Shiloh TN003

supportedunresolved NPS describes Beauregard as unaware of Buell’s arrival. Beauregard’s own April 11 account says he hoped, from a special dispatch, that Buell’s main force could not reach the field in time, and says April 7 firing assured him of the junction.

The report is evidence of Beauregard’s retrospective account of his belief, not proof of his complete information set or of reasonable ignorance. Recover the dispatch and its receipt before adjudicating intelligence responsibility.

unknownunresolved

Numerical ammunition availability, ration distribution, and combat readiness by formation and phase remain unestablished. Qualitative participant claims of exhaustion below do not justify an invented readiness score.

supportedunresolved Beauregard reports planning an early April 5 attack, delayed until April 6 after difficult marching and rain on the night of April 4.

Preserve the report’s planned date and stated causes. A delayed attack may reflect both inherited weather and command decisions; causal classification requires an earlier replacement boundary.

supportedunresolved Both Grant and Beauregard describe fatigue and rain as constraints; Beauregard additionally says his men fought over twelve hours without food.

Participant explanations for decisions, not measured army-wide readiness. No numerical exhaustion score or common coefficient is inferred.

supportedunresolved Nelson reports leaving his three batteries at Savannah. Edward McCook reports the Second Indiana Cavalry stayed on the opposite bank until Monday evening, with detached orderlies the only portion in action.

Transport constraints and administrative assignment are source-qualified facts; no invented readiness score or command effect follows. The cavalry exception is not zero participation for every person.

supportedinherited NPS says Grant was ordered to await Buell at Pittsburg Landing. Halleck’s March 20 order directly requires concentration until joining Buell and avoiding engagement, but does not itself name Pittsburg Landing.

Direct order establishes a superior’s constraint and includes fortification language. Its issue date is not proof of receipt time; later modifications and the exact landing-specific order remain to be traced.

supportedunresolved Beauregard’s report describes the objective as striking Grant before Buell joined, then removing captured resources while retaining Corinth as the strategic point.

Retrospective stated objective, not a recovered complete set of prior orders. A campaign evaluation must distinguish destruction/capture, concentration timing, and retention of Corinth.

supportedpost_outcome Union victory

Source outcome is distinct from campaign contribution.

supportedpost_outcome Buell reports limited April 7 pursuit and says he lacked cavalry and road knowledge; Grant reports that subsequent pursuit found the main Confederate army had retreated in good order.

Battlefield victory does not imply destruction of the opposing army or completion of the Corinth campaign. These are attributed accounts, not a quantitative campaign contribution.

supportedunresolved Beauregard’s April 11 report dates Johnston’s death to 2:30 p.m. April 6 and says chief command then devolved upon him. The Army handbook describes staff carrying the news to Beauregard; his exact receipt and effective-assumption times remain unestablished.

Distinguish a reported time of death from the time the successor learned of it and exercised authority. Neither commander receives an automatic share of the two-day residual.

supportedunresolved Grant reports Crittenden and McCook arriving during the night. Buell says only Nelson and Crittenden were on the ground when they moved soon after 5 a.m. April 7, with McCook arriving during deployment.

Arrival in the vicinity, Savannah, Pittsburg Landing, disembarkation, line deployment and fighting are distinct events. Crittenden reports about 21:00 at the landing; McCook reports 05:00 April 7 while Rousseau disembarked and the rest followed. Retain the original Grant/Buell accounts without a division-wide readiness timestamp.

supportedunresolved Halleck’s April 5 order says Buell will exercise separate command unless attacked, in which case Grant may take general command. Grant’s report acknowledges Buell’s distinct army and field role.

Formal authority, tactical direction, and personal decision responsibility must be distinguished. Issue date does not establish receipt time. No equal division of battle credit follows from these names.

disputedunresolved The Army handbook says the written order sent to Wallace was lost and summarizes conflicting recollections: a river-side route versus taking position on the army’s right.

This is a sourced account of a dispute, not inspection of the missing order. Responsibility for delay remains unresolved; later recollections require their own dates and incentives.

supportedunresolved Wallace says he joined a little after nightfall, disposed his brigades and batteries about 1 o'clock at night, and opened artillery fire shortly after daybreak.

Arrival, readiness and fighting are distinct stages. The night bridges April 6-7; no precise arrival clock or resolved blame is inferred.

supportedunresolved Ammen's diary describes forming an advanced line about 22:00 April 6 and receiving the Twenty-fourth Ohio back about midnight.

Formation and reassembly are later than landing and infantry crossing completion; exact diary composition date is unestablished. No independent synchronized readiness clock is asserted.

disputedunresolved Nelson reports rousing his men at 04:00 April 7 and commencing action at 05:20; Grose reports his regiment moving with the brigade at 05:30.

These attributed clocks and unit scopes are not synchronized. Preserve them with Buell's soon-after-05:00 advance rather than selecting a precise common start.

supportedunresolved NPS lists US 65,085 and Confederate 44,968 as forces engaged; these are not verified opening strength.

Whole-engagement totals may include reinforcements; do not condition opening expectations on later arrivals.

supportedunresolved The compiled April 4–5 return lists 44,895 present for duty, including 7,564 in the Third Division. Its notes exclude that division from April 6 fighting, omit strengths for two Sixth Division regiments and one battery, and omit division staffs.

A paper return with different dates and explicit omissions is not a census of opening combatants. Subtracting 7,564 gives a partial subtotal, not a corrected opening estimate. The handbook explicitly identifies Lew Wallace’s division as the Third Division in the separately cited wallace-handbook-strength claim.

disputedunresolved Jordan’s return, forwarded by Beauregard April 21, reports an effective total before battle of 40,335, including 4,382 cavalry. Its footnote says both columns disagree with the following reports Nos. 136 and 137.

This is one retrospective return’s definition, not an adjudicated count of men engaged. Its own disagreement warning must travel with the number. Reports 136/137 are now inspected in the follow-up claims; the conflict remains unresolved and this original observation is preserved.

disputedpost_outcome The same return reports an effective total after battle of 29,636.

After-battle strength is neither April 7 opening strength nor a simple casualty count. It cannot become a pre-battle predictor. Report 137 prints 32,212 for its April 10 return, but the two dates/populations are not shown equivalent; retain this 29,636 separately.

disputedunresolved Force estimates 32,000–33,000 Union officers, noncommissioned officers and privates actually engaged on Sunday; this is a later interpretive estimate, not an opening return.

Force explains differences between present-for-duty and combatant counts, but his calculation also depends on a corrected unit exclusion. Preserve as a disputed source estimate; it measures participation over Sunday, not availability at first contact.

disputedunresolved Force’s text excludes the Fifteenth Michigan from Sunday; footnote 3 explicitly says this is a mistake and gives that regiment’s Sunday casualties.

Retain Force's correction but not his uncorrected exclusion. The Michigan 1862 report supports April 5 arrival and the same casualty totals over April 6-7; it does not establish the footnote's Sunday-only allocation. Reed's narrative supports Sunday presence but his table conflicts. No original Oliver report has been inspected.

supportedunresolved Force gives approximate Monday reinforcements of 20,000 from Buell, 6,500 from Lew Wallace, and 1,400 from other regiments.

These are rounded later-history figures. Monday participation is not proof that everyone first arrived Monday or was deployable at dawn. The Army handbook’s 5,800 for Wallace and the April 4 return’s 7,564 are retained as different observations. Reed's separate 5,837 engaged account does not establish the basis of Force's 6,500. Reed's separate 17,918 Army of the Ohio reconstruction includes estimated and late-arriving components and does not adjudicate Force's about 20,000.

supportedunresolved The Army handbook describes Wallace’s division as 5,800 men who arrived after dark April 6 and did not fight that day.

Reed supplies a separate 7,564 - 1,727 = 5,837 accounting bridge. This is close to 5,800 but does not prove the handbook's derivation or explain Force's 6,500. Preserve each source population and the disputed explanation of delay.

disputedunresolved The Army handbook places Nelson’s leading brigade across the river from Pittsburg Landing at 17:00 April 6, and about 600 men west of the river and in line by 18:00.

Preserve the handbook account and original 600 observation. Primary accounts now distinguish reported 17:00 and 17:30 landings, partial boatloads, a roughly 400-man regiment, and all infantry across by 21:00. Neither the common clock nor the derivation of 600 at 18:00 is established.

disputedunresolved Report 136 prints an effective total of 38,773, with 34,727 infantry, 1,973 artillery and 2,073 cavalry. Its separate Present For duty columns show 2,587 officers and 37,011 enlisted men; Present Total/Aggregate are 46,425/49,444, and Present and absent Total/Aggregate are 57,252/59,774. The heading describes forces that marched April 3. Both returns are submitted/forwarded under Bragg with a bracketed June 30 date.

Retain the column labels and printed figures as separate populations, not interchangeable strength definitions. Effective total is not officers plus enlisted men For duty. The April 3 march heading and Monday-arrival footnote do not establish a single underlying muster or April 6 opening population. Submission/forwarding date does not establish when command knew these numbers. Same reporting chain as the earlier return, not independent review.

disputedpost_outcome Report 137 prints an effective total of 32,212, with 26,697 infantry, 1,682 artillery and 3,833 cavalry. Its separate Present For duty columns show 2,184 officers and 29,910 enlisted men; Present Total/Aggregate are 44,588/47,493, and Present and absent Total/Aggregate are 60,961/64,500. The heading dates the after-battle return April 10. Both returns are submitted/forwarded under Bragg with a bracketed June 30 date.

Retain the column labels and printed figures as separate populations, not interchangeable strength definitions. Effective total is not officers plus enlisted men For duty. This after-battle return cannot be an opening predictor. Printed infantry rows disagree with their subtotal; no silent repair. Submission/forwarding date does not establish when command knew these numbers. Same reporting chain as the earlier return, not independent review.

supportedunresolved Report 136 attaches to First Corps infantry a footnote that Colonel Hill's Tennessee regiment came upon the field during the engagement on Monday.

The footnote complicates treating the April 3 heading as one opening population. It supplies neither a regimental headcount nor a numerical adjustment; the table alone does not settle inclusion or exact arrival time.

supportedpost_outcome Report 137 attributes differences in aggregates and totals from the preceding return to killed, wounded and missing, and to the arrival of Carroll's brigade and previously detached cavalry.

This is the return’s explanation, without a numerical bridge or arrival dates. The populations differ; subtracting the two effective totals is not a casualty estimate. It does not reconcile either return with p.396.

disputedunresolved The printed effective grand totals differ: report 136 has 38,773 versus p.396 before-battle 40,335 (1,562 fewer); report 137 has 32,212 versus p.396 after-battle 29,636 (2,576 more). These are arithmetic comparisons, not corrected strengths.

Dates and populations are not shown equivalent. The p.396 muster dates remain null; report 137’s April 10 date cannot be transferred to it. Report 137’s composition note does not numerically explain the p.396 discrepancy. NPS 44,968 remains separately untraced.

disputedpost_outcome Report 137’s four printed infantry effective rows sum to 26,797, whereas its infantry subtotal is 26,697. Its infantry enlisted For duty rows sum to 24,290, whereas the printed subtotal is 24,692.

Arithmetic diagnostics on the inspected print, not authority to emend it. The printed effective branch subtotals sum to the printed grand total 32,212; replacing the infantry subtotal by a row sum would change that total. Original unit returns or an independently checked edition are needed to investigate which figures are wrong. No claim that every other column reconciles.

supportedunresolved Prentiss says his November 17 report transmits a field return marked A describing the morning of the engagement; the compiler says it is embodied in p.112.

The report is retrospective. The underlying attachment is not recovered; the compiler abstract still leaves omitted formations unnamed.

supportedunresolved The p.112 Sixth Division abstract prints 2,790 in the First Brigade, 1,774 in the Second, 899 unattached and 5,463 total; it does not identify its two omitted regiments or one battery.

These dated return aggregates are not an opening census. Preserve the original compiler omission note and division-staff exclusion.

supportedunresolved Reed says the Sixteenth Iowa was counted on April 5 but remained at the landing; Chambers says on Sunday it was preparing to join Prentiss when Grant redirected it to reserve duty and then McClernand.

Administrative assignment and inclusion in a return do not prove availability at Prentiss's first contact. Prentiss also excepts this regiment and cavalry from the advance. No exact readiness time is inferred.

supportedunresolved Reed explicitly identifies the Eighteenth Wisconsin as arriving April 5 after the morning return, camping with Prentiss, and fighting Sunday; he adds an estimated 735 for duty.

This identifies a source-described omission, but does not establish a one-to-one mapping of all unnamed p.112 omissions. The 735 is a later estimated table entry, not a recovered original muster.

supportedunresolved Reid reports the Fifteenth Iowa arrived Sunday morning and disembarked after firing had begun along Prentiss's lines; Reed says it was absent from the April 5 return.

Arrival, disembarkation, ammunition issue and combat deployment are different phases. No strength at first contact or exact arrival clock is supplied.

supportedunresolved Prentiss reports the Twenty-third Missouri joined after disembarking as he reformed at 9.05 a.m.; Reed describes an April 6 arrival about 9 a.m.

This is later-morning participation, not presence at first contact; the clock remains attributed to Prentiss's November account.

disputedunresolved Reed prints 7,545 for the Sixth Division, including estimated additions and April 6 arrivals under an April 5 return heading. It is not a replacement for the p.112 total of 5,463.

His 735 for Eighteenth Wisconsin plus 782 for Fifteenth Iowa plus 575 for Twenty-third Missouri equals 2,092, while 7,545 minus 5,463 equals 2,082. His artillery and cavalry total 889 versus p.112 unattached 899. The ten-man discrepancy and the mapping of original omissions remain unresolved; arithmetic is diagnostic, not an explanation.

unknownunresolved

The inspected compiler abstract and later compilation do not establish all three original omission identities. Eighteenth Wisconsin is explicitly absent from Reed's account of the April 5 return, but late-arrival additions cannot be assigned automatically to the two original unnamed regiment slots or the battery slot.

supportedunresolved Michigan's report for 1862 says the Fifteenth Infantry reached Pittsburg Landing the day before the April 6-7 battle and lost 33 killed, 64 wounded and seven missing in that action.

The report supports an April 5 arrival account and two-day casualty totals. Matching Force's numbers does not establish his Sunday-only allocation or direct source dependence. The 869 March roll names are not opening combatants.

disputedunresolved Reed's narrative places the Fifteenth Michigan on the field Sunday, initially without ammunition; his recapitulation excludes both unassigned infantry regiments from April 6 and adds them as April 7 reinforcements.

The p.97 unassigned infantry are Fourteenth Wisconsin and Fifteenth Michigan. The conflict prevents adopting Reed's 39,830 as a reconciled April 6 total. His 750 estimated for duty and 730 commander-reported engaged do not establish opening availability.

supportedunresolved Rousseau reports that Colonel Oliver joined his brigade early April 7 with about 230 officers and men of the Fifteenth Michigan.

The report opening dates the action to the 7th. This is a joining contingent, not the whole regiment's Sunday strength; do not subtract it from other counts to infer casualties or stragglers.

supportedunresolved Wallace's April 12 report says the Fifty-sixth and Sixty-eighth Ohio and one gun from Thurber's battery were detached to prevent surprise at Crump's Landing.

Names and purpose are passage-backed; this passage gives no personnel total. Reed separately adds cavalry and a train guard. Wallace's account does not adjudicate responsibility for the delayed march.

supportedunresolved Reed reports 1,727 left at Crump's Landing and 5,837 actually engaged; his component table reports 701 for the Fifty-sixth Ohio, 424 for the Sixty-eighth Ohio, and 559 cavalry for duty.

7,564 minus 1,727 equals 5,837 within Reed's account. Named infantry and cavalry sum to 1,684; the residual 43 is arithmetic, not an independently reported gun/train-guard count. The report does not explain Force's 6,500; numerical proximity to the handbook's 5,800 is not proven derivation. Reed's secondhand Wallace 5,000 remains an untraced lead.

supportedunresolved Reed explicitly takes present for duty as engaged and does not remove noncombatants.

His engaged totals use a declared convention and cannot silently substitute for men at the firing line, synchronized opening combatants, or Force's narrower account.

disputedunresolved Nelson reports a 13:30 April 6 departure, a four-hour march, the column head at Pittsburg Landing at 17:00, and action at 18:30; these do not establish a reconciled crossing clock.

13:30 plus four hours is 17:30 before allowing crossing time, whereas the same report says 17:00 at the landing. This is a source timing tension, not permission to correct either clock. The handbook instead places 17:00 at the opposite bank. Approximation, stages and textual error remain possible.

supportedunresolved Ammen reports departure from Savannah at 13:00 April 6. His separately printed diary describes arrival at Savannah before noon April 5, Nelson crossing first with part of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, and boatloads of three or four companies.

The April 10 report and diary extracts are separate accounts by one author; the diary composition date is unknown. Boatloads are not measured personnel totals or crossing rates. No arrival clock is inferred from the reported departure.

supportedunresolved Anderson reports the Sixth Ohio disembarked about 17:00 April 6; Jones reports the Twenty-fourth Ohio landed about 17:30 and initially formed on the river hill.

Regimental landing is separate from deployment and first firing. These reports complicate the handbook sequence rather than establish one common clock or a headcount at 18:00.

supportedunresolved Grose reports the Thirty-sixth Indiana formed after crossing Sunday in eight companies about 400 strong, with two companies left behind on other duty.

This is the reported leading regimental contingent, not the whole brigade, Nelson division, or a precise 18:00 census. Nelson's separate 380 taken-into-action row has a two-day scope; retain both without treating their difference as losses.

supportedunresolved Nelson says all his division's infantry were across by 21:00 April 6.

Infantry completion is not the arrival of every arm of the division, nor proof all fought Sunday. Ammen's later nighttime formation and return of Twenty-fourth Ohio are separate phases.

supportedunresolved Nelson reports 4,541 taken into action; the accompanying table covers April 6-7 and gives 380 for the Thirty-sixth Indiana.

The nine infantry rows sum to 4,541, but this is neither the leading Sunday contingent nor a contemporaneous dawn count. Reed repeats the 4,541 from Nelson rather than independently confirming it. Cavalry orderlies are noted separately in the casualty columns; no unreported personnel addition is inferred.

supportedunresolved The compiler's March return abstract prints 6,724 present for duty in Nelson's division, including 890 cavalry; it excludes six division staff.

The heading gives a reporting month, not an exact muster day. This broader administrative count is distinct from 4,541 taken into action and Reed's March 31 infantry compilation. No subtraction is adopted as a corrected battlefield force.

supportedunresolved Crittenden reports reaching Pittsburg Landing about 21:00 April 6, with debarkation following as soon as practicable; he reports being conducted to his position about 05:00 April 7 and the Third Kentucky Cavalry remaining opposite the landing for lack of transport.

This separates boat arrival, debarkation, field position and excluded cavalry. McCook reaching the field later is a relative sequence, not a synchronized whole-army readiness time.

supportedunresolved Alexander McCook reports Savannah arrival at 19:00 April 6, Pittsburg Landing arrival at 05:00 April 7 while Rousseau disembarked, and subsequent arrivals of the other brigades.

A commander and one disembarking brigade do not establish division-wide readiness. The Second Kentucky Cavalry was left guarding baggage. Grant's general night-arrival statement remains alongside these more specific stages.

supportedunresolved Wood reports reaching Savannah early April 7, Wagner's brigade fully debarked by noon, and his own arrival at 13:00; transport was not immediately available for his cavalry and artillery.

Debarkation does not establish when Wagner reached the fighting line. Buell's late-battle/pursuit description and Garfield's later arrival remain separately scoped; no complete Wood division is added to a dawn population.

supportedunresolved Garfield reports his three regiments debarked at 13:30 April 7 and reached the front about 15:00; he says they were under artillery fire but not engaged.

Presence, exposure to fire and the author's engagement category remain distinct. His brigade has no admitted strength here; Reed's estimate for Wood includes only Wagner. Do not encode missing strength as zero.

supportedunresolved Reed prints 5,535 for duty for Nelson under a March 31 return heading, separately from the 4,541 taken from Nelson's report.

Reed's listed infantry composition differs from the compiler's broader March total of 6,724. The remaining unit/date/accounting differences are not reconciled. Neither is a Sunday-evening crossing census.

supportedpost_outcome Reed prints 9,118 present for duty for McCook from an April 30 return, separately from his reconstructed April 7 engaged estimate.

The underlying return date is after the battle. It must not be supplied as a prebattle observation or mechanically substituted for the reconstruction.

disputedunresolved Reed's Army of the Ohio reconstruction prints 7,553 for McCook in the detail but 7,552 in the recap; the recap adds Nelson 4,541, Crittenden 3,825 and Wagner 2,000 to total 17,918.

The one-person discrepancy is retained. The McCook/Crittenden estimates draw on mixed-date returns; Wagner is an estimated late arrival. Using 7,553 would give 17,919, a diagnostic calculation, not a corrected total. Components overlap the total and cannot be added again. No number is a synchronized April 7 dawn census.

supportedunresolved Reed quotes an undated letter on file in which Buell recalls 18,000-19,000 and estimates McCook at 7,552, while Reed notes meager returns and estimation from March 20, March 31 and April 30.

The underlying letter and its date have not been inspected. Retain the unqualified recalled strength as a secondhand account, not a dated primary return or a new typed population. Force's about 20,000 remains a separate estimate.

unknownunresolved

The inspected primary reports identify successive companies/regiments and about 400 in Grose's formed regiment, but do not establish the handbook's about 600 at 18:00 or an exact common-time Sunday contingent. Its original derivation remains untraced; do not add partial arrivals to whole-regiment returns.

supportedcommander_created NPS attributes the absence of fortification to Grant.

NPS attribution remains a hypothesis about responsibility. Halleck’s March 20 fortification instruction is now available; receipt, implementation, camp-selection authority and later orders require review before attributing an avoidable failure to Grant.