Johnsonville TN032

supportedunresolved Forrest says his movements had been so secret for twenty-four hours that the garrison seemed to think he had retired. Sinclair says Thompson's estimate of the Confederate force rested on scouts and on men captured from transports below Johnsonville. NPS says the Union discovered the batteries being finished on the afternoon of the 4th.

Attributed knowledge from interested reports; the telegrams were read in Thomas's dispatches but not selected.

supportedunresolved Johnsonville was the western terminus of the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad. Forrest on November 3 describes the landing and banks, several acres, piled with freight for Sherman's army, boats unloaded for want of room and trains running day and night, and says he had only his ordnance train and a few wagons. Sinclair says the property on the boats should have been landed between October 30 and November 4.

Descriptions of the depot's stores and transport; no quartermaster return inspected.

supportedunresolved Forrest's November 3 report says he would try the next day to sink or destroy the gunboats and transports, and argues that blockading the river would do more for Hood than moving into Middle Tennessee. NPS says the raid aimed to check the Union advance through Georgia.

Stated aims in an interested report and a modern summary.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Forrest says the wharf was a sheet of flame for nearly a mile by night and that he withdrew having completed the work of the expedition; Sinclair says the Confederates shelled the depot on the morning of the 5th and then left the river.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome Forrest says his batteries set the gunboats on fire within fifteen minutes and then set the transports in flames. Sinclair reports as hearsay ('It is said') that the gunboats were burned on King's order, and says the transports were burned on Thompson's direction, that the firing of the boats was premature, and that the fire spread from them to the stores on the levee. NPS says the Federals set fire to the transports for fear of capture.

The accounts conflict on who fired the boats; the conflict is preserved and not resolved.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads Unknown; the live field reads zeros. Sinclair gives the Union loss as 8 killed and wounded and the property destroyed or captured on the river as about $2,200,000 (NPS: $2.2 million). Forrest gives his loss for the whole expedition as 2 killed and 9 wounded, the enemy's as probably 500 killed, wounded and prisoners, and $6,700,000 worth of property.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Forrest's and Sinclair's property figures cover the whole river operation of October 28-November 5, not only this record.

supportedunresolved Sinclair says Colonel Thompson commanded the troops and Lieutenant-Commander King the gunboats; that, as 'It is said', the gunboats kept firing until disabled, when King ordered them abandoned and burned; that Thompson, on the recommendation of King, the gunboat officers and Howland, directed Howland to burn the transports; and that Thompson and Howland are responsible for the destruction. Forrest says he ordered the simultaneous opening at 3 o'clock. The frozen commanders are Major General Forrest (CS), Colonel C.R. Thompson and Lieutenant Commander Edward M. King (US); the live page lists 'Henry Thompson' and Sinclair prints 'Col. C. E. Thompson'.

Sinclair's responsibility finding is an inspector's post-event judgment. The live name and Sinclair's initials are not adopted. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text reads a supply depot garrison of approx. 4,000 against Forrest's cavalry; the live field reads 4,000 (US 4,000; CS 0). Sinclair lists the November 4 force as the 43d Wisconsin, 700 men, detachments of three colored regiments (number blank in print), 800 armed quartermaster's employees, 20 cavalry, the First Kansas Battery, two guns of Company A, Second U.S. Colored Artillery, a section of the quartermaster's battery, two captured 20-pounder Parrotts and three gunboats. He reports Thompson's estimate of 13,000 Confederates with 36 guns and thinks it too large. Forrest describes the place as garrisoned by 'a heavy force' and the Union fire as coming from 28 guns on the gunboats and 14 on the hill.

Sinclair's list is incomplete and its employees are not soldiers; Thompson's 13,000 is a scouting estimate. No figure for Forrest's own force was inspected. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Sinclair says the river at Johnsonville is about 400 yards wide and straight, that hills come within 100 yards of the right bank, and that the left bank was flat and heavily wooded, uncleared before the attack. Forrest says the Union fort stood on a high hill with strong works and that his men built their batteries behind ambuscades that hid them. NPS says the Confederate guns were so well positioned the Federals could not hinder them.

The river and wooded bank predate the action; the concealed batteries were built during it. Narrative descriptions.