Honey Hill SC010

supportedunresolved Hatch says the maps and guides proved worthless and a guide led the column down the wrong road on the night of the 29th, and that he later learned he would have met little opposition had he reached the railroad then. Smith says he based the day's dispositions on information from Colcock, Gonzales, Jenkins and De Saussure, officers who knew the ground.

Attributed knowledge from interested reports.

supportedunresolved Hatch says fog, grounding and a pilot's mistake delayed the landing, the engineer steamer arrived late so the artillery and transport could not land promptly, the sailors dragging the naval battery were worn out, ammunition ran nearly out with none arriving from the rear, and he attributes the repulse to the strong position and 'our want of ammunition'. Smith says that at Thomasville only two of the five trains he had requested were waiting, which left his Second, Third and Fourth Brigades there, and that his leading brigade reached Grahamville about 8 a.m. on the 30th.

Transport and ammunition statements from interested reports; no ordnance return inspected.

supportedunresolved Hatch set out to seize the railroad at Grahamville; NPS says the aim was to cut the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. Smith says he was told that if he held the enemy in check until 2 p.m. several thousand reinforcements for Savannah would arrive, and that he took the Georgia militia out of the State for that purpose.

Stated aims from interested reports and a modern summary.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Hatch says it became certain the position could not be carried and that the retirement after dark was made without loss or confusion and without pursuit; Smith says the enemy retired rapidly toward the gunboats in the night and calls it a 'flight'.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The characterizations of the withdrawal conflict.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty fields read 796 (US 746; CS 50). Hatch gives his total killed, wounded and missing as 746 and says 13 unwounded and 5 wounded of his 28 missing were reported prisoners. Smith gives his loss as 8 killed and 42 wounded and estimates the enemy's at upward of 1,000, with over 200 dead left on the field.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Hatch's recapitulation table is not legible in OCR.

supportedunresolved Smith says he directed the operation and assigned Colcock, the district commander and next in rank, to the immediate executive command of the main line, with Gonzales over the artillery and Jenkins over the cavalry. Hatch says his command began after landing and credits Potter, who commanded the advance. The frozen commanders are Colonel Charles Colcock (CS) and Major General John Hatch (US); Hatch signs as Brigadier-General.

Direction is attributed as the reports state; the frozen and live rank for Hatch is not adopted over his signature, nor the reverse. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live force fields read 6,400 (US 5,000; CS 1,400). Hatch says the force collected, including a naval brigade, numbered about 5,500 of all arms. Smith says he had 'in all about 1,400 effective muskets on the field, and all engaged', could not estimate the enemy in the dense wood but found them largely superior, and that reinforcements (Chesnut's South Carolina reserves, 'about 3o0 effective muskets' in OCR, at midnight and 860 of Baker's brigade before daylight) arrived after the action. Robertson arrived about 4.30 p.m. with part of the Thirty-second Georgia, a battery and a company of cavalry, which Smith says came up too late to be used in the action.

Hatch's 5,500 includes all arms and the sailors; Smith's 1,400 counts effective muskets only. The later arrivals are not part of the engaged force. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; the live figures are not adopted.

supportedinherited Hatch says the column marched on a narrow road through dense woods, and that the Confederate centre was an inclosed redoubt on the crest of a small ridge, 'said to have been built two years since', flanked by rifle-pits, with a small creek and a marsh of dense undergrowth in front commanded by their fire. Smith says the dense wood prevented him estimating the enemy.

The redoubt, creek and marsh predate the action. The rifle-pits Hatch says the enemy 'had thrown up' beside the redoubt are not dated in the inspected passage; the inherited tag does not extend to them. Narrative descriptions.