Honey Springs OK007

supportedunresolved Cooper says spies who had enlisted in his brigade reached Fort Gibson, that he could not at first tell whether the crossing at the Creek Agency was a heavy scout or the main body, and that on reconnoitring he found the Federal force larger than reported. Britton says Blunt learned of the planned Cooper-Cabell movement and advanced in column to deceive the Confederates as to his strength. NPS says Blunt correctly surmised the concentration.

Attributed knowledge from an interested report, a history and a summary; no original messages inspected.

supportedunresolved Cooper says many guns failed to fire because of very inferior powder whose cartridges became worthless in damp air, that he could have held Elk Creek but for the worthless ammunition, and that flour, salt and sugar were burned at Honey Springs for want of transportation. Britton says the depot was fired but a commissary building with bacon, flour, salt and dried beef was captured. NPS says wet powder caused misfires.

Interested and retrospective descriptions; no ordnance or commissary return inspected.

supportedunresolved NPS and Britton say Blunt crossed to attack Cooper before Cabell's reinforcement could arrive for a combined movement against Fort Gibson. Cooper says his eastward retreat deceived the enemy into returning to Gibson and saved his train and stores.

Stated aims from a summary, a history and an interested report.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Union victory and the live result Union Victory. Britton says the Confederates were driven across Elk Creek and pursued about three miles, burning Honey Springs depot. Cooper says the retreat was orderly and successful in the face of superior numbers. NPS says any chance of taking Fort Gibson was gone.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 716 total (US 79; CS 637); the live field reads 211 (US 77; CS 134). Britton relays Blunt's report of 17 killed and 60 wounded, 150 Confederate dead buried, 400 Confederate wounded and 77 prisoners, and Cooper's report of 134 killed and wounded. Cooper gives 134 killed and wounded and 47 prisoners, and says the Federal loss exceeded 200 on a surgeon's report.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Blunt's Confederate figures are an interested claim; the frozen CS 637 and Cooper's 134 are far apart.

supportedunresolved Britton says Blunt organized two brigades under Judson and Phillips, rode forward to examine the Confederate line and deployed from column into line. Cooper says Tandy Walker, mistaking an order, took the reserve miles away and returned too late for the bridge, and that he personally directed the Choctaws' charge near Honey Springs; his orders gave Watie the right wing and McIntosh the left. The frozen commanders are Brigadier General Douglas H. Cooper and Major General James G. Blunt; the live page styles Blunt a Brigadier General.

Command roles from a history and an interested report; the listed commanders do not receive automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads District of the Frontier [US] and 1st Brigade, Native American troops [CS], with no numerical bounds; the live field reads 3000 (US 3000; CS 0) and the live description says Blunt had 3,000 men. Britton counts Cooper's eight regiments and two squadrons against Blunt's three regiments and three battalions, gives Blunt eight field pieces and four howitzers to Cooper's one four-gun battery, and says Cabell arrived after the battle with upwards of two thousand men. Cooper says his aide estimated the Federals at probably 4,000, which he thought some 500 under the mark, and reports a general feeling among his troops, after their ammunition failed in the wet, that it was useless to contend with a foe doubly superior in numbers, arms and munitions, with artillery ten times superior.

Unit counts, gun counts and interested estimates of the other side; no return for either side inspected. The 'doubly superior' comparison is the troops' feeling as Cooper reports it, not a count. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live CS zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Britton says Cooper's line lay in the timber and brush on the north side of Elk Creek, that Blunt halted behind a ridge in the prairie half a mile away, that the brush was thick enough to hide a foe a few yards off, and that a shower fell before the attack. Cooper's General Orders No. 25 placed his wings at the Elk Creek crossings and ordered that the enemy be kept from the timber north of the creek; he says the second crossing above the bridge was his weakest point and that heavy rain made his troops' arms useless in the morning skirmish.

Ground and weather from a history and interested orders and report; no map inspected. The dispositions predate the battle.