Killdeer Mountain ND005
1864-07-28 to 1864-07-29 · ND · Sully's Expedition Against the Sioux in Dakota Territory [July 1864] · frozen result: Union · NPS summary (as listed)
Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully, who had defeated the recalcitrant Sioux at Whitestone Hill in September 1863, wintered on the Missouri River. During the winter, Sully's superior, Maj. Gen. John Pope, formulated a plan for ending the difficulties with the Sioux. He would order a force of about 2,500 men, commanded by Sully, into the field to find the Native Americans and engage them in battle. In addition, he would send infantry behind Sully's force to establish strong-posts in the "Indian country." Thus, Minnesota troops were ordered to meet Sully's force at the mouth of Burdache Creek on the Upper Missouri for active campaigning. The two columns rendezvoused on June 30 and set out against the Sioux. They established Fort Rice on July 7 at the mouth of Cannonball River and moved on. The Sioux, who had been operating north of Fort Rice, moved across the Missouri River and took a strong position on the Little Missouri River, about 200 miles from the fort. On July 26, Sully marched out to engage them in battle. On the 28th, he arrived near the Native American camp which he reported included 5,000-6,000 warriors "strongly posted in wooded country, very much cut up with high, rugged hills, and deep, impassible ravines." Sully met with some of the tribal chiefs first, but nothing came of it so he attacked. Heavy fighting ensued, but eventually the artillery and long-range firearms took effect and the Sioux began losing ground. The retirement turned into flight. The Native Americans left all their possessions, and a running fight of almost nine miles scattered the warriors who were not wounded or killed. Killdeer Mountain broke the back of the Sioux resistance. Sully did meet the remnants of the Sioux warriors that had escaped Killdeer Mountain in August and defeated them, but they had none of the spirit formally exhibited.
Dossier claims
Draft dossier, revision sully-1864-review-correction-2026-09-25. Claims are extraction records with their quoted passages, not historical adjudication. JSON
information
supportedunresolved Sully changed course on information that the Indians were on or near the Knife River; he says they had twenty-four hours' notice of his advance after his scouts met a war party, and that a large body out hunting for him later struck his rear.
Knowledge attributed in an interested report; no message log inspected.
receiving information that the Indians were on or near the Knife Riveror41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…they had twenty-four hours’ notice of my advanceor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…who we ascertained afterward had been out hunting for me, came up on my rear.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…logistics
supportedunresolved Sully says the pack saddles supplied were unusable, so he pressed light private wagons into service, threw away tents and kept only provisions and ammunition, and marched over 165 miles in six days including the fight.
Transport statements from an interested report; not a return.
I then pressed into the service all the light private wagons with meor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…By throwing away all tents, everything but provisions and ammunition, I could move rapidly with a very few wagons.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…having made a march of over 165 miles in six days, one day being occupied in the fight.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…objectives
disputedunresolved Sully says the Indians prepared to fight confident of beating him, and that when pursuit proved impossible he destroyed their camp. NPS says Sully met some chiefs before attacking; the inspected July 31 report does not mention such a meeting, but says that the day after the fight Indians planted a white flag, were fired on by some men, and that he saw the flag too late.
Stated aims from an interested report; the NPS parley statement is not found in the inspected report. No account by the Dakota bands was inspected; their numbers, aims and losses come from their opponents' estimates, prisoners' or scouts' statements relayed by them, or the NPS summary.
no doubt with full confidence of whipping meor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…I therefore thought the next best thing to do was to destroy their camp.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…Sully met with some of the tribal chiefs first, but nothing came of it so he attacked.nps-nd005-v1, Description · snapshot
ae05baadc83e…some Indians came forward and planted a white flag on the hill side; some men, however fired on them and they retreated. I saw the flag too late.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.144 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…outcome
supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Sully says by sunset no Indians were on the ground; Thomas says a very large proportion of the property of the 1,600-lodge camp was destroyed on the 29th. NPS describes a running fight of almost nine miles; that statement is not found in the inspected July 31 report.
Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.
By sunset no Indians were on the ground.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…destroying the abandoned property of the Indians, which was a very large propor- tion of all the property belonging to the camp of 1,600 lodges.or41-1-thomas-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.166 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
69787f179050…a running fight of almost nine miles scattered the warriorsnps-nd005-v1, Description · snapshot
ae05baadc83e…disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads 46 (US 15; CS 31). Sully judges the Indian killed at 100 to 150; Brackett's battalion found 27 dead in its sector (13 after the charge). The compiler's note on Sully's omitted list shows 2 killed and 8 wounded in Brackett's battalion, 1 killed and 1 wounded in the Sixth Iowa, 2 killed in the Second Minnesota Cavalry and 1 wounded in the Dakota cavalry; Thomas mentions two pickets killed on the 29th.
Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Brackett's 27 may be within Sully's estimate; the live 15 and 31 are not traced.
The total number of killed, judging from what we saw, was from 100 to 150.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…killing 27 found dead on the field afterwardor41-1-brackett-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.161 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
7e0b0e1f4cbe…The charge resulted in the killing of 13 Indians found on the fieldor41-1-brackett-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.161 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
7e0b0e1f4cbe…sliows 2 killed and 8 wounded in Brackett’s Minne- sota Battalion; 1 killed and 1 wounded in Sixth Iowa Cavalry; 2 killed in Second Minnesota Cavalry; and 1 wounded in the First Battalion Dakota Cavalry.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.144 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…two of the pickets, members of Com- pany D, Second Minnesota Cavalry, were surprised and killedor41-1-thomas-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.166 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
69787f179050…responsibility
supportedunresolved The frozen US commander is Brigadier General Alfred Sully. The frozen and live Native American commander is Inkpaduta (no rank; the live page tags him [CS], not adopted); none of the inspected reports names him, so his role is not established here. Sully directed Brackett to charge a large body on the right; Brackett says he asked and received permission to charge with sabers. Thomas commanded the Second Brigade on the left, and McLaren destroyed the camp on the 29th.
Command roles from interested reports; no automatic sole credit.
Brigadier Generalarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle ND005, belligerent US, fullname Alfred Sully; column rank · snapshot
6c587c298717…Inkpadutaarnold-cwsac-commanders, battle ND005, belligerent Native American, fullname Inkpaduta; column fullname · snapshot
6c587c298717…I directed Brackett to charge them.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…asking and receiving permission of you to charge them with saber.or41-1-brackett-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.161 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
7e0b0e1f4cbe…This I did, ordering Colonel McLaren, Second Cavalry, on that duty.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.143 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…strength
unknownunresolved
No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.
supportedunresolved The frozen force field gives detachments from eight units (2,200) and the Santee and Teton Sioux without figures (US bounds 2,200 and 2,200); the live field reads 0. Sully lists his two brigades and says the whole force on the field numbered about 2,200; he puts the Indians at over 1,600 lodges and at least 5,000 or 6,000 warriors of the Unkpapas, Sans Arcs, Blackfeet, Minneconjous, Yanktonais and Santee. Thomas also gives 1,600 lodges. NPS gives Pope's planned force of about 2,500.
Sully's July 28 field figure and his estimate of the opposing camp that day; NPS's 2,500 is the planned force, not a field count; the Indian figure is an opponent's estimate. No account by the Dakota bands was inspected; their numbers, aims and losses come from their opponents' estimates, prisoners' or scouts' statements relayed by them, or the NPS summary. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.
Detachments from eight units (2,200) [US]; Santee and Teton Sioux [I]arnold-cwsac-battles, battle ND005; column forces_text · snapshot
952b5d08402a…field about 2,200 men.or41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…there were over 1,600 lodges, at least 5,000 or 6,000 warriorsor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…the camp of 1,600 lodges.or41-1-thomas-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.166 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
69787f179050…terrain
supportedinherited Sully says the Indians were posted on Tahkahokuty Mountain, a chain of high hills full of timbered ravines, with rolling prairie in front; the ravines made a mounted charge impossible, so he dismounted. Brackett found ravines and thickets impracticable for horse; Thomas calls the abandoned camp a splendid position for defense. NPS quotes Sully as reporting the camp strongly posted in wooded country cut up with high, rugged hills and deep, impassible ravines; that wording is not in the inspected July 31 report.
Natural ground from interested reports; no map verification.
which is a small chain of very high hills, filled with ravines, thickly timbered and well wateredor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…owing to the country being inter- sected by deep ravines filled with timberor41-1-sully-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.142 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
b99c301a1b45…ravines and thickets impracticable for horse.or41-1-brackett-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.161 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
7e0b0e1f4cbe…which was a splendid position for defense.or41-1-thomas-tahkahokuty-selections-v1, p.166 (OCR page markers; not checked against print) · snapshot
69787f179050…strongly posted in wooded country, very much cut up with high, rugged hills, and deep, impassible ravines.nps-nd005-v1, Description · snapshot
ae05baadc83e…Open questions
- Pope's report (read in its opening), Pollock's, Pattee's, Miner's, Stufft's, Pope's battery, Rogers's, Camp's, McLaren's and Adams's reports, the list of property destroyed (p.172), the Dakota bands' account and maps remain deferred. Brackett's report is the targeted follow-up for the casualty figures.
- NPS/CWSAC (the live battle page and the frozen Arnold rows) is one family. Sully's July 31, 1864 report and Thomas's August 1 report (Second Brigade) are interested accounts; Brackett's August 1 report is a separate family used as the follow-up. Sully also wrote the Whitestone Hill report in the 1863 pass. Official Records volumes are shared containers, not additional witnesses. Report dates are not event times or proof of contemporary knowledge.
- No automatic commander attribution, causal campaign score, morale/readiness number or battle/campaign double counting. Participants are named as the sources name them; characterizations in the sources (including 'hostile', 'savages', 'massacre' or 'battle') are quoted as the sources' own words and not adopted.