Stones River TN010

supportedunresolved Cist says Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson's division, and that Bragg's staff discovered only on January 2 that Van Cleve's troops held an eminence enfilading Polk; NPS says Bragg surmised Rosecrans would withdraw.

Retrospective accounts of knowledge; no inspected message log.

supportedunresolved Cist says that after the December 31 fighting, having decided to await attack, Rosecrans sent for the provision trains and ordered up fresh ammunition (no separate date or clock given), and that with Morgan and Forrest absent on raids Bragg's cavalry was reduced from 10,070 on the December 10 return to 5,638.

Attributed supply and detachment facts from one retrospective history; no inspected return.

supportedunresolved Cist says both commanders planned to attack the other's right: Rosecrans with his left across the river into Murfreesboro, Bragg by wheeling against the Union right to seize the line to Nashville; Bragg ordered attack at daylight, Rosecrans at seven.

Attributed plans from one retrospective history; no inspected orders.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen result remains Union victory. NPS says Bragg left on January 4–5 and Rosecrans claimed the victory; Cist says Bragg's army was in retreat by 11 p.m. on January 3 and that Bragg called his December 31 success a victory barren of results.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The retreat timing differs between the sources and is outside the frozen interval.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 23,515 total (US 13,249; CS 10,266); the live NPS field reads 23000 total (US 13000; CS 10000;). Cist gives Bragg 10,125, and Rosecrans 1,553 killed, 7,245 wounded and about 2,800 captured, with 28 guns lost against Bragg's 3.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap.

supportedcommander_created Cist says Rosecrans abandoned his own attack to save his right, then, against some generals' urging to fall back to Nashville, decided to stay and await attack.

Attributed in-battle decisions by the listed Union commander; their contribution is not estimated. Cist is an interested staff historian of Rosecrans.

supportedunresolved Cist says Breckinridge received Bragg's orders for the January 2 attack on the crest held by Van Cleve's division, and quotes Bragg's report calling the movement a failure. He says that at 12.15 on the night of the 2d Cleburne and Withers sent a communication urging that disaster be avoided by retreat, endorsed by Polk at 12.30 a.m. January 3, and that at noon Bragg, on consultation with his generals, decided to retreat.

Subordinate and army command roles are distinct; quoted reports are not inspected originals. No automatic sole credit to either listed commander. The live heading ranks Bragg Major General against the frozen General; the heading is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The live NPS field reads 45000 total (US 45000; CS 0;); the narrative says Rosecrans left Nashville on December 26 with about 44,000 men against Bragg's army of more than 37,000. Cist gives Rosecrans 43,400 on the battlefield and computes Bragg's effective force at 46,604 from a December 10 field return less cavalry absent on raids, calling Rosecrans's army slightly inferior.

The sources disagree on which army was larger. NPS gives a December 26 departure figure for Rosecrans and an undated Confederate figure with no stated basis; Cist gives a battlefield figure for Rosecrans and his own adjustment of Bragg's December 10 return. None is adopted as matched opening strength. Live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Cist describes open fields around Murfreesboro fringed with dense cedar brakes that covered infantry but were nearly impervious to artillery; NPS describes a Union division's strong bluff position east of the river on January 2.

Retrospective terrain description; no map verification or numerical terrain effect.