Manassas, First VA005

supportedunresolved Nicolay says McDowell was still unaware that Johnston had joined Beauregard and that the army had no suspicion it had been fighting him all day until the late attack on its flank. McDowell's first telegram says the enemy 'it seems' had just been reinforced by Johnston, and he later learned from a prisoner of 20,000 from Johnston; his report says reliable information showed an undefended ford above the bridge. Nicolay and McDowell describe a Confederate regiment mistaken for Union troops before Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries.

Knowledge as reported after the fact by McDowell and reconstructed by Nicolay.

supportedunresolved McDowell says wagons and horses arrived more than a week late, that he set out still short of subsistence wagons, that the provision delay moved the attack from Saturday to Sunday, and that the men had three days' rations on July 20; after the battle they had thrown away their haversacks and were without food and artillery ammunition. Nicolay says the men were famished and exhausted by the afternoon and that tools for Blenker's intrenchments at Centreville never came forward.

Supply statements from an interested report and a history; no quartermaster or subsistence return inspected.

supportedunresolved McDowell says he meant to turn the Confederate left, reach the Manassas Gap railroad and interpose between Beauregard and Johnston. Nicolay says Johnston, as ranking officer, adopted Beauregard's plan for a simultaneous advance on Centreville, then a modified plan to attack with the right, which the Union attack overtook.

Stated plans from an interested report and a history.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. McDowell says the retreat became a rout and then a panic, with guns and caissons abandoned at Cub Run; NPS says the Confederates were too disorganized to pursue; Nicolay says pursuit was ordered with the greatest caution and that the largest capture of guns and wagons came at the Cub Run bridge. NPS's statements on McDowell's replacement and the administration's view of a long war are campaign and political contribution, not tactical outcome.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen casualty text reads 4,700 (US 2,950; CS 1,750); the live field reads 4,878 (US 2,896; CS 1,982). McDowell reports 19 officers and 462 men killed and 64 officers and 947 men wounded, calls the missing return very inaccurate, and says a Confederate officer admitted 1,800 killed and wounded, which other information showed to be much under the true number. Nicolay gives the Union loss as 25 guns (28 claimed), 481 killed, 1,011 wounded and 1,460 wounded and other prisoners, and the Confederate loss as 387 killed and 1,582 wounded. Nicolay reports D. R. Jones's separate loss of 14 killed and 62 wounded at McLean's Ford.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. The McLean's Ford figures may overlap the Confederate totals and are not added. Nicolay's Union 481 killed and 1,011 wounded repeat McDowell's return (19 and 462; 64 and 947); their agreement is dependence, not corroboration.

supportedunresolved The frozen commanders are Brigadier Generals Joseph E. Johnston and P.G.T. Beauregard for the Confederates and Brigadier General Irvin McDowell for the Union; the live page lists McDowell as Major General and Johnston as Lieutenant Colonel. Nicolay says Johnston assumed command as ranking officer, and that Beauregard took personal command of the line on the plateau while Johnston returned to headquarters to watch the whole field. McDowell says he ordered the withdrawal covered and took personal command of the forces holding the Centreville ridge, and says the First Division's delay in leaving camp put the other divisions two to three hours behind. Nicolay says Miles at Centreville became incapable of duty.

Command roles from a history and an interested report; the three listed commanders receive no automatic credit, and the live ranks are not adopted.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen force field reads 60,680 (US 28,450; CS 32,230); the live field reads 31,680 (US 28,450; CS 3,230). Nicolay gives McDowell's command as 34,320, his moving column as 28,568 with forty-nine guns, perhaps under 28,000 after discharges, and the Confederates on the field as 32,000 with fifty-seven guns (Beauregard 21,833, Johnston 8,884, Holmes 1,355; total 32,073), plus unreported detachments. McDowell says he crossed Bull Run with about 18,000 men and that the numbers opposed were variously estimated.

Figures differ in scope: command, moving column, force that crossed, and reported Confederate effectives. The live Confederate 3,230 is not adopted. Nicolay's 32,073 includes Kirby Smith's, Fisher's and Hill's troops, which he says arrived between noon and four o'clock; it is a population across the day, not at one moment. None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedunresolved McDowell says the stone bridge was reported mined, covered by a battery and an abatis, that the ground from Sudley Springs was thickly wooded for about a mile and then open rolling fields to the Warrenton turnpike, and that the wood road to the upper ford was longer than expected. Nicolay describes the hill south of Young's Branch as higher and stronger than the first Confederate line and says the Confederates were on the height with the Union at its foot. NPS names Matthews Hill and Henry Hill.

Ground from an interested report, a history and a summary; no map inspected.