, for the effort ceiling; neither is treated as independent corroboration. Report dates are not event times or proof of contemporary knowledge.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting.