Nashville TN038

supportedunresolved Cox says Hood had pretty full knowledge of Thomas's concentration, deserters reported Hood intended to withdraw from his advanced lines, and fog hid the early Union movements on the 15th. NPS says Thomas told Halleck on the night of the 14th that he would attack the next day.

Attributed knowledge from an interested history and a modern summary; the telegrams were not inspected.

supportedunresolved Hood says steps were taken to supply the army from the country, shoe-shops were at work in each brigade, and captured rolling stock was running to Pulaski; he says his artillery horses had been sent to the rear, so 54 guns could not be brought off. Cox says Thomas delayed to increase his mounted force and that Hood's ill-clad and poorly shod troops would have suffered from a change of quarters in the storm.

Supply statements from interested sources; no quartermaster or ordnance return inspected.

supportedunresolved NPS says Thomas intended to destroy Hood's army and planned to strike both flanks; Cox says the modified order called for a strong demonstration by Steedman on the left while Wood and Smith made the main attack. Hood says he felt that if attacked in position he could defeat Thomas and gain Nashville and its supplies.

Stated aims from interested sources and a modern summary.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Union victory. Hood says his right repulsed the attacks but, after Bate's division gave way at 3.30 p.m. on the 16th, his whole line broke and retreated in great confusion; Cox says the Confederate left was 'crushed in like an egg-shell'; NPS says Hood's army fled.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 6,602 (US 2,140; CS 4,462); the live field reads 9,561 (US 3,061; CS 6,500). Cox gives Thomas's losses as 3,057, fewer than 400 killed, and the capture of about 4,500 prisoners and 53 guns (1,200 prisoners and 16 guns on the first day). Hood gives his artillery loss as 54 guns and says his killed and wounded were small and his prisoners not great; he says his losses for the whole campaign, including prisoners, did not exceed 10,000.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Hood's campaign total is context, not a Nashville count.

supportedunresolved Cox says Washington ordered Thomas to attack or turn over his command, that on the 16th Thomas left assaults to the corps commanders' discretion and approved McArthur's proposal to assault Shy's Hill, and that Smith and Wilson each claimed the redoubts. Hood blames the break on Bate's division giving way and calls it an unfortunate event that could not have been anticipated. The frozen commanders are Major General Thomas and General Hood.

Direction and blame are attributed as the sources state; competing credit claims are preserved. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. The frozen side-specific numerical strength bounds are blank (missing_numeric_strength). No figure in this pass is adopted as a simultaneous opening force.

disputedunresolved The frozen force text names the IV and XXIII Corps, the detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, a provisional detachment and the cavalry corps against the Army of Tennessee, with no numbers; the live field reads zeros. Cox says Smith's three divisions aggregated nearly 12,000, Steedman brought 5,200 of 8,000 from Chattanooga, about 8,000 were detached at Murfreesboro, Thomas had about 6,000 infantry and artillery and 3,000 cavalry at Nashville on November 30, the cavalry present for duty numbered 10,884 of which 2,272 were dismounted, and Cruft's division exceeded 5,000 by December 14. On Hood's own loss figures Cox puts Hood's army at about 44,000. Hood's addenda give an effective total of 23,053 on December 10; Hood reports about 6,000 Union troops at Murfreesborough.

Mixed dates, bases and scopes (aggregates, present for duty, effective; detached garrisons); Cox's 44,000 is his own reconstruction. In the garbled OCR table of Hood's addenda the cavalry and artillery components (2,306 and 2,405) read the same on both dates; whether the effective totals include Forrest's cavalry is not established. None is adopted as a matched opening strength; live zeros are not measured absence.

supportedinherited NPS says Morton had overseen sophisticated fortifications at Nashville in 1862-63. Cox describes hilly, mostly open ground with knobs two or three hundred feet above the Cumberland and groves of timber, and Overton's Hill as a broad rounded elevation.

The hills and the city fortifications predate the battle. Narrative descriptions.

supportedunresolved Cox says a freezing storm on December 8 covered the hills with ice so that movement was impracticable, that Hood's detached redoubts on the left were incomplete, and that the new works on Shy's Hill, established by Hood's engineers and objected to by Bate, were built under fire. Hood says works had been commenced on each flank of his extended line.

Weather and works during the operations; not inherited.