Fort Sanders TN025

supportedunresolved Longstreet says so many reports led to the same conclusion that he determined he must attack (the reports' subject lies just outside the selected passage), and that approaching the fort he saw men straggling back. Burnside says a Confederate night advance that drove in the Union pickets led the defenders to expect an attack there, and that Lieutenant Benjamin roused the men early. NPS says Longstreet believed a storming party could assemble undetected at night.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts and a summary.

supportedunresolved Burnside says rations were reduced during the siege, useless animals killed to save forage, and the garrison kept from absolute want. Longstreet says his limited transport had brought no intrenching tools except his pioneers', and that picks and spades captured at Lenoir's were brought up on horseback.

Supply statements from interested accounts covering the siege, not only the day; no return inspected.

supportedunresolved Longstreet says he determined to attack and, if possible, get possession of Knoxville, and ordered the assault by three brigades, with Jenkins ordered to advance a brigade a little later and pass the enemy's lines east of the fort. NPS says Longstreet undertook the expedition to divert Union troops from Chattanooga and to get away from Bragg.

Stated aims from the Confederate commander and a summary's judgment; not a causal estimate.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Longstreet says the column broke up and fell back in confusion; NPS says the attack lasted twenty minutes and calls it the decisive battle of the campaign.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. NPS's 'decisive' is a campaign judgment.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 880 (US 100; CS 780); the live field reads 815 (US 15; CS 800). Burnside reported on November 30 about 300 prisoners, about 500 Confederate killed and wounded, 98 dead passed through his hands and his own loss about 20; his 1865 report says that such as could not retreat surrendered, 'in all, about 500', that the enemy's loss was certainly over 1,000 and his own 13. Longstreet says Colonel Ruff was killed at the ditch and that the bodies of Colonels McElroy and Thomas were afterward found in it.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Burnside's two reports differ from each other.

supportedunresolved Longstreet says the assaulting lines were formed several hundred yards behind the rifle-pits instead of close up on them. Burnside credits Lieutenant Benjamin and Ferrero's division. The frozen commanders are Lieutenant General Longstreet and Major General Burnside; the live heading ranks Longstreet Major General.

Judgments are attributed; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live rank is not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field has unit names only; the live field reads zero. Burnside gives about 12,000 effective men in Knoxville, exclusive of new Tennessee recruits, against an enemy estimated at 20,000 to 23,000 including cavalry, and says the assaulting column was three brigades, reinforced by a second column. Longstreet says three of McLaws's brigades made the assault, with Anderson's brigade following, and earlier that the enemy had as many as he did in a strong fortified position.

Garrison, army and assault-column figures differ in scope; none is adopted. Live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Burnside says the fort was begun by the Confederates before the Federals entered East Tennessee and much improved by Poe's engineers, that abatis, chevaux-de-frise and wire entanglements were made where needed, and that traverses protected the garrison. NPS says the ditch was twelve feet wide and four to ten feet deep with vertical sides. Longstreet says the troops could not pass the ditch for want of ladders.

Inherited relative to the November 29 start; the works and siege-built entanglements may be commander-created under a campaign boundary and are not credited here. Longstreet's lack of ladders is Confederate preparation, not inherited ground. No map verification.