Memphis TN004

unknownunresolved

No original orders, reconnaissance, intelligence or message chain was inspected to establish the combatants’ prior knowledge. Mahan’s account of surprise is not independent proof of what the Confederate commanders knew.

supportedunresolved Mahan describes Ellet’s rams as a hasty adaptation of available boats in six weeks, with timber bulkheads and protective work.

A retrospective preparation account beginning before the frozen June 6 engagement, not a quantified readiness or equipment-quality score. The cited Ellet letter was not inspected separately.

supportedunresolved NPS describes Davis and Ellet launching a naval attack on Memphis on June 6.

An attributed operational target. The city’s subsequent surrender and occupation do not supply inspected prior success criteria or an additional independent campaign win.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen row and live NPS page record Union victory. NPS says all Confederate vessels but General Van Dorn were sunk or captured, then describes the city surrender and later occupation by Fitch’s Indiana Brigade.

One source family, not independent corroboration. Keep naval result, municipal surrender and subsequent army occupation distinct within the June 6 record; no extra wins or causal campaign contribution are assigned.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text gives 181 total, US 1 and CS 180; live NPS displays the same totals. Mahan describes a pistol wound to Queen of the West’s commander that eventually caused his death.

No inspected casualty return establishes categories or reporting cutoffs. Do not count the later death as an additional opening participant or add it to the table total; Mahan’s statement alone does not reconcile the aggregate.

supportedunresolved Mahan says Ellet’s instructions let him operate in Davis’s command area independently of Davis. He assigns Queen of the West to Charles Ellet and Monarch to A. W. Ellet.

Retrospective authority and vessel-command attributions; original instructions were not inspected. NPS’s joint-attack wording does not establish a unified chain of command. Do not adopt Mahan’s criticism as a measured command effect or allocate credit automatically to all listed commanders.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched opening personnel for both sides. The frozen numerical bounds are blank. Vessel lists and counts are not crew or total personnel counts. Live zero displays are not measured absence of people.

supportedunresolved Mahan describes five Union gunboats and two participating rams, Queen of the West and Monarch, against eight Confederate vessels. He places Switzerland’s entry after the fight was decided.

These are vessel populations, not personnel strengths. Keep the initial action distinct from the later pursuit; do not count every purchased ram as an initial participant.

disputedunresolved The live NPS table displays zero personnel for both sides while the frozen force field names opposing vessels.

The frozen numerical personnel bounds are missing. Preserve the live display as a source-version artifact without interpreting zero as a measured absence of crews or troops.

supportedunresolved Mahan says Confederate vessels remained in front of the city, complicating Union fire, while the Union gunboats initially faced upstream and dropped with the current.

Attributed navigation and firing context, not a mapped orientation, measured terrain advantage or proof of the commanders’ precise motives.