Wyse Fork NC017

supportedunresolved Cox reports that a dispatch received at 10 o'clock on March 8, relaying a Black informant's report of a heavy column crossing at the Wilmington road, was regarded as exaggerated, partly because the cavalry ordered to watch that road reported nothing of their own knowledge; he concludes the cavalry had grossly neglected its duty, and the surprised regiment of Upham's advanced brigade could not be rallied. From prisoners and Black people who came within his lines he learned that Hoke had been reinforced from the Army of Tennessee under Bragg in person. Bragg reported on March 7 that Hoke thought Schofield in his front, on March 8 that Schofield was not and that prisoners named Cox in command with three divisions, and on March 10 that prisoners reported large reinforcements. NPS says the Confederate attacks of the 8th stalled because of faulty communications.

Attributed knowledge from interested reports and a modern summary; the dispatches Cox mentions were not inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox reports that the only quartermaster's transportation was fifty wagons and teams for all purposes, which kept the troops on the railroad and prevented any advance of more than six miles beyond its end before March 11; he ordered the March 7 advance although the railroad reached only two miles beyond Core Creek and the troops were short of rations, and it proved impossible to feed them regularly at the front. Bragg asked Johnston on March 10 whether Sherman could be delayed so that he could save supplies.

Transport and ration statements from interested reports; no quartermaster or commissary return inspected.

supportedunresolved Cox says the chief object of his movement was to open a new base of supplies for Sherman at Beaufort Harbor and cover the rebuilding of the railroad, and that he advanced on March 7 to command the Southwest Creek position and its roads. His history says Johnston authorized Bragg to strike the column from New Berne in the hope of driving it back in time to reconcentrate in front of Sherman; Bragg wrote on March 6 that uniting the Smithfield troops with his own would insure a victory, and on March 10 that he thought it best to join Johnston. Cox's report calls the Confederate object to drive his command back on New Berne before the other Twenty-third Corps divisions arrived. NPS says Schofield assigned Cox to direct the forces from New Berne toward Goldsboro.

Stated or inferred objectives from interested accounts and a modern summary; Cox's statement of Confederate intent is his inference.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Bragg reported on March 8 that he drove the Union troops from their position, capturing three guns and several hundred prisoners, and on March 10 that his flank moves gained no decided advantage; he withdrew. Cox reports that the Confederates were repulsed on the 10th and evacuated their lines that night, that one Union gun was abandoned, and that of Upham's two regiments one reached the main line and the other, the Fifteenth Connecticut, was broken and nearly all captured. His history instead says Upham brought off the Fifteenth Connecticut in tolerable order and the other regiment was almost wholly captured, and that no part of the principal line was ever held by Bragg.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. Bragg's three guns and Cox's one lost gun differ, and Cox's report and history name different regiments as captured; both disagreements are preserved.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 2,601 (US 1,101; CS 1,500); the live field reads 2,800 (US 1,300; CS 1,500). Cox's report table for March 8–10 gives 50 officers and 1,207 men, 'a total of 1,257', nearly 900 captured with Upham's brigade; a compiler's footnote refers to the revised table. His history gives 1,257 with 935 captured. The No. 3 return, compiled from nominal lists, gives a grand total of 1,337 for Kinston, March 8–10. Cox reports 266 prisoners taken and about 100 Confederate dead left on the field, and his history infers that Bragg's loss equalled or exceeded Schofield's. Bragg called his own loss comparatively small.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The No. 3 return is a later compilation from nominal lists; its regimental columns are largely garbled in OCR and only the final totals are relied on. The Kinston and Bentonville grand-total lines print killed, wounded and missing figures that sum to their totals; the Averasborough recapitulation is garbled and its final 682 is read by position. A live NPS figure that matches it is not independent corroboration. The Union figures 1,101, 1,257, 1,300 and 1,337 are preserved; no Confederate return was inspected.

disputedunresolved The frozen commanders are Major General Schofield (US) and General Bragg (CS); the live page gives Bragg as Major General. Cox reports that he ordered the March 7 advance and, on the 9th, sent Thomas' brigade to support Palmer's flank and ordered the breastworks extended to the left; most orders of the 8th and 10th are stated in the passive voice. He reports that the general commanding the department was with him on the morning of the 8th and rode with him to the field, returned to New Berne that evening and was on the field again during the attack on the center on the 10th; his history names Schofield as arriving at New Berne on the 7th and consulting with Cox on the morning of the 8th, and says Schofield directed him to keep a watchful defensive until the rest of the Twenty-third Corps arrived. Bragg's March 8 dispatch says Schofield was not in his front and credits Hill and Hoke. NPS calls it Cox's advance.

Bragg's belief that Schofield was absent conflicts with Cox's account of Schofield's presence on the 8th and 10th; neither is adopted. The frozen and live ranks for Bragg differ; neither is adopted. Direction is attributed as reported. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live force fields read 20,500 (US 12,000; CS 8,500). Cox reports that the district garrisons had about 6,000 effectives and the provisional battalions of convalescents about 3,000, and that the Provisional Corps as organized, exclusive of 2,000 effectives left in garrisons, had a total effective force of 13,056. On May 16 he wrote that the Confederate force was 'now known' to have been about 16,000 under Bragg. His 1882 history says the best Confederate authorities put Bragg's North Carolina troops at eight or ten thousand, the Army of Tennessee men with Bragg at Smithfield a week later at 3,950, and infers a total of thirteen to fifteen thousand; its footnote gives Johnston's six or eight thousand and Beauregard's ten thousand plus six thousand. Bragg's dispatches give no numbers.

Cox's 13,056 is an organizational effective total before the fighting, not a count engaged; his 16,000 and 13,000–15,000 are later estimates of the enemy, the second derived by adjusting Confederate 'effective' figures. The frozen CS 8,500 differs from both. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cox's history describes the country between the Neuse and Trent as a great marsh (Dover Swamp and Gum Swamp), with a slight ridge on the near side of Southwest Creek as the only dry land and carrier of the principal roads, and the battlefield as tangled wood and swamp that impeded movement and prevented either side from seeing far. His report says a heavy line of Confederate entrenchments covered Southwest Creek to the Neuse, the stream was unfordable and its bridges destroyed, and his troops built breastworks from Wise's Forks to the railroad, later extended with abatis and felled-timber entanglements. Bragg reported the Union troops strongly entrenched in the position to which he drove them. NPS places the stop at Southwest Creek below Kinston.

The swamp and creek predate the action; the Confederate creek line predates March 7 by Cox's account; the Union breastworks were built during it. The tag stays unresolved.