Fort Wagner SC005

disputedunresolved Gillmore says the attack had to be a surprise and that the batteries were built in secrecy, knowing from deserters of ten to twelve Confederate guns. Jones quotes Beauregard that neither the attack nor the building of the works was unknown, says a scouting party found the barges on the night of the 8th, and that there were abundant indications of an attack on the 9th; he thinks the local commanders could not have known the extent of the works.

Contested claims of surprise from an interested report and a history quoting Beauregard. No original reconnaissance, order or message chain was inspected to establish contemporary knowledge. Surprise in a summary does not independently establish what each commander knew.

supportedunresolved Gillmore says forty-seven pieces with 200 rounds each were placed secretly on Folly Island, the work and transport done at night, and that the attack was postponed a night partly because the boats were unseaworthy; on the 10th the heat and his troops' exhaustion suspended operations short of Wagner. Jones says the south end of Morris Island was comparatively defenceless because Beauregard lacked force, labor and guns for both islands.

Preparation and supply statements, not returns.

supportedunresolved Gillmore's plan was to seize the south end of Morris Island, reduce Wagner, demolish Sumter from there, and then let the ironclads remove the obstructions and reach the city; Jones gives the same four steps and says Dahlgren denied any understanding on the fourth.

Plan statements from the attacking commander and a derivative history.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory for the July 10-11 record. Gillmore's July 12 dispatch says the south end of the island was captured with eleven guns on the 10th, but on the 11th the parapet was gained and the supports recoiled. Jones calls the descent a complete success and the assault a failure.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The frozen interval joins a Union landing success and a repulsed assault; the result applies to the record as frozen.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text and the live page read 351 total (US 339; CS 12). Gillmore's July 12 dispatch put the Union loss in both actions near 150 and the enemy's at not less than 200; his report adds that Beauregard admitted 300. Jones gives Strong's figures: 15 killed and 92 wounded on the 10th, 8 officers and 322 men on the 11th, 436 for both; a Confederate loss of 294 on the 10th and 1 officer and 5 men killed and 1 officer and 5 men wounded in the assault.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The frozen US 339 and CS 12 correspond to no single inspected figure; the two days' populations must not be merged.

supportedunresolved Gillmore ordered Strong's landing by signal and Seymour to carry Wagner at daybreak on the 11th. Jones reports the dispute over who was responsible for the July 11 assault: Seymour says Strong acted on instructions given directly by Gillmore, Strong blames a regiment's halt, and Jones thinks the column too weak. On the Confederate side Jones names Colonel R. F. Graham in command and Olmstead's Georgians. The frozen commanders are Brigadier General 'Qunicy' Gillmore (US) and General P. G. T. Beauregard (CS).

Command roles from an interested report and a history; neither listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads Brigades; the live field reads zero. Gillmore says that before taking command he judged scarcely 11,000 men available for offensive operations and 17,463 effective in the whole department; Terry's division, about 4,000, and Strong's brigade, about 2,500, were gathered on Folly Island, and nearly 2,000 of Strong's brigade embarked in the boats. His report puts the department's aggregate means for offensive operations, after his changes, at 10,000 effective volunteer infantry, 350 volunteer artillerists and 600 engineer troops. Jones reports Gillmore's July 20 letter as saying he had commenced with somewhat more than 13,000 on Morris and Folly Islands. Jones gives Gillmore's July 10 tri-monthly aggregate present (exclusive of sick) as 20,837, Beauregard's grand total in South Carolina and Georgia as 15,318, with 927 men on Morris Island including the garrisons of Wagner and Gregg; he says about 700 met the landing and about 1,200 held Wagner on the 11th.

Department, island and garrison scopes on July 8-11 from an interested report and a derivative history. None is adopted as a matched opening strength. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Gillmore describes an assault from small boats across Light-House Inlet onto an open beach under artillery fire. Jones describes Morris Island as a sand bank with ridges giving shelter, Wagner stretching from the beach to Vincent's Creek with a front of about 275 yards, and the Confederate south-end batteries as detached and very incomplete.

Ground from an interested report and a history; no map verification.