Ball's Bluff VA006

supportedunresolved Stone says Philbrick's scouts mistook openings in the trees for a camp, that cavalry sent to screen Devens was turned back without scouting, leaving him without warning, and that Stone himself was unaware of the peril on the right until about 5 p.m. Evans says his pickets discovered the crossing at an unguarded point, that a captured courier showed McCall's intentions, and that by about 10 a.m. he was convinced the main attack would come at Ball's Bluff.

Knowledge as each commander reports it; no signal or message log inspected.

supportedunresolved Stone's memoranda give Baker boats for 172 men at 6 a.m., raised to 272 with a canal boat, and argue that managed in order they could have crossed 720 to 1,080 men an hour; his report says no system was enforced at the landings, artillery was sent before its infantry, and the largest boat swamped in the retreat. Evans says his troops fought without food or rest for more than twelve hours before the battle.

Stone's figures are his own post-battle memoranda written under criticism; no quartermaster return inspected.

disputedunresolved Stone says his orders were to make a demonstration to draw out the enemy's intentions at Leesburg, that Devens was to raid a supposed camp and return, and that Baker had discretion to withdraw or reinforce but was to advance only against an inferior force and not beyond Leesburg; his order found in Baker's hat allowed pushing to a strong position near Leesburg. NPS describes an attempt to cross and capture Leesburg. Evans ordered his regiments to drive the enemy to the river.

The summary's 'capture Leesburg' and Stone's stated limits differ; Stone's accounts were written under criticism.

supportedpost_outcome The frozen and live results read Confederate victory. Evans says his charge drove the enemy into the river and that the force at Ball's Bluff surrendered at 8 p.m.; Stone says the troops fought at the bluff until the boats were gone and then swam, surrendered or hid; NPS calls it a Union rout. NPS's statement that the rout led to the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War is political contribution, not tactical outcome.

Retain the original result and engagement interval; later movements and campaign contribution are different measures. No new probabilities or individual causal credit.

disputedpost_outcome The frozen and live casualty fields read 1,070 (US 921; CS 149); NPS says more than 700 Federals were captured and Baker killed. Evans puts the enemy's loss at 1,300 killed, wounded and drowned, with 710 prisoners, three guns and 1,500 stand of arms taken; his own loss statement is omitted from the printed report and referred to a separate return.

Original casualty returns were not inspected; preserve totals, categories, cutoffs and differences. No canonical reconciliation or casualty-based opening count; related actions must not be added without resolving population overlap. Evans's report covers October 21-22; the Edwards Ferry action is not added to the Ball's Bluff record.

supportedunresolved The frozen and live commanders are Brigadier General Nathan Evans and Brigadier General Charles P. Stone, and the frozen list adds Colonel Edward Baker. Stone says he gave Baker entire control on the right with discretion to withdraw or cross, and in his November 2 letter blames Baker for determining to bring on an action, mishandling the crossing and posting; he says Baker replied 'I shall not retire.' Baker was killed about 4 p.m. Evans directed his regiments into the fight, says Jenifer commanded only the first five companies, and says Stone was superseded by Banks at 3 a.m. on the 22nd.

Stone's attribution of fault to Baker is an interested account written under newspaper attack; Baker left no report in the inspected pages. No listed commander receives automatic sole credit or blame.

unknownunresolved

No inspected return establishes matched personnel at a common opening boundary. Imported numerical estimates remain unchanged; this pass does not validate them as simultaneous opening forces.

disputedunresolved The frozen and live force fields read 3,600 (US 2,000; CS 1,600). Stone says Baker had between 1,600 and 1,700 bayonets on the field, that the enemy was nearly if not quite three to one, that he had warned Baker of about 4,000 opposed, and that reports of 10,000 were highly exaggerated. Evans gives his own force as 1,709 aggregate, and the enemy's as five regiments and three guns at Ball's Bluff and about 8,000 in all, including the Edwards Ferry force.

Figures differ in scope (field at the bluff, the whole crossing, each side's estimate of the other). None is adopted as a matched opening strength.

supportedunresolved Stone says Baker's line had a steep bluff and the Potomac close behind it, a valley on its left and a wooded hill beyond, and that a battery in the woods prevented moving Gorman's brigade to the right. Evans says the Union troops held a strong position in the woods. NPS says the Confederate counterattack drove the Federals over the bluff and into the river.

Ground from the two commanders and a summary; no map inspected.