Franklin TN036

supportedunresolved Hood says dispatches captured at Spring Hill showed Schofield was ordered to hold Franklin until it could be made secure. Cox says a depression and trees hid Hood's lines from the Carter house but they were plainly seen from Stiles's knoll, and that battle smoke was said to have misled Hood about his first advantage at the centre.

Attributed knowledge from an interested report and history; the captured dispatches were not inspected.

disputedunresolved Cox says Schofield found on arrival that no pontoons had come, that improvised planking gave two passable bridges by noon, and that the trains were nearly all across by 3 p.m. NPS says Schofield wished to stay at Franklin to repair the bridges and get his trains over. Hood says he did not use his artillery during the day because women and children remained in the town; Cox, writing from his own observation, says Hood's recollection is in error.

Transport statements from an interested participant history; the artillery-use conflict is preserved as a dispute.

supportedunresolved Hood says it was all important to attack Schofield before he could make himself strong, that he determined to attack in front without delay, and that his orders were to drive the enemy into or across the Harpeth. Cox says Schofield had ordered the troops to cross at 6 p.m. if not attacked before sunset.

Stated aims from interested sources.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Hood says his troops carried the first line and parts of the interior line and that the enemy abandoned his works near midnight, leaving his dead and wounded; in December he wrote that they failed to carry the interior line. Cox says Schofield ordered the withdrawal at eleven after the front was quiet.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 8,587 (US 2,326; CS 6,261); the live field reads 9,933 (US 2,633; CS 7,300). Hood gives his loss in killed, wounded and prisoners as 4,500, about 1,000 prisoners taken, and Union dead indicating a loss 'equal or near our own'. Cox says Hood's computation gave 7,547 since the opening of the campaign and 6,300 in this battle, including 700 prisoners; Union losses were 2,326, more than 1,000 in Wagner's two brigades. NPS counts six Confederate generals killed or mortally wounded; Cox counts twelve generals disabled. Cox gives 22 flags taken by Reilly's division and 10 by Opdycke's brigade; Hood, per Cox, says thirteen.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Hood's campaign figure (7,547) includes Columbia and Spring Hill and is not a Franklin count.

supportedunresolved Cox says Schofield put Cox in command of both Twenty-third Corps divisions to intrench the line and himself watched from the fort north of the river; that Wagner, contrary to his orders, sent a command to his two advanced brigades to fight; and that White and Opdycke charged without waiting for orders. Hood says the line advanced at 4 p.m. The frozen commanders are Major General Schofield and General Hood.

Direction and fault are attributed as the sources state; Cox was the officer commanding the line, an interested participant, and his account of Wagner rests on two unnamed officers. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

supportedunresolved The frozen force text reads the IV and XXIII Corps against the Army of Tennessee with no numbers; the live field reads zeros. Cox says Hood attacked with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps, Johnson's division of Lee's corps being the only one of that corps yet up, and that the two Twenty-third Corps divisions could not reach the river on the right, so Kimball's division was added. Hood says Stewart's and Cheatham's corps attacked with Johnson's division engaged later.

Formations only; the campaign returns in Cox's pp.11–19 are dated November 6 and October 31 and are not a Franklin count. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited Cox says the ground sloped very gently from the Union line, that few battlefields were so free of obstruction to view, that the river bent around the town, and that Fort Granger, built more than a year before on the higher north bank, commanded the bridges and railway cut.

The plain, river and Fort Granger predate the battle. Narrative description by a participant; no map verification.

disputedunresolved NPS says Schofield formed his line in works thrown up in the spring of 1863. Cox says the Twenty-third Corps began building breastworks that morning and had a strong intrenchment by noon, with an osage-orange hedge thinned into a palisade before Stiles. Hood says the works were so hastily constructed that there was only slight abatis on part of the line and none on the extreme right.

The accounts differ on whether the line used 1863 works or works built that day; phase left unresolved.