Chustenahlah OK003

supportedunresolved McIntosh says an express from Cooper on the 25th reported a delay of two or three days and offered help if McIntosh found it necessary to advance. Cooper says he wrote that he could not reach Tulsey Town before the 26th.

Messages described by the two commanders; the letters themselves were not inspected.

supportedunresolved McIntosh says scarcity of forage led the two commanders to agree that either should attack on sight, and that Cooper's movement would be delayed by the desertion of his teamsters.

Supply conditions stated by the attacking commander; not a return.

supportedunresolved McIntosh says the plan was for Cooper to move up the Arkansas and get behind the chief's position while he marched up the Verdigris and attacked directly; NPS says he chose to attack despite being outnumbered.

Plan and decision from the attacking commander and a summary.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory; NPS says the retreat became a rout. McIntosh says the stronghold was broken up and the force scattered, and that he held the camp at 4 o'clock; Cooper heard the chief escaped with about 200 warriors.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads 251 (US 211; CS 40). McIntosh says the enemy's killed were upwards of 250 and his loss 8 killed and 32 wounded, but his closing line reads 'Killed, 0; wounded, 40' in OCR; he captured 160 women and children (read '1G0') and 20 negroes. Cooper says Stand Watie's pursuit next day killed 15 without loss.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The basis of the live US 211 is not established in the selected passages.

disputedunresolved The frozen commanders are Colonel James McQueen McIntosh and Opothleyahola. McIntosh sent Griffith to the right and Young to the left and says the Seminoles were led by Halek Tustenuggee. Cooper says McIntosh pushed on without waiting even for Stand Watie, calls this precipitancy, and argues the chief could have been captured had McIntosh waited for Cooper's column.

Cooper's criticism is his own interested judgment, not an established causal finding. No automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field names McIntosh's and Douglas Cooper's brigades with no figures; the live field reads zero; the frozen description says McIntosh left Fort Gibson with 1,380. McIntosh says he came to Fort Gibson with 1,600 and marched with a force of 1,380, that the enemy was estimated at 1,700, and that Stand Watie's 300 arrived as the battle ended. Cooper says McIntosh announced he would take the field with some 2,000, and that his own column had not arrived: he heard of the attack the next morning.

Column figures and an estimate of the enemy; by both reports Cooper's column was not engaged, although the frozen force field names it. No account by Opothleyahola's side was inspected; every figure for his force and losses is an opponent's estimate or a history's. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedinherited McIntosh says the enemy held a high, rugged, oak-covered hill beyond the stream, with 200 or 300 yards of open ground below and a warrior behind each tree, and afterwards retreated into rocky gorges in the mountains. NPS says the defenders were secluded in the underbrush along a rugged hill slope.

Natural ground described by the attacking commander and a summary; no map verification.