Charleston Harbor SC004

supportedunresolved Beauregard says the accumulation of Union troops and ironclads at Port Royal and in the Edisto and Stono had convinced him the attack was imminent. Du Pont says buoys strewn in the channel raised suspicion of torpedoes, one of which burst near the Weehawken, and that the army could give him no cooperation.

Contemporary perceptions stated by the two commanders. No original reconnaissance, order or message chain was inspected to establish contemporary knowledge. Surprise in a summary does not independently establish what each commander knew.

supportedunresolved Du Pont counts only 139 shot and shell fired by his vessels and says five of the eight ironclads were wholly or partially disabled, chiefly in their guns; Beauregard, citing Union statements, gives 151 fleet shots against 2,209 from the forts, 520 of which struck, and credits Yates's traversing device with keeping guns trained with five men.

Ammunition expenditure and battle damage, not supply returns; Beauregard's fleet figures are copied from Union journals.

supportedunresolved Du Pont intended to pass Sumter and engage its northwest face, then proceed to the city; Beauregard says the fleet was driven back before reaching the lines of torpedoes and obstructions and that the heaviest batteries were not engaged.

Stated intent and the defender's account of how far the fleet came.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result reads Confederate victory (Warships were repulsed.); the live result Confederate Victory. Du Pont made the signal to withdraw at 4:30 (Beauregard says the remaining monitors kept up their fire until 5.25 p.m.), did not renew the attack and wrote that Charleston could not be taken by a purely naval attack; the Keokuk sank the next morning. Beauregard says Sumter could resist another such attack when the fleet left.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text and the live page read 36 total (US 22; CS 14). Beauregard calls the Confederate casualties slight and refers to subordinate reports; in October he says no life may have been lost on the ironclads but bloody clothes were found in the Keokuk.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The Keokuk and Nahant casualty lists printed with Du Pont's report were read but not selected.

supportedunresolved Du Pont says he decided without consultation not to renew the attack after hearing the monitor captains' reports. Beauregard credits Ripley, commanding the First Military District and charged with the harbor defense, and says the Union land forces did not co-operate. The frozen commanders are Rear Admiral S. F. Du Pont (US) and General P. G. T. Beauregard (CS); the live page gives Beauregard as Brigadier General.

Command roles from the two commanders' reports; neither listed commander receives automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force text reads 9 warships; the live field reads zero. Du Pont attacked with eight ironclads and his flagship and says that, had he entered the harbor, he would have had 1,200 men and 32 guns; a reserve of wooden vessels was not engaged. Beauregard lists seven monitors, the Keokuk and the New Ironsides carrying thirty-two guns, and says seventy-six Confederate guns, including nine mortars and fifteen smooth-bore 32-pounders, were brought to bear on the fleet.

Vessel and gun counts that agree on nine vessels and 32 guns; no garrison strength. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

disputedunresolved Du Pont says obstructions marked by rows of casks stretched from Moultrie to Sumter, that the narrow channel and current made his flagship partly unmanageable at 1,000 yards, and that the monitors and Keokuk reached 550 to 800 yards from Sumter. Beauregard says the Keokuk came no nearer than 900 yards, the New Ironsides was struck at 1,700 yards from Sumter and could not stand the fire at the range of a mile, and the monitors were disabled at not less than 1,300 yards, and in October that no ironclad passed nearer than 1,100 to 1,300 yards of the outer batteries except the Keokuk.

The two commanders' ranges differ; no chart inspected. The obstructions and forts predate the attack.