Mossy Creek TN027

supportedunresolved Sturgis says he received information in the night of the 28th that a Confederate cavalry brigade had camped at Dandridge, sent much of his cavalry toward it, and recalled La Grange, and Foster and Wolford if they found no enemy, once he ascertained the enemy's strength; his dispatch says Wolford and Foster found no enemy at Dandridge, and that the whole Confederate force had moved to his front in the night. Martin says that on reconnoitering for another attack he found the Union force strongly posted and overlapping both his flanks, with a fresh brigade arriving.

Attributed knowledge from interested accounts; no message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Martin says his artillery had exhausted all but canister, his divisions averaged five rounds for small arms, and at dusk his men had not an average of one round; he describes men ragged and barefooted, many horses unshod and no pay for six months. Sturgis says his horses were pretty well worn down and asks to replace the brass guns with Mott's brigade.

Condition statements from interested accounts, partly post-battle; no supply return inspected.

supportedunresolved Sturgis says he meant to take advantage of the division of the enemy's forces to surprise and destroy the part at Dandridge, and that he did not pursue farther than needed to inflict immediate injury. Martin says he moved Armstrong's division with the artillery to engage the Union attention while he hoped to flank it with Morgan's division, which the rapid Union retreat avoided.

Stated plans from interested accounts; not a causal estimate.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Sturgis reported the enemy driven back about 4 miles in great confusion, with the pursuit not pushed beyond Talbott's Station because of darkness. Martin says his retreat was orderly and that at dusk the enemy was finally repulsed. NPS says the Confederates were back at their starting point by dark.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit. The characterizations of the Confederate withdrawal conflict.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Total unknown (US 151; CS unknown); the live field reads 151 (US 151; CS 0). Sturgis's January 8 report gives 18 killed, 77 wounded and 5 missing, with a total read "LOO" in OCR (the components sum to 100, a computation here); his January 1 letter gives 96. For Confederate losses his January 8 report gives General Elliott's reckoning of 400 killed and wounded and others' 250 to 300; his January 1 letter puts the enemy loss between 300 and 400. His report says 44 prisoners were taken and 22 dead buried, while his evening dispatch says about 50 prisoners. Martin appends a casualty table not printed in the inspected OCR.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Sturgis's own totals differ, and a compiled return (garbled in OCR) is not selected. An OR footnote to the 'LOO' total ('But see revised statement, p. 651') falls just outside the selected range.

supportedunresolved Sturgis attributes much of the day's success to Brigadier General W. L. Elliott and describes Mott's infantry holding its fire, then charging with the bayonet. Martin commends Armstrong, Morgan and brigade commanders and says the retreat was made in perfect order. The frozen commanders are Major General William T. Martin and Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis; the live page gives Major General Samuel Sturgis and Colonel William Martin.

Attributed judgments from interested accounts; the frozen commanders do not receive automatic sole credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen Confederate bound (2,000) is an imported figure and the Union bound is blank; this pass does not validate either as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen Confederate force text attributes to Sturgis a report that the Confederate cavalry was supported by a brigade of infantry, followed after a semicolon by "approx. 2,000 men"; it does not state whether that figure belongs to the attributed report. The live field reads zero. In the inspected passages Sturgis puts the enemy's entire cavalry at about 6,000 and, in a 3.15 p.m. dispatch, reports a division of infantry and two batteries with it. Martin says he engaged with all his guns and 2,000 men, that the force opposing him was at first not greater than 4,000 with two batteries, and that he later found three brigades of cavalry, six regiments of infantry and three batteries in his front.

Martin gives the force opposing him as larger than his own; the inspected Sturgis passages give no count of his own force and contain neither a brigade of infantry nor a 2,000 figure. Martin's own-force 2,000 equals the frozen figure, but no derivation is established. None is adopted. The live zero is not measured absence.

supportedunresolved Martin says the ground from Talbott's Station to Mossy Creek was open, rolling tilled fields flanked by high woodland, and that he could not maneuver his artillery except near the railroad; he used a railroad cut on the flank of the advancing infantry. Sturgis says the enemy advanced over open ground where he was mowed down while the Union troops were largely sheltered.

Ground described by interested accounts; no map verification. The field positions were chosen during the action and are not tagged inherited.