Valverde NM001

supportedunresolved Canby says his attempts to bring on a battle where his New Mexican troops would not have to maneuver failed because Confederate officers who had lived or served in New Mexico understood its people; on the 21st reports and a personal reconnaissance convinced him a direct attack would be costly, and he says Plympton's command was unaware of the storming party threatening McRae's battery. Sibley says a February 16 reconnaissance showed the futility of assaulting the fort, and that the Union flag of truce was for two hours taken by his troops to be a surrender proposal.

Retrospective statements of what each commander learned; no message chain inspected.

supportedunresolved Canby says many Confederate animals stampeded in the night for want of water and 200 to 300 horses and mules were captured. Sibley says the loss of 100 mules of the Fourth Regiment's train delayed the movement on the 21st and that wagons with the regiment's kits and blankets were abandoned; after the battle, burying the dead and caring for the wounded left him with five days' scant rations. His May 4 report, dated at Fort Bliss, says he found himself 'at this point' as late as mid-January 1862 with two and a half regiments poorly armed, thinly clad and almost without blankets.

Condition statements from interested reports; no supply, ammunition or transport return was inspected.

supportedunresolved NPS says Sibley aimed to cut communications between Fort Craig and Santa Fe. Sibley says the only hope was to force an open-field fight by crossing to the east bank, turning the fort and forcing a battle for the recrossing. Canby says he had resolved to fight where his New Mexican troops would not have to maneuver under fire, and in the afternoon decided to force the Confederate left.

Stated aims from a summary and interested reports; not evaluated.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results are Confederate victory. Canby reports success until about 5 p.m., when a Confederate charge took McRae's battery and drove its support from the field, after which he ordered the retreat. Sibley reports the capture of the battery and the enemy driven from the field, and says the victory should have led to the capture of the fort. NPS says the Confederates were left in possession of the field but had suffered heavy casualties.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome Frozen: 389 total (US 202; CS 187). Live: 450 total (US 263; CS 187). Canby's February 22 estimate was probably 40 killed and 150 wounded, with a few prisoners; his March 1 report puts the loss at one-fourth of the effectives on the field. The compiled Union return's totals are garbled in OCR; the characters '65', '157' and '263' appear in its total line, and the last matches the live US figure, but the columns cannot be read. Sibley's February 22 report gives 10 killed and thinks 100 wounded will cover his loss, and estimates the Union loss at some 300 killed and wounded.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen US 202 is not found in the inspected passages; its basis is not established. Canby's February 22 estimate carries an OCR footnote mark whose note, printed at the foot of p.487, reads 'But see revised statement on p. 493', the page of the compiled return.

disputedunresolved The frozen rows list Sibley (Brigadier General) and Green (Colonel) for the Confederates and Canby (Colonel) for the Union; the live page styles Canby Brigadier General. Sibley says Green conducted the operations of the 20th with his approval; he took the saddle on the 21st, and his February 22 report says he relinquished full direction to Green during the day (the hour is lost in OCR), while his May 4 report says that at 1.30 p.m., exhausted, he sent his staff to report to Green. Canby says Roberts was the immediate commander at Valverde until 2.30, and that he himself ordered the attack on the Confederate left and the retreat; he blames the refusal of one volunteer regiment to cross the river for the loss of the battery.

Command assignments reported by the commanders; phase unresolved. Green's direction of the afternoon Confederate attack and Roberts's morning command are attributed actions, not ratings. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names the Department of New Mexico (regular and volunteer units) against the Army of New Mexico without counts. The live NPS description gives Sibley 2,500 men and Canby more than 3,000, while its Forces Engaged field reads US 2,500 and CS 3,000. Canby (March 1) gives the Confederate force as a nominal aggregate of nearly 3,000 by captured rolls and returns, understood to be reduced to about 2,600, and his own aggregate present on the morning of the 21st as 3,810, including about 1,000 unorganized militia; he says his troops always met superior numbers and that the Confederates were all mounted. Sibley's February 22 report puts the enemy on the field at about 3,500 (1,200 regulars) against never more than 1,500 of his own engaged, and the force contended against at near 6,000; his May 4 report says the enemy was not less than 5,000 with a reserve of 3,000 at the fort, against not more than 1,750 of his own on the field (600, 600, 300 and 250 by unit).

Nominal aggregates, a morning 'aggregate present', engaged counts and each side's estimates of the other, on different dates and bases; the live NPS field assigns the description's two figures to the opposite sides. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedunresolved Canby describes the Rio Grande valley bounded on the east by a basaltic mesa 40 to 80 feet high, the Mesa del Contadero above the post, and sand ridges in the mal pais whose ravines were natural covered ways favoring the Confederates. The fight turned on the upper ford at Valverde; Canby says the final Confederate position behind a sand ridge parallel to the river was one of great natural strength, and that his infantry had to march 7 miles and ford a deep, rapid stream twice to reach it. NPS calls the old riverbed where the Confederates halted an excellent position.

Ground described by an interested report and a summary; no map verification. The ridges and riverbed are natural features, but their use was chosen during the action, so the phase is left unresolved.