Wilmington NC016

supportedunresolved Schofield says the enemy was warned by his cavalry of Cox's flank march and abandoned his works; NPS says the Confederates saw the trap ready to close. Bragg says the pursuit was feeble because, as he later learned, the enemy was throwing a corps by way of Masonborough Sound to his rear.

Attributed knowledge in interested reports; Bragg's explanation is information learned after the event.

disputedunresolved Schofield says stormy weather made his plan to send navy boats and pontoons by sea impossible, and that on the night of February 14 unusually high tides defeated his attempt to move the pontoons on their wagons along the beach; he says Cox crossed Town Creek with a single flat-boat, and that fifty-one heavy and fifteen light guns and much ammunition were taken. Bragg says the enemy's refusal to receive prisoners embarrassed the saving of stores, that the Wilmington and Weldon railroad carried off the prisoners able to travel and all important stores, and that some naval stores and a small lot of cotton and tobacco were burned; Schofield says the enemy fired his steamers, cotton and military and naval stores, and NPS says Bragg burned cotton, tobacco and government stores.

Movement and stores statements from opposing interested reports; the scale of destruction differs and is kept.

supportedunresolved Schofield says his ultimate object was Goldsborough and that Wilmington was his first objective as an auxiliary base. NPS says the Confederate works prevented a Federal advance up the Cape Fear. Bragg says he sent a detachment to obstruct the Cape Fear after the withdrawal.

Stated aims from interested reports and a summary.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen result is a Union victory. Schofield says the enemy abandoned his works on both sides of the river during the night of February 19 (the compiler brackets '[18]'), that Cox routed the Town Creek position on the 20th taking 2 guns and 375 prisoners, and that Union troops entered Wilmington without opposition early on the 22d. NPS dates the Fort Anderson evacuation to the night of the 18th-19th. Bragg says the withdrawal was made successfully before daylight on the 22d and the pursuit was feeble.

The Fort Anderson date differs between Schofield's text and the compiler's bracket and NPS; kept as recorded. Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty field reads 1,150 total; the live page reads zero. Schofield gives the Union loss from February 11 to the capture as about 200 killed and wounded, and the enemy's as not less than 1,000 killed, wounded and prisoners. Bragg says Hagood lost about 350 of his command in fighting his way back; Schofield's 375 Town Creek prisoners are above.

Schofield's span begins on February 11, before the frozen interval; his enemy figure is an estimate. Bragg's 350 is the loss of Hagood's command (his Fort Anderson garrison of 2,000, per Bragg). The frozen 1,150 is not reconciled with these figures; the live zero is not measured absence. Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Schofield (Major General) and Bragg (General); the live page gives 'Major General Braxton Bragg', and the frozen ranks are kept. Schofield says that on February 11, before the frozen interval, he pushed Terry's line forward with Cox's division in support. He says he later crossed Cox's and Ames's divisions to Smithville, and that Cox routed the Town Creek position while Terry held Hoke's force. Bragg says he reached Wilmington on the 21st, after the west bank was lost, and withdrew the troops before daylight on the 22d; NPS says Bragg ordered the evacuation. Hagood fought his way to Wilmington from Fort Anderson.

Roles attributed by opposing interested reports. Bragg was absent until the 21st by his own account. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit; Terry, Cox, Ames, Hoke and Hagood are named as attributed actors, not rated.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field and imported bounds give Cox's, Ames's and Paine's divisions at 12,000 against Hoke's division and Hagood's brigade at 6,600; the live Forces Engaged field repeats 12,000 and 6,600, and NPS says about 6,600 Confederates under Hoke held Fort Anderson and a line of works. Schofield says Terry held a line with about 8,000 men when Cox's division landed on February 9, and that the force he then had seemed too small to turn the position. Bragg says Terry had been reinforced by Schofield's corps to nearly 20,000, that his own force of all arms did not exceed 6,500 effectives including reserves and cavalry, and that Hagood's Fort Anderson garrison was 2,000.

Imported and reported figures with different bases and dates: the frozen bounds' basis is not stated, Schofield's 8,000 is Terry's force on February 9 before Cox's arrival, and Bragg's 20,000 and 6,500 are his February 25 figures. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; the live Forces Engaged field repeats the frozen 12,000 and 6,600 and belongs to the same NPS/CWSAC family, so it is not a separate confirmation. The frozen bounds are imported unchanged.

supportedunresolved Schofield says Fort Anderson on the west bank had a line running to a large swamp, with a line opposite running across the peninsula to Masonborough Sound; the position was impregnable to direct attack and could be turned only across the sound or around the swamp. After the evacuation the enemy was entrenched behind Town Creek, with its only bridge destroyed. Bragg says Schofield turned Fort Anderson by a land march west of Orton Pond.

Ground and works described by opposing commanders; no map verification. Phase left unresolved.